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ABSTRACT

Information on the background and viewpoints of Middle Eastern students who are studying in the United States is presented in revised papers from a 1978 seminar, "The Middle East: The Arab World and Iran." In the first section of the report, "General Background," James Cowan reviews social and cultural factors, as well as questions of philosophy and policy. In the second section, "Arab Students," David Mize provides a theoretical framework for viewing the experiences of foreign students and follows up with information about students from North African countries. Halim Barakat discusses political factors that influence Arab students, and Phebe Marr describes students from the Arabian Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent. In part 3, "Iranian Students," Frederick Lockyear describes the Iranian educational system and draws implications for U.S. admissions policies; Marvin Zonis addresses social and cultural influences on Iranian students; Leonard Binder views their political activities; and Fahimeh Mortazavi describes the situation of women in Iran. (The seminar on which this publication was based took place before the departure of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi from Iran.) Some of the articles are followed by discussion sections, based on interchanges between the authors and seminar participants. Appended materials include a bibliography, a brief, a comprehensive overview entitled "Some Major Concepts to Stress in Studying the Middle East," and a list of seminar participants. (SW)

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STUDENTS FROM THE Arab World AND Iran

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

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

Arab World and Iran

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Editorial Note:

The seminar on which this publication is based took place before the departure of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi from Iran. Thus, in some of the articles, the Shah's government is referred to as though it were still in power. Despite this fact, readers will find these articles useful in understanding the situations of Iranian students in the U.S. The political and economic situation in Iran remains unsettled as this publication goes to press. Iranians made up the largest group of foreign students studying in the United States during the academic year 1978-79, with estimates ranging from 30,000 to 75,000. About 18,000 Iranians were under direct government sponsorship prior to the downfall of the regime of the Shah in January 1979. The remainder of the Iranian students were in the U.S. with the assistance of family, friends and personal resources for tuition and living expenses. Without private and governmental financial support, many of these students face a precarious future, not to mention possible immigration actions against them if they do not remain enrolled in a college or university. Political and economic changes, regionally and within specific countries, will continue to influence enrollments of Middle Eastern students in U.S. colleges and universities. As change occurs, it is hoped that this publication will serve as an interpretive guide, one which should be supplemented by other sources of up-to-date information.

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foreword

The NAFSA Committee on Students from Middle Eastern Countries (COSMEC) held its first professional development seminar on the Arab World and Iran in Washington, D.C., during 1978. The objective of the seminar was to provide better understanding of the cultures of the area by examining the educational, social, political, economic, religious and linguistic factors which may affect the adjustment of the students from each area to the environment of educational institutions in the United States.

The intensive six-day seminar provided the participants with a better perspective about the area through lectures and discussion groups. We trust that this report will assist those who work with Arab and Iranian students.

Our appreciation is extended to the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (now in the Division of Student Support Services, Office of Academic Programs, International Communication Agency) for making the seminar and this report possible through a grant to NAFSA's Cooperative Projects Committee. Our appreciation is equally extended to the members of the Cooperative Projects Committee and to the NAFSA staff who assisted with the seminar.

Finally, appreciation is extended to the COSMEC members who contributed their time and energy to the planning and implementation of the seminar. Virgil Crippin, Dennis Peterson and Joel Slocum all worked on this project. Gary Althen served as an *ad hoc* member of the committee and edited this report. COSMEC received extensive assistance and cooperation from Kathy Sullivan of AMIDEAST, and appreciation is due to her as well.

Simon A. Horness
Seminar Director
Chairman, COSMEC

Introduction

This volume is intended for United States college and university personnel who work with students from the Middle East. The essays included here are based on presentations made at a seminar, "The Middle East: The Arab World and Iran," held March 1978 in Washington, D.C. The papers have been modified for presentation to a wider audience in hope that they will contribute to an understanding of the background and viewpoints of Middle Eastern students in the U.S. Since these essays were written by scholars as well as practitioners, viewpoints and writing styles represented in this volume vary.

This report is organized in three parts. In the first part, "General Background," James Cowan gives an overview of social and cultural factors influencing Middle Eastern students. He also points out some questions of philosophy and policy that arise when large numbers of Middle Eastern students enroll in U.S. educational institutions. Donald Azar outlines those concerns specific to Middle Eastern students enrolled in English language programs in the U.S. His article is included in the background section because it touches on a wide range of issues concerning Arab and Iranian students in the U.S.

The second part of this volume concerns "Arab Students." David Mize begins with a theoretical framework for viewing the experience of foreign students and follows up with information about students from North African countries. Mize includes a bibliography of publications he considers pertinent to his topic. Halim Barakat discusses political factors that influence Arab students in the U.S. Phebe Marr examines the backgrounds and characteristics of students from the Arabian Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent.

"Iranian Students" are the subject of the third part of this report. Frederick Lockyear describes the Iranian educational system and draws implications for admissions policies of U.S. institutions. The social and cultural influences on Iranian students are addressed by

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Marvin Zonis; Leonard Binder views their political activities; and Fahimeh Mortazavi describes the situation of women in Iran.

Some of these articles are followed by "question and answer" or "discussion" sections. The "questions and answers" are based on interchanges between the authors of the articles and participants in the seminar. The "discussions" are based on conversations among the participants. The opinions expressed in the articles are those of the contributors and not necessarily those of COSMEC or NAFSA.

Appended to the report are a bibliography, a brief and comprehensive overview called "Some Major Concepts to Stress in Studying the Middle East," and a list of the seminar's participants. On the inside back cover is a map of the Arab world and Iran.

Two points are mentioned in various places in the text. One is that generalizations based on culture need to be used cautiously. It is clear that Arab or Iranian students in general do not think or act like American students. The differences can be explained by citing cultural differences. Some knowledge of the cultural background of Arab and Iranian students can thus be helpful for Americans who deal with them. This does not mean that all aspects of behavior or all the problems and prospects that go with being a foreign student can be explained with reference to cultural differences. Differences between individual personalities must also be recognized and respected.

Another dominant point mentioned repeatedly by contributors to this publication is that foreign students, whether from the Middle East or elsewhere, are not just people with problems but people with promise and opportunities. Most of them do well in U.S. educational institutions, coping in sometimes marvelous ways with situations for which they are not always especially well prepared. While their problems receive attention, their success can go unnoticed. Personnel in the field of foreign student affairs might want to draw more attention to their clients' successes.

Part I:

General Background

Factors Influencing Arab and Iranian Students In-Country and in the United States

James W. Cowan

In the short life span of the American university system, four different forces have influenced the direction taken by any one single institution of higher learning. The most important of these forces is related to principles. The abstract doctrine of academic integrity impels the university to continually evaluate its goals and methods. This is an ethos which suggests that there is something called "truth," that men can uncover it and that it will make men free.

Some men who adhere to this academic doctrine suggest the heresy that nature and man are governable. A few even argue with conviction that all of man's mysteries can be unraveled; but they add many conditions, such as: if the technology were known, if human presuppositions can be made plain, if goals are good and if intentions are known, if passions can be stilled, and if histories can be, on the one hand, manipulated or, on the other, stabilized as centers of values.

Be that as it may, most scholars seem to adhere to this academic code of integrity as a part of their professionalism. Its precepts of search and revelation also seem to generalize to scholars of other nationalities. Indeed, in some places this academic doctrine takes on the status of a god of good that scholars must serve.

In the historical sense, this doctrine of integrity was an ideal of the oldest university in the world, that of the Pharoahs on the ancient Nile, although they did not rush about trying to tell everyone about it. Curiously, it is still in evidence in its modern descendant—the Al Azhar University in Cairo.

In the global sense, the doctrine is in evidence in universities as culturally diverse as those of Moscow, Bonn, Paris, Beirut and Los Angeles. Despite the different political systems scholars inhabit—after

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James Cowan is the director of the International Programs and Studies Office of the National Association of State University and Land Grant Colleges. He was previously president of the American University of Beirut.

all, Marxist-socialists and chauvinist-colonialists do see different truths as a result of their philosophies—they share a dedication to the academic code of finding their truths and telling them. It is in this professional tradition that Nobel honors scholars and their accomplishments. It is in the belief of that code that societies of private men and public governments support the university financially. Centers of learning may come and go, as do men, but their ethical and universal code remains and endures. As doctrine, the pressure of this university code becomes a substantive reality in the choices men make in action.

A second force which influences institutions of higher learning is the nation-state under whose laws the colleges and universities, the centers of higher learning, are required to live, teach and survive. The state needs the brainpower of the institution. It also absorbs its talent and makes demands on its staff. Let us not forget that there have been times when a loyalty oath was a requirement for admittance to an American university faculty; when military budgets supplied research funds and buildings for our mega-campuses; and when the industrial-military complex or the business-industrial complex brought its chemical and pesticide tragedies to the universities' laboratories and medical centers where people of a different ilk could cast their light on the technological dark. The state influences universities and pressures its men and women just as surely as does the historical truth-serving tradition.

A third force on higher education is derived from social and family pressures, a collective exigence mandating that the university be sensitive to human needs. This sensitivity to social issues and needs originated in the American land-grant concept of a university. It was the reason for extension activities and the underlying ideological commitment dictating outreach programs. It was a simple policy of serving people. According to Philip G. Altbach, a comparative higher education expert, it is

> *this uniquely American contribution of academic life (that) has had a direct impact in the developing countries, where American foreign aid and technical assistance fostered institutions of higher education modelled directly on the American state universities; and more indirectly in Europe, where the American commitment to public service and involvement with business and agriculture slowly have had an effect on European universities.*

The fourth force which determines the direction and quality of the life of the institution of higher learning is a faculty-student dynamic, the maintenance of a dialogue, where old and new questions are asked. The tensions each generates make the intellectual process and program possible. Each is a power to respect. Each can exercise a force to initiate or block campus reform; each can frustrate the smooth operation of a university management; each can set the tone of a university, protecting self-interests, upsetting those of others and preserving values important to each. Happily, in free societies, each has access to the press to keep the other honest and uncorrupted by the powers each can exercise. In addition, students can always withdraw from the university when it no longer suits their needs, and faculty can move elsewhere.

These four forces converging simultaneously on the university can be considered as potential storm centers, able to make the academic bubble burst or wobble now and then off its true course. Any one force allowed to get out of hand can blow the university out of gentle, human control and send it bounding end over end into an uncharted future. To ignore any one of these four axes at any one time is an act of ignorance and invites disaster, for these are potent influences on institutions of higher learning. To manipulate one without watching all the others is an occupational hazard, and those interested in the continuation and preservation of the university ideal watch all, for all contribute to its well-being.

My topic here is neither the ideals of the university nor the conceptualization of the university as a functional system. Nor is it the manipulation of that system. So, you might well begin to ask, "What is the relevance of this beginning?"

Call it a pair of walking shoes to slip on and off at the door, a means by which we might take the same trip and notice the same landscape. Foreign student advisers in their position as educators and counselors have a unique and inviting perspective. For they can see all the forces I mentioned in operation. They can and should also advise and help set university policy. They can and should convey insights and influence outcomes. They can offer their campuses both a message and an argument that will contribute to their institutions' ultimate well-being. They can alert their institutions to the global trends being noticed in Washington, D.C., and combine these with their own observations to promote the health of those they serve, protect and nurture—the foreign students on their campuses.

My objective was supposed to be to provide a better understanding of the culture of the Middle East—the Arab world and Iran—by examining educational, social, political, economic, religious and linguistic factors which may affect the adjustment of the students from that area to the environment of U.S. educational institutions. But let's consider a larger view, a communication perspective that says there is a dynamic process that needs to be understood and husbanded. As a harbinger of a new clientele in the American university system, people from the Middle East are a force to watch. Their presence may bring to bear each of the four forces on the university. Theoretically, they come in search of our academic and political ideals, such as those on human rights which our nation fought hard to see approved in a United Nations resolution. Realistically, however, they come as a result of nation-state imperatives—theirs and ours.

It may be worthwhile at this point to dwell a bit on an aspect of these imperatives. Let us look briefly at the topic of Arab oil, more specifically, Saudi Arabian oil. Let us look at it quantitatively and interpret some of its dimensions.

One Saudi oil well yields about 12,000 barrels of oil a day, while a Venezuelan well yields only 250 barrels a day and an American well, a mere 17.5 barrels a day. Estimates suggest that the world consumes about 55 million barrels of oil each day. In his book, *The Arabians*, scheduled for publication next year, Peter Iseman claims:

> *with production hovering at about 8.9 million barrels a day, only 15 to 37 Saudi oil fields are even being worked. One of them alone, a 150 mile-long teardrop-shaped oil field named Ghawar, holds more oil than the proven reserves of the continental U.S. and Alaska put together.*

Simple computation confirms that the Saudis can supply the world at the current rate of production for about 150 years. Our nation's need for Saudi oil is much argued. But the facts are that America consumes Saudi oil at the rate of about 16.5 million barrels a day; our spending is an estimated $4 billion a month on oil imports. In universal terms, the Saudi oil industry earns just over $100 million a day, with their unabsorbed surplus of revenue now running at $36 billion a year.

An academic perspective might further enliven these impressive numbers. Were Saudi Arabia to use its daily dollar capacity on education, it could supply the annual operating costs of all our 72 land-grant universities in three months. Furthermore, as Iseman suggests, Saudi oil revenue could buy all the gold in central banks in four years, five months and eight days. It could buy General Motors in four months and eight days. It could buy the Columbia Broadcasting System network (CBS) in seven days and five hours. Throw in the additional income figures from Iran and from the other Arab countries, the United Arab Emirates, Libya and Algeria, and the already staggered mind collapses.

These dollar facts have been known and watched for some time, but their implications seem lost on the average American. Not just ingestion but absorption is slow. A 1977 *New York Times*/CBS News poll indicated that 48 per cent of Americans do not even believe that the United States really imports oil.

These facts suggest that Middle East development and the American way of life are a delicate *pas de deux*. To their great credit, the Arabs are not throwing their economic weight around incautiously, but they can pretty much select the time, set the rhythm and direct the orchestra.

As a result of these "new" economic realities, we can scarcely deny that we are in a state of mutuality and interdependence. The Arabs can do little with their oil but sell it. We must buy it to sustain our energy requirements. In export-import terms, the Arab world and Iran are a market for our goods and services. Indeed, a Pentagon study estimates that 150,000 Americans will be working in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf area by 198C. We can estimate that about the same number of Middle Easterners will be coming here to study—coming mainly to the land-grant institutions and the community colleges of America, lured by the appealing argument that education should be relevant, that knowledge should be in the service of human needs.

But how relevant are we to these ends as perceived by the Middle Easterner?

Foreign student advisers, more than most educators, are aware that since 1946 foreign student enrollments in the United States have been steadily rising. A Carnegie Council report on higher education and global perspectives suggests the numerical nature of that increase. In 1946 an estimated 15,000 foreign students were enrolled in American universities and colleges. Ten years later, the figure stood at 82,000. By 1974, the figure was around 218,000. Nigeria alone plans to place 100,000 of its youth in American higher education by 1980. The best guess of the American-Mideast Educational and Training Services, Inc., and the Institute of International Education is that students from the Arab countries and the Middle East region now make up three per cent of the total enrollment of universities nationwide. Iranian students, as a single group, are said to be 40,000 strong this year with 25,000 anticipated as a yearly demand for the next ten years. Saudis now number 12,000; those from the Levant (Lebanon, Syria and Jordan) about 6,000; North African Arab nations are sending about 6,400. Community colleges have a special appeal for Middle Easterners, for, as Thomas Diener, director of the Institute of Higher Education Research and Services at the University of Alabama, points out, about 25 per cent of those foreign students in the community colleges are from that area.

In addition to the specter of the numbers seeking attention, there are other facts we know about this new clientele.

By and large, they are children of the upper class—the ruling, managerial and elite of their societies. Generally speaking, this new clientele has gone to expensive, often private, secondary institutions with mixed preparatory effect. In those private schools they have been treated very carefully as individuals. Generally, they have not been processed through educational factories, computer enrollment or mass educational testing services. The Middle Eastern student has blossomed into his or her humanhood in cultivated gardens where the care has been specific, dignified, careful, and tenderly given. Many have Western-educated mothers, speak three or more languages, and are well traveled. Often their parents have served colonialist powers and imperialistic mandates, to mixed emotional effect. Middle Eastern students are not politically or globally naive. In their lifetimes, Eisenhower stopped Israel and Great Britain at Suez. Nassar's revolutionary movement succeeded in Egypt and failed in Yemen. They have seen three Arab-Israeli wars, dozens of coup attempts within their countries and literally hundreds of superpower adventures pursued in the glorious names of peace, balance of power, and freedom. Many Middle Eastern students have lost members of their families to the vagaries and misadventures of this political strife.

In addition to knowing who they are and their history, we know other things about the Middle Eastern equation:

(1) Generally speaking, those financing their own education do better than those selected by governments to receive state scholarships.

(2) Only about 60 per cent actually get the degree for which they come. The rest either go home, seek a lesser degree or go to an easier school.

(3) Mostly, they come for scientific and technical training. There is high demand among them for programs costing the greatest portion of the total institutional budget. For example, according to the U.S. Office of Education, 23 per cent of those enrolled in community colleges in 1976 and 1977 chose engineering studies.

These facts raise philosophical and practical questions. Should wealthy nations share the hidden costs of scientific and technical training, since their youth are part of our new university clientele? Is Arab participation in university funding justifiable on the same grounds used by American legislatures since 1946? Or are other arguments more valid? If so, what are they? Should some of the more creative and talented Middle Eastern students be channeled into the liberal arts, anticipating that as construction and technological advancements level off, the real problems of people will be human and cultural ones?

We might well ask other questions, too. What institutions of higher learning are really ready to teach this new clientele? (Which faculty are now known to be irrelevant to them most of the time?) What new confrontations will the foreign students stage? Do the Iranian student demonstrations against the Shah in the U.S. indicate the future pitch of political demonstrations on our campuses? What new questions will non-American students pose in the classroom? What texts will need to be rewritten? and what opportunities will be missed by those who have not done their homework by finding out who this new clientele is?

What else do we know about the Middle Eastern student? Certainly, that many have painful stays and are unhappy with the American culture and the university as they find it. As a mechanism of survival, some sadly will reject their Arab or Persian heritage, acquiring our mores, our accents, and our materialism. Some will reject the American perspective, acquiring potent anti-American sentiments to be discharged in the future. I hope most will be guided by the wise educator into a transcendent, bi-cultural synthesis enriched by both old and new worlds. But the Middle Easterner will have to be coached in how to deal with those who are careless of who sits in the classroom and with those who misunderstand him. The Middle Easterner will also have to be coached in how to risk the rejection of and sometimes suffer manifest defeat by those who are misguided nationalists—those who are only Arab or Persian or American.

We also know that there is little collective attempt to link the Middle Eastern student back to his or her American mother institution.

Former Arab and Iranian graduates tend to communicate a rather sobering message: that, indeed, they survived their American experience, but their impact on their own societies was ignored and unappreciated.

Why are there so few academic linkages? Is it that we fail to recognize the research or diplomatic potentials in such linkages? And where must the burden for this deficiency lie? Who within the system should be organizing our mutual horizons? Should it be the office of alumni? Should it be the business of the national government? Should it be the offices of foreign student advisers? the academic departments? the professional societies? the classroom teacher? should it be at the student's individual initiative? If we hope for the latter, it may never come.

Let me dwell for a moment on the Middle Easterner's adjustment—the dimensions of his or her psychological and cultural shock when arriving on the American scene.

First, the student experiences an unbelievable pain of homesickness. It is qualitatively and quantitatively different from any homesickness you have perhaps ever known. It is not the typical loss of home characteristics of the rural or urban American youngster. The Middle Easterner feels a threefold loss: the loss of the love of his family, the loss of the constraints of his society and the loss of his own philosophical legitimacy.

A word about each.

The Middle Eastern family is a larger and more closely knit unit than its American equivalent. Young Middle Eastern men especially have to cope with homesickness accompanied by a socially- and family-inculcated guilt. Also, they bear a burden of responsibility unknown to most American male youth. An Arab or Iranian child usually is the product of a young mother and an old father. For men, marriage in the Middle East is generally delayed until the mid-thirties or early forties. By the time an Arab boy is in college, his father faces life-threatening situations characteristic of an American child's grandparents. A college-aged youngster experiences terrible guilt at leaving his home for mere academic reasons. His absence is interpreted as abandonment. His family, especially his mother, has already begun to depend on him in practical living. Unlike an American youth, who is raised on independence, an Arab youth is raised on the philosophy of dependency.

In addition to his loss of home life, the Middle Eastern youth feels the loss of the secure constraints that his family and society personify. All the societies of the Middle East are paternal in general form. They are authoritarian traditional societies. Tradition, not religion, is the real dictator of people's lives. And in the Middle East that tradition has evolved over five thousand years, has birthed three of the world's major religions and has experienced all major political systems. This lengthy, complex and rich historical tradition gives the Middle Eastern student a sense of history and time that is vastly different from that of his American counterpart, who has only lived under a Christian, Western heritage and usually can trace his family back only two generations, perhaps three, and his government back 200 years. How ready is the American higher education community to understand and address the Middle Eastern youth who has a lengthier tradition to proportion, and a greater family and social imperative to govern and maintain?

Theoretically, public universities have been commissioned to turn out young people who are good citizens, subordinate to the state and national government. But practically speaking, Middle Eastern youngsters are inoculated against our political self-interest and our internal domestic persuasions.

A Middle Eastern youngster's family and tribe come first. Those who share the mother tongue and its cultural heritage come second. Both share what Iseman calls a "special world" of "face," a "second derivative of reality."

Imagine that I am meeting an Arab minister for the first time. After a few pleasantries, I ask him, "How many children do you have?" He replies, "Six. And you?" My answer is, "Two. But they are girls." From this exchange, we have established our mutual Arab face and my American identity, for I know that Arabs normally count only their sons in their totals. By my reply, I have answered his question, told him something more, handing him an image of both his container and what it contains juxtaposed with mine and what it contains. He can now comfortably tell me about his daughters and how many of them he has proudly fathered. Thus, social reality has a "funhouse mirror" dimension.

If that example seems befuddling, this next illustration may help.

Public health records of the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia show that cholera was first recorded in 1976. Before that, cholera was reported under the rubric of "summer diarrhea." What this public record indicates is that the Health Ministry now has enough confidence in itself to report the incidence of cholera. To non-tribal eyes, cholera appears to be a sudden epidemic. To Arab eyes, cholera is almost under control. It becomes a reality when it is about to disappear.

Middle Easterners are impressed with our ideals of egalitarianism, freedom and truth. But the needs and goals of those belonging to traditional societies are not those of new societies.

Their ethics presuppose that all deserve to survive; ours dictate that only the best deserve to survive.

Their models of society are stability and historical continuity; our social model has been change.

Their families are organized to promote happiness and tranquility. (More than three generations of family members often live in the same dwelling.) Ours are formed to promote self-reliance and competition. We work toward pushing the child from the nest as soon as possible.

Arab art forms personify the rhythms of love and peace; ours are formed of the rhythms of sex and violence.

As for the Middle Eastern woman, she covers herself with modesty but has a powerful, seductive and controlling role in the well-being of her society. The American woman has burned her bra but has a less than powerful role in her American society. The Middle Eastern woman is adored and praised for her contributions and insights. Her American counterpart is treated as an object and becomes the butt of dirty jokes. Professional women are beginning to be welcomed into Middle Eastern affairs as a source of talent and skill. American professional women are accepted, but reluctantly and with suspicion. Often they are perceived, in competitive terms, as a threat.

Middle Easterners extend courtesy and civility within the home. Their streets are full of noise and chaos. Americans extend courtesy and civility outside the home. Their streets are clean and orderly.

The swift and severe code of justice in the Middle East is looked upon by us with horror: beheadings and public hangings for murderers, ritual and real stonings for infidelity, and dismemberment for theft. But Middle Easterners are shocked to find that we have known rapists who walk freely on our streets. They wonder at our national statistics that suggest that as many as one out of every six Americans is the victim of a violent crime every year.

In addition to his different world view concerning society and behavior, the Middle Eastern student has at least two other social difficulties. He must adjust to an immediate political and rhetorical climate of hostility, and he has been unprepared for it. For example, professional agitators and their followers have created an anti-Arab sentiment in the United States; it is especially apparent in the mass media. They have created this sentiment because an anti-Arab sentiment suits their political and economic purposes and self-interest. Until only recently, Arabs have come into view, not as human beings, but as archetypes of evil or foolishness. Heretofore, the Arab student has found himself on the defensive. Being placed on the defensive quickly fosters a minority mentality, and an Arab's defense of himself in Western terms is difficult. He defends unsurely, for the strategy of a planned and anticipated combat is different from a surprise attack. It is not that an Arab lacks the means. His civility makes him unwilling. It is a moral dilemma, the kind that would reject the legitimacy of a so-called preemptive strike across a neighbor's borders.

Few of us are prepared to defend a Christian way of life as it is practiced, a system of free enterprise, our government's foreign policy, or local legal and moral tradition. We take them for granted, not for all time, perhaps, but for the time they serve to organize society without dysfunction. Segregation in public lunch rooms, transportation and housing existed until recently in America for the same reasons it now exists in South Africa. But peoples and societies mature. Old arguments are given up for new ones when the times and circumstances suggest the need.

Young Arabs who have come to learn to build a bridge, transplant a heart and use computers are caught off guard when they must defend a cultural tradition they have absorbed from birth. Ironically, they are sometimes called upon to defend in public a religion they have inherited, a religion which has vastly superior numbers to that of Christendom. It is thus a strange phenomenon to belong to a religious majority and try to discuss anything with a minority that thinks and acts as if it is the majority; or to discuss economics with a people who live beyond their means, have an enormous public debt and huge balance of payment deficits.

Educationally, the Middle Eastern student enters the American centers of higher learning with additional handicaps. Some are strengths from his cultural perspective. For instance, the Middle Eastern student has far greater skills in memorization, in dialectical invention, in conversation, in the development of a single theme and in poetic and rhythmic prose. These are the skills of an oral society.

Wit is prized, and sociability is honored. The American student of the same age is visually oriented, and his language skills, we are told, are lower than those of his historic predecessors.

Linguistically speaking, Arabic as a language compounds and is associative. College English skills require analysis and subordination of thought; Arabic requires synthesis and coordination.

The Middle Eastern student is not familiar with the idea of taking tests frequently. Rather, he or she is accustomed to the idea of preparing for a few very important tests, tests that are so important that the temptation to cheat can be very difficult to resist.

With a clientele presenting such differences, the American university will find it increasingly necessary to see itself through the eyes of the Middle Easterner. We can anticipate some interesting changes and some casualties as a result of that process, for as Harold Howe, II, of the Ford Foundation observes: "The more 'national' the U.S. universities remain, the less useful they will be to (this) nation which must henceforth make its way in an interdependent world."

Some changes we can easily anticipate:

(1) The Middle Eastern student will expand the horizons of his classmates and his instructors if the climate is quiet enough to elicit the dialogue.

(2) The financial structures of the university will likely have to change to obviate taxpayer resentments, rising costs and shrinking enrollments of American youth.

(3) The impact of the student trained in the United States and returning to his home country is certain to grow, for good or ill. American higher education can get into the chauvinistic business of extending its cultural self, creating a whole new set of conspicuous consumers. Or it can teach what the Middle Easterner needs to know to govern his society wisely, getting him to understand our experience in implementing change. We can teach him how to avoid some of the technological tragedies we mindlessly have suffered.

(4) The commitments of the university to serve an interdependent but different citizenry of the world will have to come under careful examination. This will mandate staff and teaching changes. Are changes possible, though, when less than one per cent of the entire university and teaching talent pool of the U.S. has global perspectives? Most of those who do have expertise tend to be in the agricultural field. Other specialties will have to draw their talent from professional sources, not degree programs. For example, business has a cadre trained by multinational corporations.

So does the field of journalism, whose talented stringers have been shuffled in and out of hot spots all over the world. The least likely place to look for talent with global perspectives and a multi-cultured orientation seems to be academia.

(5) There will be tensions vocalized over the increasingly insular and impersonal nature of the institution when a client arrives expecting solidarity and personal involvement. The tensions will probably accelerate if large numbers of mature women and senior citizens are funneled into the system at the same time.

(6) There will be tensions expressed over a polished, upper-class student having to deal with an increasingly more competitive and less sociable middle-class professor.

(7) There will be tensions generated over a society dedicated to the happiness myth of greater material wealth as a sign of success and a Middle Eastern society which has a third of the wealth of the world and is dedicated to the happiness myth of greater social cohesion.

By risking the tensions and the confrontations, American institutions of higher learning will have to face a troubling and painful stage of self-examination. We will, I suggest, not be able to avoid the dialogue. We will see some academic bubbles bursting or wobbling way off course and some managing the winds and gusts of change with wisdom. However, what we cannot do is to take off our walking shoes—those we put on at the beginning—no matter how they squeak or pinch. If we care about what happens next to higher education in America, we will have to keep them on and hope that good will and good sense will guide us.

DISCUSSION

- The kind of Middle Eastern student Mr. Cowan referred to—well-educated, wealthy, well-traveled—is the kind of student who has traditionally come from the Middle East. Now, however, there are more and more who are not so wealthy or sophisticated. Do they need to be treated differently?
- It is important for foreign student advisers and others working in U.S. colleges and universities to understand not just the background and aspirations of Middle Eastern students themselves, but those of their sponsors as well. Some sponsoring agencies want their students in the U.S. to have a thorough exposure to American society and culture, for example, but others do not want that at all.
- The idea of having students from other countries, or at least some of them, pay the "full cost" of their education in the U.S. is one that

needs careful examination. If implemented, it might lessen the antipathy with which foreign students are sometimes greeted in the U.S., and it could produce some income that might bolster foreign student programs. On the other hand, it might reduce the number and diversity of students who could study in the U.S.

- Foreign student advisers might want to assume the role of educators of faculty and staff who deal with foreign students and who, as a result, might be interested in learning more about those students' educational, social and cultural backgrounds.

Programming and Teaching English as a Second Language for Arab and Iranian Students

Donald Azar

Many foreign students coming to the U.S. enter an English language program before undertaking an academic program. The experience in the English program is important not just because the student needs to learn English reasonably well in order to achieve academic success and adjust to living here, but because it is in the English program that the student is first exposed to the academic system that prevails in this country. In the English program, foreign students can learn not just English, but also skills, attitudes and habits that will contribute to their academic success later on.

In recent years, large numbers of students have begun to come to the U.S. from Middle Eastern countries. For many, if not most of them, an English language institute is the first place they go to in the U.S. Often they bring attitudes and habits which, while perhaps useful in their own countries, are antithetical to academic success in an American institution. It is, therefore, appropriate to pay special attention to the subject of Middle Eastern students and English language programs in the U.S.

There are a number of hazards involved in trying to draw an adequate profile of programming and problems related to ESL (English as a second language) instruction for students from the Middle East. The variety of programs and students is enormous. While "national character" traits have some value in setting expectations and making interpretations, such cultural stereotyping can be dangerous in one's dealings with individual students. Much of what is said here is applicable to ESL programs for students from any part of the world, but many comments are related specifically to Middle Eastern students. Many ideas are given here in the form of prescriptions, based on years of experience in developing an ESL institute that serves students

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who are, in the majority of cases, destined to pursue their academic careers elsewhere in the U.S.

English Programs and Students: Descriptive Factors

Students of English as a second language come to the U.S. with differing levels of language ability and with differing educational backgrounds and personalities. The English program may be intensive (18-27 hours per week), semi-intensive (10-15 hours per week), or part-time (3-5 hours per week). The degree of integration between the English program and advising services available on the campus will vary from institution to institution.

Individual student differences will depend on their language and academic background, field of study, level of intelligence, personality characteristics, and prior orientation concerning the U.S. academic system and the implicit expectations it places on students. Taking all of these factors into account, each institution must examine its own program and its approaches to problems in dealing with students. Program requirements and institutional policies must be reviewed over and over again, with support secured at all levels for decisions affecting them.

Imperatives of Operating an ESL Program

There are certain imperatives to be faced when operating an ESL program. The advising and programming problems that go with an intensive English program are much greater and more specific than they are in the case of an academic program. Being the first contact for all of these students is a tremendous responsibility which requires advising students who can barely understand English on such matters as their language skills, their study habits and skills, their personal adjustment, and the academic program they seek to enter after completing ESL studies. Operating an English institute also entails programming in intercultural communications with American students, faculty on the campus, and community people. In general, ESL students need closer attention and supervision than most students who are not in intensive language programs.

It is very important to teach ESL students, especially Arab and Iranian students, how to study. This is a point which cannot be stressed enough. Students of very high intelligence or students who work extremely hard sometimes do not do well because they have no idea how to approach the material they covered in class. At St. Louis University a special program in study skills has been instituted. It is still a fledgling program but it is clearly needed for this group of students.

Integrating ESL Program with Other Campus Agencies

The problem of culture shock is often intensified for ESL students, who have to adjust to the demands of a rigorous classroom and study schedule as well as to a new society and institution. The task of aiding students in dealing with their new situation cannot fall to the ESL faculty, which already has the heavy responsibility of helping the new students learn English. Thus, a successful ESL institute will be closely integrated with the institutional offices where the orientation-advising-programming functions are normally carried out. This includes the foreign student adviser's office, the dormitories and the faculty who do academic advising.

Initial and ongoing orientation are usually the responsibility of the foreign student adviser (FSA), who may have help from others. Initial orientation must include at least basic "survival" information concerning food, clothing and supplies, banks, medical services, etc. Initial orientation must also deal with the students' expectations concerning study in the U.S. Ongoing orientation must constantly reinforce what was done in the initial program and add to it with greater detail and sophistication.

At St. Louis University about 100 students arrive at the beginning of the semester for English language training. Each student is interviewed by two faculty in the English program for a pronunciation and listening evaluation. The structure of his program, the activities it entails and placement in the program are all discussed with the student. Then the FSA interviews each new student and, among other things, introduces his staff and the dormitory staff. The FSA begins an academic placement file for each student, no matter what the student's English proficiency level is. Thus, the student's background and his projected field of study are known initially so that he can be assisted should he need advice or help with academic placement.

The FSA's orientation program at St. Louis University is usually a two- or three-day orientation to the campus and to the city. It focuses on logistic matters such as basic geographical orientation and also includes small receptions that old foreign students organize for the incoming English program students. (A plan to have American students organize receptions was not successful.) The old and new foreign students share information informally to an extent that was not anticipated. These receptions become a kind of pre-departure orientation for the old students, many of whom "pick the brains" of the new students to try to find out just what is going on at home—what is happening in specific professions, what is happening politically and socially, and so on. This kind of exchange is very healthy because it makes the new student less of a taker and more of a giver. The new students begin to see themselves as resource people in the way the old students do, a role that is very constructive for a group of people who are otherwise fairly helpless and in danger of feeling overwhelmed by a sense of their own limitations.

The foreign student adviser's office should also take care of advising on matters of immigration and financial aid. In addition, the FSA's office is usually the one, or the principal one, concerned with organizing social or educational programs that bring foreign students into contact with U.S. students, faculty and community people. These programs are important for ESL students.

The ESL program administration should be closely integrated not just with the foreign student office but with the dormitories or residence halls. A foreign student counselor in each dormitory, familiar with routine immigration procedures, university policies, and, of course, dormitory details, can greatly relieve the burden on an ESL faculty and an international office and can increase access to assistance for the foreign student. Such advisers should be fully integrated with the regular dormitory staff but should report to the international office.

At St. Louis University an adviser in each dormitory functions as a full-fledged foreign student adviser. The adviser answers countless questions of all kinds, implements programming, and takes care of logistical problems with linen, television sets, air conditioners, etc. Each dormitory has its own orientation which covers many of these matters as well as such topics as personal hygiene and roommate courtesy, thus alleviating some problems between U.S. and foreign roommates.

St. Louis University also has an orientation for the rest of the dormitory advising staff. There had been a great deal of hostility on the part of those advisers before matters relating to foreign students were discussed with them. Arab students, for the most part, had been very young people who did not have what would be considered the proper motivation for coming to the English program in the first place. They had gotten into a great deal of trouble in the dormitories with raucous behavior, late hours, fast cars and many other things. These problems have by no means been eradicated, but they have been alleviated, and the fact that the residence hall staff is integrated with the ESL program and the international office helps to reduce the pressure on all concerned.

A final area in which it is important to have integration between the ESL program and other parts of the institution is that of advising for academic placement after the language program. From the day of arrival students in the program should be interviewed and referred to academic advisers, either in the international office, the office of academic advising or wherever such advising is done. The appropriate time for real placement work to begin is when the language program has ascertained the language level of the student and the approximate time the student will be ready to begin seeking a degree.

At St. Louis University heavy use is made of departmental academic advisers. Faculty who are willing to advise foreign students are identified through a letter to each department and contacted when their expertise is needed.

Placement-related work is also incorporated into ESL classes. For example, part of an advanced writing class includes a paper on the student's field of study, with research done in the library. Using available information, students also write a report on the institutions that might be appropriate for them.

A final device that is frequently used to get ESL students started on their academic work is to have them attend a class in their academic field while they are still in the intensive ESL program. Students in the advanced ESL class at St. Louis University attend a lecture (without credit) three hours a week in their major field of study. This is an easing-in process to get them accustomed to vocabulary and teaching methods. While many programs offer credit for academic work taken in conjunction with language courses, it is most often the case that the foreign student's English coursework suffers when he takes an academic course for credit. At that stage in the student's development anything that is hindering the language learning process ought to be avoided, even if the students have a difficult time understanding why they should not be getting academic credit as early as possible.

Attitudes and Expectations of Middle Eastern Students

Because the attitudes and expectations that Middle Eastern students bring to language programs in the U.S. shape their approaches and responses to their work here, it is helpful in dealing with these students to have something in mind about how they operate and what they expect.

The Middle Eastern students' general approach to higher education and language training, their ideas about attendance and examinations, and their ideas about "recommendations" and "ability" in language learning will be discussed below. Keep in mind that these are stereotypical attitudes and may not apply to individual students.

With respect to the general approach to higher education and language training, many Middle Eastern students who enter the English language program (and also an academic program) have the idea that admission constitutes graduation; the notion of being removed from class for reason of failure is not considered. Students who hold this attitude may approach their studies quite casually and therefore fail in them.

Initial interviews and orientation should emphasize the point that being admitted is only the beginning, with graduation coming only after successful completion of certain requirements. It should be stressed that these requirements are not negotiable and students must work hard on a daily basis in order to meet them.

Sometimes students fail to understand that they must work hard in order to complete their program successfully. In these cases a student may be dropped from the program and perhaps helped to make arrangements for enrollment elsewhere. Usually, removal from the program succeeds where mere words had failed to convey the idea that admission does not equal graduation in the U.S. educational system.

Students who believe that admission to a program is tantamount to graduation are often less concerned than they need to be with class attendance and with examinations. Attendance is extremely important in an English language institute, given the manner in which each day's work depends upon the previous days' work. Poor attendance and even tardiness can be disruptive to the class and detrimental to the individual student. Once again, it is necessary in orientation to try very hard to make clear to students that regular attendance is necessary for successful completion of a program.

Concerning examinations, it has often been the case that Middle Eastern students have felt that if they were not prepared for an examination, they should not take it. There are always reasons for not being prepared for an examination ranging from, "I had a cold," to "It's Ramadan and I haven't had any food and I haven't had any sleep." Because it may seem logical to a student not to appear for an examination under these circumstances, care should be taken to stress the importance of examinations in our instructional process and the student's responsibility to take them.

Many Middle Eastern students have the idea that their goal in an ESL program is to get a good "recommendation" for study in their major field, rather than to improve their ability to use English. That is, they believe that if they have sufficient ability to succeed academically, they need only do a minimal amount of work to obtain an adequate degree of "recommendation" from the ESL program. They do not realize the extent to which their abilities in all aspects of the language are detailed in a final evaluation that goes to the academic institution. The student must understand that those degrees of ability are distinctly related to a "degree of recommendation."

Because of poor orientation at home and the existence of many of the attitudes described above, a number of undergraduate Middle Eastern students have wasted their first semester in the U.S. The semester often becomes more a social/ESL orientation than a language-learning experience. The reasons are varied but include the attitudes discussed above as well as an initial feeling of "getting loose" after leaving home and being on their own for the first time. Combined with these factors are preconceptions about our society and such practices as dating and drinking, all of which can seriously affect attendance and language-learning in general.

Measurement of English Proficiency

Measurement or testing of English proficiency should be considered with two uses in mind. The first is placement of students at skill levels in an intensive institute; the second, for academic program students, is to determine whether or not any language training is advisable or required prior to or along with regular academic courses. Testing for English program placement should be geared as closely as possible to the material taught in the institute and should include scrutiny of all skills. At St. Louis University the Michigan Test of English Language Proficiency (MTELP) and ESL in-house examination in grammar, vocabulary and reading comprehension are used. A written composition and an oral interview are also included. This range of testing allows for placement at various levels for an individual student. That is, a student may be in an intermediate vocabulary level, a beginning grammar and structure level and in another level listening and speaking.

When a student is tested and placed within the English language institute, there must be adequate consultation with the student to define the level at which the student is studying and to estimate the amount of time that will be needed before that student will be ready to undertake an academic program. Many students, Middle Eastern and others, have the notion that one semester of intensive English ought to be sufficient, regardless of their initial level of ability. The program must make it clear from the beginning what the distinctions between each level are, what the goals for each level are and what degree of preparation each level allows.

Testing and faculty evaluation upon completion of the language institute are extremely important. In relation to regular academic placement, final evaluation can range from "not recommendable for further language study or for any academic work" to a recommendation for any amount of academic work. At the far extremes of the spectrum, decisions are not difficult. Between them is a "gray" area where a very detailed evaluation from each faculty member is crucial to responsible recommendation. It must be stressed that detailed faculty evaluation following three to nine months of intensive language training and student contact is a much more reliable and valid measure of student skills than a score on any one objective test. For Iranian and Arab students in particular, objective test results are significantly lower than they are for many other students in part because Arab and Iranian students are extremely test-poor; that is, they simply do not know how to do well on objective tests, and their scores on them are not a good measure of their overall ability. After their English studies many of them have sufficient skills for academic study but do not achieve a score on the TOEFL (or other objective test) that is considered acceptable. The best measure of their ability is not the TOEFL but the evaluations prepared by faculty who have become familiar with the students after months of intensive contact.

Linguistic Considerations

It is always helpful when discussing English institute students with a particular linguistic background to draw some contrasts between their native language and English, the language they are learning. Let us do that briefly here, looking at Arabic- and Persian-speaking students. Because of the nature of English language education throughout the Middle East and because of the extreme differences between Arabic/Persian and English, Middle Eastern students undergo serious difficulty in language learning and in preparation for academic study in the U.S. In most Arabic-speaking countries there has been, until recently, little exposure to English, so that students from these countries have a great deal to learn in regard to the system itself—the structure, the sounds, the vocabulary and the basic concept of a language that is used in a different way from their own.

In pronunciation, there are numerous problems in both vowel and consonant sounds and in accent shifting, especially for Iranian students. The problems are not universal for Middle Eastern students and can be dealt with by repeated oral pair drills, work with the concept of "voiced" versus "unvoiced" consonants and regular practice in listening and speaking for stress and intonation. All work on pronunciation (and in fact all work on language), because of limited class time, is primarily for the purpose of helping the student to hear the sounds properly and understand the technical aspects of listening and speaking difficulty. The only real solution to listening and pronunciation problems is for the student to internalize through practice the new speech patterns that are being studied.

Concerning language structure, Persian- and Arabic-speakers learning English must learn a new sentence order, with attention to object placement, verb placement and general rules of grammar. In addition, the use of articles, prepositions, two-word verbs and modal auxiliaries presents special and difficult problems for both groups.

Formal writing in English is probably the most difficult skill for most Middle Eastern students to learn. In addition to problems in structure or style, their handwriting causes great difficulty. It is extremely helpful (and also builds student confidence) to provide a special class in handwriting for these students throughout the program. At St. Louis University such a class has been necessary for nearly all the Arabic-speaking students and many of our Iranian students as well.

Sponsored Students

It is extremely important that the staff of the English program, the sponsor and the student completely understand the relationships among themselves. The sponsor must understand how the program operates and the degree of autonomy its operations require. There must be clear communication between the program and the sponsor. It is best if one individual within the program serves as liaison with a sponsor, dealing with all financial, insurance, placement and evaluation questions pertaining to the particular sponsor's students. If the students can see that there is a reliable procedure for getting their money and solving their various problems, daily living is much smoother for all three groups. If the sponsor has full confidence in the language institute and the institute's ability to accomplish the language objectives, then the institute should be allowed to maintain autonomy in accomplishing those objectives. As long as the program knows what the sponsor requires and the sponsor knows what the program is able to provide, there should be no conflict, and the student's difficulty outside the language learning process should be minimal.

Implicit in all that has been said is the idea that professionals in the field must be attentive to the changing characteristics, needs and desires of their students. Numerous adjustments have been made to accommodate the influx of students from the Arab countries and Iran, and no doubt readjustments for other kinds of students will have to be made in the future.

Part 2:

Arab Students

Social, Cultural and Religious Factors Affecting North African Students

David Mize

Before focusing on students from North Africa, I want to present a conceptual framework that I will refer to throughout this paper. After presenting the framework, I will devote most of my attention to students from Libya and Algeria, since they are the North African countries that supply the largest number of students to the United States.

Let me begin with a diagram that I think helps us understand what happens when students leave their country and study abroad. (See Figure I.) Circle A represents the totality of what can loosely be called American culture. Within this rather amorphous American culture, with its many components, there are all kinds of subcultures. (This is a term which is currently out of favor with anthropologists because it suggests a lower order. More in vogue is the term "microcultures.") So, within the culture of America there are many microcultures, and they have shifting components. They include some of the things that we are all familiar with and some of which are the title of my essay, "Social, Cultural and Religious Factors."

Within the American culture we have a microculture that I am going to call academia. It is labelled B in the diagram. It has to do with colleges and universities. In its largest sense it embraces all of the elements of the post-secondary academic experience, including university administrators, university teachers, librarians, health care personnel, foreign student admissions officers, foreign student advisers and students, both foreign and American.

Then, within the microculture of academia, we have the individual American who works within academia—the individual faculty member, administrator, foreign student adviser, student or whatever. This individual is denoted C in the diagram.

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FIGURE 1

FOREIGN STUDENT, OUTSIDE HOME COUNTRY, WITHIN AMERICAN ACADEMIC MICROCULTURE



A American Culture
B American Academic Microculture
C Individual American

A' Foreign Culture
B' Foreign Academic Microculture
C' Individual Foreign Student

This describes our situation—Circle A representing American culture, Circle B the American academic microculture, and C representing the individual American.

The interaction we are concerned with is between the foreign student and the American educational system. We have the foreign culture, represented by Circle A'. Circle B' represents the foreign academic microculture. Notice that part of Circle B' is within Circle A', representing that part of the foreign academic microculture that exists entirely within the foreign country. Part of Circle B' is outside Circle A', representing students who are studying abroad. The part of Circle B' that is enclosed by Circles A and B represents foreign students in the U.S. Circle C' represents the individual foreign student in America. Notice that the fact that they are foreign students conceptually takes them out of the totality of their own culture and into our culture. Notice also that there is nothing from Circle A—our culture—that has crossed over into Circle A', their culture. This is in one sense simplistic but it is, I believe, a model of what is happening.

Now, microcultures do not interact. Individuals interact—individuals who are part of microcultures. There are individual students interacting with other students. The situation of the individual Libyan student or Algerian student can be described by this framework. If he is in the U.S. he is going to be outside his own culture, within American culture, and within that, in the American academic microculture.

The individual foreign student shares a great many things with all of those students within the microculture of students who are studying outside their own countries, and many things with other students from his own country who are studying abroad, whether they are studying in the United States or anyplace else. The chief thing these students have in common is the very fact that they are studying abroad. There is a microculture of students studying abroad. Notice that the foreign individual is totally outside his own culture, but he is within a microculture of other foreign students—Circle C' is outside Circle A' and within Circles A and B. He can move within this area. He can move away from his own culture (Circle A') and out of the microculture of foreign students (Circle B'). Figure II shows this situation—the individual foreign student can become more and more immersed within American academic subculture, more and more overlapping with the individual American student. And he can keep moving, as shown in Figure III, until he has moved out of the microculture of foreign students who are in the United States and become part of American culture. That is, he has become assimilated; he has cut links with his own culture.

FIGURE II

THE INDIVIDUAL FOREIGN STUDENT MORE AND MORE CAN BECOME LIKE THE AMERICAN STUDENT



We have all seen cases in which a foreign student here tries to arrange for relatives and friends to come to the U.S. or to the institution where he is enrolled. Let me explain what this represents in theoretical terms. What the student is interested in doing is reinforcing his position within the microculture of foreign students, and what he wants to do is to have those foreign students be members of his family because he wants to be reinforced. He wants to have people to whom he can turn. He does not want to get out of the microculture of foreign students or of students from his own country. He wants to have the experience of the United States but to have it as much in the direction of his own culture as is possible. He is not interested in becoming acculturated.

FIGURE III

THE FOREIGN STUDENT CAN BECOME ASSIMILATED INTO AMERICAN CULTURE



This brings up a very serious question. What is the responsibility of people working in foreign student affairs for the acculturation or assistance in the acculturation of foreign students? It is conceived of in many different ways by individuals who work as foreign student advisers, by foreign students who come to this country and by organizations that sponsor foreign students. In some cases the sponsoring organization says very clearly to the students, "Don't do anything to become acculturated. You're sent to get a degree in chemical engineering. Get your degree in chemical engineering. Don't eat hot dogs. Don't go to baseball games. Don't go out with American girls, and come home!" This attitude is legitimate. The organization is paying for the students' educational program. The students know the terms ahead of time. When we say, "Hey, wouldn't you like to have a homestay with an American family so you can understand what's going on?" the reply might be, "No. I don't want it."

"How come?" "I don't want it. I don't want anything to do with it. I want to go to class." This may be an exaggeration, but there are students who do not want to move out of the microculture of students from their own country.

On the other hand, there are many foreign students who want to get acculturated as quickly as they can. They want to get totally acculturated, into the position portrayed in Figure III. They want to become American.

These are the two extremes, viewed conceptually.

Now, let us turn from this theoretical perspective on the situation of foreign students and look specifically at students from North Africa. First, some definitions. North Africa is usually described using the Arabic term, the Maghreb, which can be spelled a number of different ways. This always includes Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. There are arguments about whether it includes all of Libya or not. Historically, it generally included western Libya, the part called Tripolitania, and usually excluded eastern Libya, the part called Cyrenaica. What we are discussing here is the northern brim of Africa—the traditional society of North Africa, which is complex in the extreme.

The indigenous population of North Africa was Berber, a diverse group within itself. The Berbers from the high Atlas Mountains in Morocco, for example, have very little in common with the Berbers from Cyrenaica. This brings up a point that is important in dealing with foreign students. Each foreign student has his own individualized ethnic background in national terms and he may not like to be confused or lumped with others. To call him an "Arab student" is insufficiently discriminating from his point of view. "Yes. It's true, I am an Arab student. But I happen to be a Moroccan." Or, "Yes, it's true; I am an Arab student. But I happen to be a Cyrenaican, an Eastern Libyan." The generalized treatment of Arab students is logically fallacious, philosophically unfounded and a cause of much dissension among the students. It should be realized that each of these students comes from a very distinct microculture. An extreme example: A group of Arabs live southwest of Baghdad, close to Basra, in the marshes. Called the Marsh Arabs, they spend most of their lives on boats hunting ducks, fishing, etc. In contrast, a group of Arabized Berbers lives in the high Atlas Mountains in Morocco. These two groups have less in common, in my estimation, than the most extremely different communities in the United States.

Even with their differences, a number of common factors link people from the Maghreb. The initial common experience of much of North Africa is that it was Romanized. It was under Roman domination to a greater degree than it was under Greek domination. The Greek Hellenic culture was very important there, but less influential than the Roman and of shorter duration. The Romans were displaced by the Vandals, and it is amazing how much that was Roman disappeared. Little evidence remains of Roman culture.

The major factor in contemporary North Africa dates from the seventh century, the time of the area's first Islamization. Later, beginning in the 11th century, it became Arabized—that is, the population was converted to Islam before they became Arabic-speaking, with Arabic becoming more widely used and Berber less so. In some areas, particularly in Algeria and Morocco, Berber is still spoken. These areas are Islamicized, however.

In the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries, Arab city-states in North Africa grew and survived for a long period of time. They had to call in expert assistance, and when the Ottomans were brought in to assist them, their fortunes changed. In the 15th century, with the expulsion of the Jewish community from Spain and the lack of security for Jews in Europe, many Jews moved to North Africa. A large group of Jews lived in Morocco, a smaller number in Algeria, a still smaller number in Tunisia, and a still smaller number in Libya. But they played a very big role there. Among other things, they had great centers of scholarship in North Africa.

The next common experience began in 1830 and is shared by the three countries of the Maghreb, but to a much different degree. Algeria was colonized by the French in 1830 and became part of France; the areas of Constantine, Oran and Algiers were, in fact, departments of France, with deputies sitting in the French assemblies. Italian and Spanish colonists also were living in the area.

Morocco was never a colony but was a protectorate under France. That meant that the French would protect the indigenous population from whatever it was they wanted to be protected from—either from being themselves or being taken over by someone else.

The experience of Libya was very different. Libya was invaded by the Italians in 1911. This invasion was at best marginally successful before the end of the first world war. Then more Italians came in. Western Libya—Tripolitania—capitulated. Eastern Libya—Cyrenaica—never did capitulate, although it was occupied by the Italians.

Thus, some commonalities but also some important differences in the historical experience of the countries and people of the Maghreb exist. These historical commonalities contribute to certain cultural similarities among the people of the area, and thus among students from the area.

In discussing cultural generalities, as we are now going to do, we are, in my view, on thin ice. It is risky to make these generalizations, and I am very sensitive about making statements about other peoples' cultures. I will make some nonetheless, in part because I believe outsiders can discern things in particular cultures that insiders rarely notice. I will confine myself to remarks about Algerian and Libyan students. I will not discuss Moroccan or Tunisian students because there are so few of them in the U.S.

The Algerian student has been, to an almost unprecedented degree, exposed to Western culture, through the close and painful association with France. In addition, he has grown up in a country in which strong, organized efforts are made to remove, as much as possible, the influences of Western civilization—the *mission civilsatrice* of the French. The only way that you become yourself, Algerians are told, is to undo, disassemble, disavow, repudiate, tear down, the colonial past.

The common cultural factor that the Algerians share with the Arabs but embody to a lesser degree than other Arabs is a sense of family. This lessened sense of family can be traced to two factors. Algerians have a great deal of mobility within their own society. They are constantly moving about from one place to the next. Many may be born in Constantine, educated in Algeria, and teach in Oran. So ties with the family are not as strong as they would be in a more traditionally family-oriented society.

In addition to that, many Algerians have left Algeria to go and work in Europe. Thousands of Algerians work in France today. These people have had the experience of severing their cultural ties, at least to a certain degree.

In Algeria, religion is less important than it is in most other North Africa countries. First of all, the leadership of Algeria is military, not dynastic. It does not go back to a support group of religious leaders.

Secondly, the leadership is generally indifferent to religious opinion. Whether or not former Algerian President Boumedienne had made the *hajj* (pilgrimage to Mecca) I do not know. He certainly would have if religion were as important in his country as it is in many other Moslem countries. (You can do research and find out how many of the senior members of a government are *hajjis,* that is, have made the pilgrimage to Mecca. If you find out that most of them are, you can be sure that you are dealing with a country in which religion is important.) Religion is important in Algeria, as it is in any other Moslem country, as a unifying force, whether or not people adhere to it strongly. Algeria is a staunchly Islamic country, whether or not the people are practicing Moslems.

These are generalizations about the role of religion in Algeria. On an individual basis you may find a wide range of situations. You may have Algerian students who are very strong Moslems. My experience with them, though, has indicated that this is not common. They are very indifferent to religion and appear not to be bothered by the taboos that supposedly go with being a Moslem. They drink alcoholic beverages, eat pork, carry on in any way they want. This is in part because of the way that they live. Many of them have been out of Algeria before coming to the United States. They have gone to France. They have travelled all over eastern and western Europe. So the hold of religion is less important to the Algerian students than to the Libyan students.

Another characteristic of the Algerian student is that he is very facile in learning English. How well he learns it is another thing. I use the word "facile" on purpose. The Algerian student is quickly going to score 500 on the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) * It is not generally a problem for him because Algerians are usually bilingual (speaking Arabic and French) before coming to the U.S.

The Algerians are highly politicized, more than many other Arab students, as a consequence of the war experience. A very good friend of mine, an Algerian psychiatrist, said, "You cannot deal with the Algerians for a least another two generations. They have been so scarred by their experience in gaining independence." Algeria was the only Maghrebian country that really fought for independence. They fought from 1955 to 1962, and this left them with permanent psychological scars. The fact that a lot of them were killed by armaments supplied to France by the American government in the name of NATO is not forgotten.

A final generalization about Algerian students: They came from a society which in some ways remains repressive and puritanical, and which does not allow the amount of freedom that we have in our country, and yet they have observed a great deal of this type of freedom because there is a very large foreign population still in Algeria. These foreigners live essentially a western European life—a French life. They can get everything they want. They drink, go to

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* I would like to urge strongly that foreign admissions officers stop giving so much weight to the TOEFL. The intellectual underpinnings of the current TOEFL requirements can be legitimately and seriously questioned. A score of 500 is fine for the Algerian—any Algerian student who cannot score 500 in the TOEFL should not be doing university work in this country. Because of his French language background, he has many high cognate associates with English. More importantly than that, he has used French as a learning language, which means he has acquired what Ibn Kalduhn calls "the habit of the tongue." He uses a language in the same way that we use a language. If his education has been in Arabic, he has not used his language in the same way we use ours. Arabic is not used the same way English is used. For example, the concept of reading speed does not exist in Arabic. You ask any Arabic educator, "What are you doing to get your students to read 800 words per minute?" "Nothing. It would be immoral. Anybody who took that much trouble to write we're not going to go through at 800 words a minute!" They see the matter differently. When we say we have to get their reading speed up, they say we are showing a lack of reverence for the word. There are all kinds of explanations for this difference. One very simplistic explanation is that, in the Arab view, the only book worth reading is the *Koran* and you read that often enough until you've learned the whole thing, so what difference does it make whether you read it at 200 words per minute, 400 words per minute, or some other speed?

the beaches and go to nightclubs. This way of life is closely observed by the young Algerians, and in many cases they participate in it. Thus they have had some familiarity with Western mores—with the way we live.

This is not true in the case of Libya. Libya is a far more traditional society. By "traditional" I mean organized along Islamic lines. The leadership that took over in Libya after it attained independence in 1969 was religious leadership. Negative comments about Libyan leadership frequently appear in the United States press. Colonel Quaddafy is not looked upon as the most admirable of the Middle Eastern leaders. I do not subscribe to all those criticisms. What Quaddafy did, in my view, was to get Libya back on its traditional track. He reestablished the fact that they were going to be very selective in their dealings with the West. They were not going to tolerate those excesses which were distasteful to them just to placate the westerners who were living there. It used to be possible, for example, to buy beer, wine or whiskey in stores all over Libya. It is no longer possible.

Thus, the Libyans are much more fundamentalist in their embrace of Islam. Islam is more important to them both in aggregate terms—in considering how they are going to design their state—and in individual terms terms, there are far more practitioners of Islam in Libya than there are in Algeria.

Looking now at their educational system, we can say that Libyan students have grown up almost completely under what in one way or another was a Libyan educational system. In most cases their elementary, preparatory and secondary experiences have been in the hands of Libyan or perhaps Egyptian teachers. They did not grow up with European teachers.

A second point about their educational experience is that their instruction was exclusively in Arabic. Their only exposure to English before coming to the university was in English as a second language, through a series of books that were written by one particular man and were badly taught. They did not acquire much English.

They then went into the university system, which was to a much lesser extent than elsewhere in North Africa patterned after somebody else's university system—that of the French. The Libyan system had other influences as well—British, Italian and American. They now have a very strong American influence on the form of their university system, but not so much on the substance of it. The difference between what happens here and what happens there is this: the American educational system prepares students to compete, and if they compete successfully they succeed. The Libyan university system prepares people to succeed without going through the intermediary step of competing. How is that possible? They do not stress competition. When students graduate, they are moving into a situation where there is one employer—the government. They know they are going to get a job after they graduate. Whether they do well or badly they are apt to get a job at the same level, and their advancement in their job is going to be more a function of political favors than of their intellectual achievement. Therefore, they have little motivation to strive academically. This is, by the way, something that people in the U.S. have complained about with regard to students from the Middle East—how do you motivate people who really have no challenge, nothing to overcome?

On the subject of Libyan students and politics, I am often asked what the Libyan students talk about when their government calls them home at Christmas time. The answer is that they are called home to get the message from their leader. They talk about politics, about what Libyan national policy is, *vis-à-vis* the Arab world, the Third World and the West. It would not be false to say that these are sessions of political indoctrination. It would also not be false to say that this is water off a duck's back. The students are just not very interested.

Every culture has within it mechanisms to take care of hostilities, stress, frustration and so forth. In American culture one of those mechanisms comes in aluminum cans that are sold six at a time. It is built into the society. It is not off in the corner, hidden. The foreign student had mechanisms in his own society to take care of this frustration, anxiety and tension. But here, he is not in that society. He is in this society, within a certain microculture. Maybe that microculture brings these mechanisms with it, but the more he interacts with American society the less he can rely on his customary methods of dealing with frustration, failure or whatever the problem is. In many cases, the methods which we have institutionalized in our society are taboos in his own society. This, of course, creates a problem. He is given a situation which is frustrating to him. "I've got to write this stupid term paper and I don't understand what the guy wants me to write about," a Libyan student once said to me. "I've got to write this term paper on whether it's cheaper to bale hay with twine or wire. There are only four major problems: I don't know what hay is. I don't know what twine is. I don't know what wire is, and I don't know what a bale is." Or as an Algerian student said to me, "I'm trying to study business administration. That professor. Every day he cites the example of Studebaker and Packard. Who were they?" Situations like these cause these students to become frustrated. What do they do about it? One of the things they often try to do is recreate their own student microculture. This insulates them from the United States.* They leave their microculture to get into the academic situation and then they retreat to it at the end of the academic situation.

I am always amazed at how good both the Algerians and the Libyans are at arranging to see their friends. They run all over the United States to see their buddies. Their telephone bills reflect an astonishing amount of long distance calling. In these ways they seek to handle their frustrations or insulate themselves from American culture.

Many of the Libyan graduate students in this country are married. They live in communities where there are other married students. They get along well and manage to minimize their contact with American culture but still get what they came here for, the academic degree. Another way that the Libyan student very successfully handles frustration is that he buys himself a very good automobile and he spends a great deal of time driving it. This is a frustration-reduction method that we use in the United States. Many of the Libyans do this. Virtually all of the Kuwaitis do it.

Far fewer of the Algerian students are married. They come from a less conservative society and they seem not to perceive that they have as many taboos about using our frustration-reducing mechanisms as the Libyans do. I suspect that more than one of them occasionally uses marijuana while here. I suspect that more than one of them occasionally gets drunk. I would suspect that they have gone a lot further in the direction of behaving like their American counterparts.

American colleges and universities are frequently concerned about Arab students who are failing academically. These students do not seem to be able to cope with failure very well. They often seem to see themselves as doomed. Why is that? What can be done?

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* In some ways foreign student advisers are looked upon as a threat to these foreign student communities if they are pressuring the foreign students to leave their communities where they feel at home and are at ease and can behave the way they want, and where they can use their traditional methods for coping with problems.

From my point of view, we are unfair to the foreign student because we are expecting him to do things that we never expect American students to do. We send American students abroad. Where do we send them? We send a group to England, for example. They speak English in England. But what do we do? Stanford opens up a branch in England so that the students who are in the Stanford program in England can study through that program rather than to have to fend for themselves with the British university students. We send students to study in Cairo. Where do they study? At the American University in Cairo. We send students to study in Spain. What do they do? They set up an American program in Spain. Now, what if we were allowing other countries to do the same thing? It might be a good idea, for example, for the University of Riyadh to open a branch in the United States so that Saudi students would not have to study in the American universities. Maybe it would be better to do it that way.

One point to keep in mind is that Arab students have little experience with academic failure. The failure rate in Arab universities compared to the failure rate in American universities is very low. This is particularly true in the Libyan university system.

Let me describe how it works. First, the professor is insulated from the requirement of failing the student. The professor does not fail the student because the professor does not judge the student. The professor teaches the student and prepares the examination for the student but does not participate in the grading. Other people in the department do all of the grading. The grades are then brought in and there is a meeting. This is where the second part of the no-failure or low-failure procedure comes in.

The purpose of nearly all Arab meetings is to arrive at a consensus It is not to have a vote so that in an 11-man meeting you get a six-to-five decision to do something. That is unacceptable because it would leave five people who were permanently in opposition. Something is worked out that all 11 can agree to. "Now," says the professor at the meeting about the grades, "how about the 30 per cent of the students who had below 50? Couldn't we do something for them? Isn't there any way that we can help these people out? If they are in the 40-50 range, we can get them through." And so on. In order to fail, the student really has to fail. (And when you ask the student how he did on the exam, he will not say "I failed it," as we would in English, but, "The exam failed me." The failure is externalized. The reason for the failure is the exam, not the individual's shortcomings.)

What happens to North African students if they go home (from the U.S.) as failures? They do not really go home as failures, as such matters are conceived in their society. Our system has failed them—that is the conception. I am not saying that they are coming home as heroes, but they face no built-in sanctions against them. They are retooled for other things and may be given jobs in industry. They may be given another chance at a less demanding educational institution. There is nothing especially negative attached to the idea of transferring to less and less demanding institutions until some kind of diploma or certificate is earned, even if it is from an unaccredited institution.

In conclusion, let me point out that I have dealt here in generalities. I do not like to deal in generalities about foreign students and their problems because foreign students are individuals and a lot of students from both Libya and Algeria do outstandingly well. The basic point to keep in mind, it seems to me, is that the distribution of ability is the same in every country. There is no more ability in this country than there is in Algeria or Libya. The potential of certain Algerian and Libyan students is just as great as it is in American students, and many of them do better here than American students do, despite the social, cultural and religious differences they bring with them.

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Political Factors Affecting Arab Students

Halim Barakat

Students are among the Arab groups most concerned with and sensitive to their society's agonizing issues and conflicts. Their behavior and attitudes are deeply imbedded in the ongoing confrontation between forces for change and liberation and forces for maintaining the established order. The continuation of colonialism in diverse forms, the perpetuation of inhumane conditions, the inability of Arab society and governments to deal effectively with internal and external challenges, the authoritarian nature of Arab ruling groups and the experience of successions of conflicts in recent history have weighed heavily on the conscience of concerned Arab groups, including students. I believe that students involved in political and social movements constitute, along with others, an historic agent for change. At the least, they reflect the underlying rumblings and represent a pioneering moral upsurge against injustices. They are often in the vanguard of movements for liberation, particularly in developing countries of the Third World.

Explanations of student activism vary immensely, depending on the analysts' perspectives, ideological inclinations, assumptions, motives, ties and the nature of their personal identification.

A comprehensive sociological analysis of political factors affecting Arab students takes into account factors that are internal to the socio-economic and political structures of Arab society and also factors pertaining to its international setting. Specifically, political factors affecting Arab students can be traced back to: (1) the struggle for independence and liberation from foreign control; (2) the plight of the Palestinian people and their uprootedness from their country; (3) the gap between developed and underdeveloped societies; (4) the gap between the privileged and the deprived within

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the Arab society; (5) the authoritarian regimes ruling Arab countries; and (6) the concentration of power in the hands of a few rulers.

Before dealing with some of these general factors, it should be pointed out that they generate great and deep feelings of alienation among students. These feelings may contribute to the development of revolutionary inclinations. In other words, student revolt or activism is a consequence of deep and intense feelings of alienation from the established order. These feelings among Arab students can be traced back to the above factors, with which we must here deal separately, despite their interrelatedness.*

Struggle for Liberation; Independence from Foreign Control

The first recorded student revolt in the Arab world took place in 1882, at a time of national awakening and upheaval against despotic Ottoman rule. Students then played active parts in dangerous politics and joined secret Arab societies which fomented rebellion against the Turks. These secret societies were certainly the beginning of the Arab nationalist movement for liberation from foreign control.

The present student movements, in their current form, began to emerge during the second quarter of this century when the struggle for independence started to take shape in the Arab world. During this period, the Arab countries witnessed several revolts against French, English and Zionist colonization, and increased national awareness brought about some organized political action. The thirties were a period of political upheaval, and students joined political societies and parties taking part in demonstrations and the diffusion of political ideas on nationalism, the struggle for independence and reform. Students took active part in struggles for independence, particularly in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. At present, they continue to constitute an essential part of the struggle against neocolonialism, and active political parties are led by people who were previously active as students.

Gap between Developed and Underdeveloped Societies

Among the most concrete and visible facts of this century is the existence of developed and underdeveloped societies in the world. A wide gap separates the two worlds and renders the underdeveloped societies highly dependent on the developed ones. This relationship of dependency has left the Third World almost totally stripped of their rights to determine their private destinies and control their own resources. Countries of the Third World have been subjected to all types of infringements of their rights, lands, resources and even their existence as nations. In their vulnerable positions they also became the favorite prey of colonizing powers that have constantly tried to humiliate them and have deliberately attempted to destroy their self-esteem and personality. The French colonization, for example, aimed not only at controlling Algeria's resources but also at destroying its personality and culture. As we will see later, the Palestinians suffered not only the loss of their country but also attempts to strip them of their personality and to deny them the right of self-determination and the right to be a community. In South Africa, Western colonizers continue to deprive the natives of the most elementary forms of self-determination and to destroy any positive image they may have of themselves.

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* For more details see my book, *Lebanon in Strife: Student Preludes to the Civil War.* Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977.

The condition of dependency, coupled with the process of stripping the natives of their culture, self-esteem and right for self-determination, have undermined the possibility of cooperation between underdeveloped and developed countries for achieving a better future for all. Hence, the frustration of great hopes placed by the United Nations and other world agencies on "the possibility of instituting a program of international cooperation in science and technology in which the developed and developing countries could join in a drive on problems of the developing countries."*

Conflicts of interests and attempts at control of world resources and markets for the benefit of developed societies and for quick profits by multinational companies have frustrated all forms of cooperation that might alleviate the miserable conditions of Third World societies and are responsible for increasing rather than decreasing the gap between developed and underdeveloped societies.

Gap Between Privileged and Deprived Classes

The gap between developed and underdeveloped countries is reinforced in the underdeveloped countries by an internal gap between the deprived and the privileged classes. In fact, the gap between the deprived and privileged classes within underdeveloped societies may be described as a miniature of the gap between developed and underdeveloped societies. The same kind of conditions of dependency, domination and exploitation prevail. Furthermore, the privileged groups are actually linked to the colonizers; their mutual interests result in various forms of implicit and explicit cooperation. The colonizers maintain control over underdeveloped societies by way of the cooperation of the privileged segments of these societies, and the privileged maintain their control over the deprived through the protection of the colonizers. The cycle is vicious and difficult to break. This analysis, which emphasizes the interrelationship of the conflicts between developed and underdeveloped societies and between the privileged and the deprived, as well as the cooperation of the colonizers and the privileged natives, explains why efforts at development have been in vain.

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* U.N., *World Plan of Action*, 1971, p. 3.

Colonizing powers have played the classic game of divide-and-rule within colonized societies as well as between poor nations. As admitted by Daniel Lerner,* every internal minority—linguistic, ethnic, regional, religious, sectarian or tribal—was encouraged to develop its own case. Some of these minority groups have been placed in positions of power to the exclusion of the majority, so as to develop their separate case and to increase tensions between majorities and minorities. According to the political thinker Hisham Sharabi, imperialism (1) was directly responsible for the political fragmentation of the Arab world, (2) contributed to the fragmentation of national movements into separate independence movements operating in the different political entities, (3) carried out policies inimical to certain forms of social change, (4) contributed to retarding modernization by actively encouraging ethnic and religious differences, strengthening regional separatism and backing the conservative and reactionary social groups, (5) arrested the growth of indigenous capital formation and (6) controlled education in order to influence the intellectual and political orientations of youth.**

The struggle of the people of the Third World for independence and liberation from foreign control has constituted a most significant impetus for the emergence of student movements in Arab countries. This explains why student activism has lasted so long (unlike student movements in the West) and why students have been most active in the times of national and political crises, such as in the 1950's following the Palestine war of 1948-49 and during the Algerian revolution of 1954-1960, the tripartite invasion of the Suez in 1956, the period following the June war in 1967 and the Lebanese civil war of 1975-1976. Students are also highly aware of the link between the colonizers and the privileged ruling classes in their countries; hence their political alienation and their concern over developments of international issues in other societies all over the world.

Palestinian struggle

Arab students have been most concerned about the Palestine problem since its inception. In fact, the impact of the Palestinian problem on the development of student movements has been much stronger than that of any other single issue in the area. The student struggle was greatly intensified in 1948-49 when Israel was established and the Palestinians were uprooted from their country. Numerous tragic events since then have affected all Arabs to the extent that the plight of the Palestinians in diaspora has marked a new stage in the history of Arab politics. As stated by the distinguished historian Constantine Zurayk, "The intensified sense of the tragedy aroused a feeling of revolt, not only against the external powers and interests which caused the tragedy, but also against the regimes, leaderships, organizations and systems of government and of life which made it possible. This feeling was a reflection of the general spread of discontent among the Arab peoples which produced a succession of *coups d'etat* and gave new life and vigor to ideologies and parties calling for radical change."*

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* Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing in the Middle East.* New York: The Free Press, 1958.

** Hisham Sharabi, *Arab Intellectuals and the West.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970.

It seems that while the 1948 tragedy aroused feelings of revolt, the June war of 1967 aroused a mood of revolution and intensified previous feelings of alienation and animosity. The 1948 events contributed to the following developments:

1) Students became more involved in ideological political parties, which gained new vigor and new appeal to the masses;

2) Students became increasingly disenchanted with the West and particularly with the U.S. and began to realize that colonization had continued to plague their countries in spite of independence;

3) The Palestinian students had been particularly active, along with those from deprived communities, and Palestinian leadership emerged from the ranks of students.

The direct impact of the Six Day War of 1967 was its contribution to the emergence of revolutionary movements struggling for liberation and transformations. At no time before were the left and the right in all Arab countries so sharply polarized. What took place in Lebanon in 1975-76 was an outburst of underlying conflicts and contradictions. The process might very well spill over into Egypt and other Arab countries.

My novel (translated into English as *Days of Dust*) tried to capture the mood of students and other segments of society after the June war of 1967. Upon realizing that the Israeli invasion might succeed early in the war, one of the characters felt that "his country was a mass of wounds within his heart. His country was piles of rubble. . . . Earthquakes were occurring deep inside himself. . . . Never before had he felt so powerless. He had no control over his destiny. He had no solid core. He was a jumble of parts fighting with one another instead of taking form together." This character felt later, as the war was still raging, that "his country was in flames, dry firewood, so quickly burned. And there was nothing to fight the fire. He was running barefoot in the flames. . . . Death is our only field, and we sow it with despair. Wounds are our dwellings, tears our only rain. His tragedy was that he was an Arab, facing great challenges while mired in the sands and mud of history." Upon further reflection, he became more "aware that the Arabs had been deceiving themselves in many ways. . . . The whole Arab world had been transformed into an enormous state. . . . And the Arab governments, through their radio and television and their newspapers and magazines, had participated in this deception."*

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* Constantine Zurayk, "Participation of AUB Students in Palestine Struggle," *AUB Campus Yearbook*, 1971, p. 23.

An end must be put to this process of self-deception. The solution must begin by a rejection of the entire existing structure. Hopes lie only in the emergence of a revolutionary movement. Thus, the mood of defeat is transformed into one of resistance, and an Arab voice reechoes the voice of the poet Dylan Thomas, thundering like a storm: "And death shall have no dominion." Thomas might well have been speaking of Palestine:

> Though they sink through the sea they shall rise again
> Strapped to a wheel yet they shall not break
> And death shall have no dominion**

The Arab voice reechoes also a black American freedom song:

> We are fighting for our freedom, we shall
>   not be moved,
> We are fighting for our freedom, we shall
>   not be moved,
> Just like a tree, planted by the water,
> We shall not be moved.

This revolutionary mood has continued and has expressed itself in many forms, contributing to the split between Arab governments and popular nationalist movements. The split has sharpened and the confrontation continues to polarize. Data from my study of university students in Lebanon showed the following:

1. A process of polarization between the left and the right has been increasingly shaping up, with liberals and moderates having less and less role to play in the ongoing confrontation and becoming neutralized or joining the right or the left. The support for the Palestinian resistance movement was overwhelming between 1967 and 1969, after which time privileged groups and classes began to

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* Halim Barakat, *Days of Dust*, a novel translated from Arabic by Trevor Le Gassick. Wilmette, Illinois: The Medina University Press International, 1974.

** Dylan Thomas, *Collected Poems*. New York: New Directions, 1953.

withdraw their support and even shifted into counter-revolutionary positions, realizing that support for the Palestinian cause means having to pay a price.

This polarization is also evident among Arab students on some U.S. campuses, where there is increasing dissension within Arab communities.

2. The majority of students expressed deep feelings of alienation from Arab political systems and totally rejected the basic goals for which their governments stood as well as the values on which these goals were based. These feelings of alienation extended beyond the political system to the society itself. The percentages of students who stated that they felt at war with their society and rejected the basic dominant culture ranged from 36 per cent to 75 per cent.

3. Palestinian students showed the highest inclination toward political alienation. While 86 per cent indicated that they were highly dissatisfied with the dominant political conditions, about 71 per cent of the other Arab students did so. A similar generalization can be made in respect to alienation from society. Thus, 94 per cent of the Palestinian students said they rejected the prevailing social values, in contrast to 68 per cent of the Lebanese, 63 per cent of the Jordanians, and 70 per cent of other Arabs studying in Lebanon.

4. Lebanese students from deprived communities were more politically alienated and showed greater support of the Palestinian resistance students than other Lebanese students from privileged communities.

5. The rightists and reformists were more likely than the leftists to subscribe to the ideology of contentment, which preaches fatalism, compliance and resignation. Thus, rightists expressed greater agreement than leftists with such statements as "The secret of happiness is accepting what comes your way," "Making plans only brings unhappiness, because plans are hard to fulfill," "With things as they are today, one ought to think only about the present and not worry about the future," and "I prefer to accept reality when it seems I cannot change it."

These findings and others need to be considered in the context of the Palestinian problem, which is basically one of an uprooted community seeking repatriation. For the last 30 years, the Palestinians have been living in an agonizing condition of statelessness, with their future uncertain. Unlike the Lebanese, Syrian, Jordanian and other Arabs and the peoples of the Third World, they have been living without the right of self-determination. Indeed, they have lost control over their own destiny and the political decisions influencing their lives, planning their future, defending their rights and educating their children.

The Palestinians have been highly pessimistic about the chances for a peaceful solution to their problem. However pessimistic, they never gave up the hope and I do not think they ever will. The policy of denying them repatriation will only result in tragic consequences for all concerned. The Palestinians insist on their right for self-determination and liberation. Arab students join the Palestinians in this insistence, although they may have different opinions on the question of whether a peaceful solution to the Palestinian problem is possible. These differing opinions probably contribute to the factionalism that can be found among Arab students in the U.S.

Authoritarian Regimes Ruling Arab Countries

Arab peoples have been ruled by despotic sultans or military regimes, totally exposed to their whims, without the protection of constitutions, representation, due process, or even laws. Being authoritarian as they are, these regimes control public and private institutions and agencies, including mass media and educational and religious establishments, and they use all these forces to manipulate public opinion and prevent any opposition. Rulers behave as if they owned the country and its wealth—thus, the phenomenon of having the richest countries in the world and the poorest people. Having rich governments and poor people is a striking fact in the Arab world.

Another striking fact is that these regimes have modernized systems of repression by adopting the most sophisticated technology in the areas of security and public order. Their basic concern is not planning for development but maintaining their power and privileges and insuring stability.

Here, let me mention that among the most annoying and hypocritical comments in the Western press, as felt by Arab students, is blaming the Arab people themselves for the underdevelopment of what is called their governments. Arab students, among others, realize that without Western support these authoritarian governments would not last long. Even if Arab or other Third World peoples became able to change their governments, the Western democracies would rush to reinstate them, against the will and wishes of the governed. Simply, the Arab people have been deprived of the right to participate in the making of their destinies and cannot be blamed for the behavior of their governments. This fact is very frustrating for students and other segments of the Arab society and explains to a great extent the dominance of feelings of alienation and radicalism.

Three general political factors discussed here—foreign control, the Palestinian problem and the authoritarian nature of the ruling classes—have, in my opinion, the most significant effect on Arab students. Other factors, including political fragmentation, are directly related to the three general conditions I have described.

For Arab students, these conditions have to be transcended. They are increasingly and gradually convinced that this historical task can be accomplished through a popular movement that struggles towards transformation of the present order and replacing it with a democratic, secular, socialist, united society. The dream sounds idealistic, but the struggle for it is most realistic.

Such is my reading of Arab reality.

DISCUSSION

If it is the case that tensions among Arab students in the U.S. reflect tensions in the Middle East, and the situation in the Middle East is not likely to resolve itself in the near future, then people who work with Arab students in the U.S. might want to give some thought to ways they could defuse the negative impact of these tensions on individual Arab students and on campuses and communities. Here are some specific suggestions:

–Remember that heated discussion or argument among Arabs does not necessarily signal a severing of relationships or a threat of violence. Vigorous debate may be just vigorous debate, not the harbinger of more extreme activities, and may even have salutary effects.

–Remember that it is not the responsibility of any U.S. college or university official to assure that Arab students comprise "one big happy family."

–Because foreign student advisers or others who work with foreign students might be called upon by institutional administrators, the public or the media to mediate conflicts among Arab students, they are well advised to understand as much as possible of what Arab students are thinking and feeling. This understanding can be enhanced by taking the initiative to become well acquainted with Arab student leaders–both the formal and informal ones–and discussing their political views with them.

–Encourage Arab students to share their concerns with others on the campus or in the community through the conventional means by which political discussions are carried on in this country–lectures, debates, films and articles. Assist the students in putting forth their views in a way that will not antagonize a typical U.S. audience. Their presentations might be co-sponsored by appropriate academic departments.

–Identify Arab student leaders who can serve as spokesmen or representatives to the media, taking steps to assure that journalists have a clear understanding, from the students themselves, of the students' viewpoints and the reasons for them.

–Recognize that Arab students, preoccupied as they normally are by dangerous and threatening events in their own countries, may not be as interested in participating in social and cultural activities as students from elsewhere might be.

–Be patient. Remember that the process of creating appreciation of the value of having foreign students on a U.S. campus can be a slow one.

Social, Cultural and Religious Problems of Adjustment for Arab Students from the Fertile Crescent and Gulf

Phebe A. Marr

It is not possible in a brief space to cover a topic as broad as mine in any depth. What I will do is generalize about five or six broad cultural and social differences between traditional Arab society and modern urban America in order to identify some problems that might confront Arab students in adjusting to our academic environment. Such problems should of course be seen within the framework of our differing cultural perceptions, which themselves spring from differing values and social conditions and often from differing religious precepts.

In discussing these differences, we must avoid the assumption that our values are somehow superior and those of the Arabs inferior. We must also avoid conveying this impression in dealing with Arab students. Our assumption should be that values are different, that what may be functional in one society may not necessarily be functional in another. Arabs, like other people, will resent the implication that their way of life or their values are somehow inferior to our own.

Although I am going to focus on problems of adjustment, I would like to begin by saying that, in general, Arab students feel well treated in the United States. Considerable evidence suggests that the overwhelming majority adjust very well, which is not surprising, since they are an adaptable people. Moreover, although we shall be talking about differences, it might be well to remember at the outset that there are many similarities between our culture and theirs. Arabs like our open society and find it congenial. Anyone who knows the Arab world knows its people are gregarious, extroverted, highly personable and often informal in their dealings. They match us in

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this respect and, in general, feel welcome here. In addition, living conditions here are superior to those they can expect in most other parts of the world. Those in the sunbelt even like our climate.

The numbers of Arab students in the United States has increased tremendously since 1974 because of the growth of OPEC funds. In particular, the number of Arab undergraduates has grown. In the past, graduate students greatly outnumbered undergraduates; now the situation has been reversed. This means that the newcomers are going to be younger, less mature and perhaps less well prepared for our academic programs. As a result, the problems of adjustment may increase.

One more caveat before plunging into generalizations. Although many characteristics and values are shared among Arab societies, the degree of diversity in the Arab world must be kept in mind. Students from the Fertile Crescent countries are quite different from those from the Gulf. Arabs from Mediterranean countries–Lebanese, Palestinians, Syrians–will probably have fewer problems of adjustment because their countries have had a long history of interaction with the West. Because Iraq has been somewhat more isolated and is very isolated today, Iraqi students may experience a greater degree of culture shock. In the Gulf countries the impact of the West has been felt only recently, but that impact has been very intensive and the pace of modernization has been rapid. The transition to which students from the Gulf have had to adjust in their own countries is phenomenal.

Even within one country, such as Saudi Arabia, one can find great divergence in sophistication and adaptability to American ways. Saudi Arabia is a conservative, Islamic country which officially espouses the strictest interpretation of Islam. Yet Saudi student reactions to our open society differ. Take the case of a Saudi graduate student in public administration at a major university here in the United States. He has been living in the States with his wife and family for two years and has not yet eaten in an American restaurant. He lives in an apartment complex with several other Saudi families, with whom he spends most of his time; his wife does not go out unless accompanied by him. In short, he is attending the university to partake of our technology but he is completely rejecting the American way of life. In fact, he has succeeded in replicating the Saudi way of life in his apartment, complete with visiting patterns for his wife, Koran readings and the like. At the other extreme is the case of the well-heeled Saudi student in southern California who recently rented a go-go restaurant, complete with the entertainers, to give one of his friends a memorable birthday party.

Despite this diversity, certain shared values and social conditions in Arab society can be identified and may give us a frame of reference in dealing with possible problems facing Arab students in adjusting to life in the States.

First, and most important, Arab society is a group-oriented society rather than an individualistic one. This factor has a number of aspects and ramifications, several of which follow. The extended family is the basic social unit of traditional Middle Eastern society. As the area becomes more urbanized and the economy more differentiated, the extended family shows signs of breakdown, as it has in the West, particularly with respect to residential patterns. In the villages and small towns the extended family generally lives together, and even in urban areas, where members of the extended family live in separate houses, ties are still very strong.

Not only is the operative family unit larger than our own, but it is more paternalistic, even authoritarian, in structure and style. The male head of the household exercises considerably more authority than his counterpart in the United States. Traditionally, he makes all sorts of decisions not made by the father in the United States. Often he selects the son's occupation and plays a determining role in the selection of his mate. Marriage is still a family affair, usually arranged by the family. Frequently the school which the young man attends is selected by the father. I know of several young Arab men who went into the family business or a particular profession because of parental choice rather than their own wishes, and if this is true for the man, it is far more so for the woman.

The extended family also plays a role in financial matters. Often collateral members of the family may put up the funds to send the young man or woman to the United States and later to finance the man in business. There is strength in numbers. (Incidentally, most businesses in the Middle East are family businesses and partnerships rather than joint stock companies. It has proved remarkably difficult to transplant this impersonal Western institution of the limited liability company to the Arab world.)

In sum, the Arab family is a cradle-to-grave social security and welfare system. The individual growing up in Arab society comes to rely on the family for support to a far greater degree than does an individual growing up in the United States.

This is not to say that the individual is neglected; it is just that his wishes and desires are more often subordinated to those of the family, and especially to those of its elder members. This situation forms a contrast with our own society, where individualism is a highly prized value. Our aim is to encourage the child to "stand on his own two feet," to earn his own money and finance his own activities. In general, we send the child from the family nest at a much earlier age than is the case in Arab society. Even the idea of putting distance between oneself and the family is foreign to Arab culture.

Hence, one may imagine some of the problems facing an individual who has been reared in a society where he can rely on family support to the maximum extent and who is then thrust into our highly individualistic, highly competitive society where the individual has to fend for himself, take the initiative, etc. I see this as one of the greatest possible difficulties for the Arab students. Family, kin and friends who constitute the major support structure for the student are lost and there is little substitute in the United States. (I might mention that the teacher or the adviser is frequently regarded as a surrogate for the paternalistic authority provided by the father.)

Arabs are usually surrounded by people; if it is not the family, it is friends and neighbors. The favorite leisure-time activity for men is sitting in the cafe; for women it is visiting friends. The Arab student may experience homesickness or lonesomeness. By contrast with Arab society, we place a high value on privacy, and often we want to be alone. This attitude is frequently not understood by Arabs. When I first went to the Middle East, I lived for several months in a small village. Adjusting to the lack of privacy is one thing I found most difficult in that setting. Whenever I would try to remove myself from the family, to get away by myself, I always aroused suspicion. I was always asked, "Why do you want to be alone?" This attitude may well derive from bedouin society, where the worst sanction that could be applied was to be sent off alone; the fear of being alone remains even when survival is not at stake.

Arabs' ideas about housing reflect their affinity for being around other people. Typically, Arabs like to live in compounds or large houses which can accommodate several generations of the family. Our aim, by contrast, is usually to get away from the authority of the family. The standard mother-in-law joke reflects this approach. The case of an Arab friend of mine illustrates the typical Arab view on the matter of housing. My friend is a sophisticated, very Westernized Lebanese businessman, who not too long ago bought an apartment house in Beirut. He put his business on the ground floor and then moved the remainder of the family into the rest of the building so they could all be together.

One of the complaints sometimes heard from Arab students, especially Gulf students, concerns the difficulty of living in apartment houses in the States. The apartments are too small, they say, and too difficult to move around in; there are no close neighbors; and they cannot make much noise. As time goes on, Arab students tend to cluster in certain apartment houses. In fact, apartment houses, like people, get reputations. The good reputation of certain apartments spreads and to get into the right apartment may be almost as important as getting into the right university. In a sense the apartment then tends to replicate the Arab neighborhood and the extended family compound.

If Arabs have trouble adjusting to the single dwelling, they have more trouble adjusting to the absence of the coffee house and the function it performs. Many of us live in cities or towns or suburbs where there are no real streets. We drive back and forth to work alone and come home at night to sit in front of the TV by ourselves or with members of our immediate family. The Arab, by contrast, wants to walk in the neighborhood, to see familiar people and, above all, to sit and talk in the cafe. He wants to be with people. All of this grows out of a culture where family, kin and friends are of the highest value.

A second generalization about Arab culture, a corollary of the first, concerns what I shall call "personalism." Arabs like to do things on a personal basis. They prefer to conduct their business with people they know and trust and to deal with people on a face-to-face basis. Again, this forms a contrast to modern American society, with its emphasis on institutions and standardized impersonality. This is not to say that impersonal institutions such as the bureaucracy and the political party do not exist in the Arab world. They do. But beneath the facade of these institutions one generally finds the Arab doing business on a personal basis. It is this warm sense of personal relations, reflected in the hospitality for which Arabs are justly famous, that Westerners often find most appealing in Arab culture. Although dealing with people on a personal basis takes more time, and is perhaps less efficient, it is a feature of our own society which we seem to have lost and which, perhaps, accounts for a greater degree of alienation in the West.

This personalism is often misunderstood in our society. *"Intisab,"* a word which might be loosely translated "pull," is a time-honored and highly regarded way of doing things in the Arab world. In our society it has a negative connotation, but it does not in theirs. In fact, it is expected. If you need a job, or if you have a problem, you can always turn to someone on a personal basis. You do not turn to impersonal institutions, filling out lengthy application forms which get fed into a computer. Instead you go visit a person or pick up the phone and contact a real person at the other end to help solve your problem. Everyone works through contacts. In our society such contacts are absent, or, worse, their use is regarded as suspect. One should be aware that the Arab students coming here are going to miss that kind of contact. I am aware that the great number of Arab students enrolling in U.S. institutions will make such personal attention increasingly difficult to give. Whatever personal contact can be given to Arab students will make their transition to American life smoother.

A third important characteristic of Arab culture concerns the idea of "face." There are many ways to look at this concept. To me, the most meaningful way is to place it in the context of the value that Arab society places on pleasant personal relations. Good personal relations, getting along with people with a minimum of friction, is more important to the Arab than competence and efficiency. If we can imagine a continuum of values where efficiency is at one extreme, and good personal relations at the other, our society would fall toward the efficiency end and the Arab's toward the personal relations end. Our society will tolerate a great deal more abrasive behavior if competence is at stake, although too much abrasiveness will also be penalized. Arabs certainly understand efficiency and value competence, but their tolerance for abrasiveness is much lower. I am reminded, in this connection, of an episode which took place in an oil company in the Middle East. An Arabist, unfamiliar with the local dialect, was hired to write an Arabic textbook for American oil drillers. The standard Arabic sentences and exercises were written and two local Arabs–both well educated–were hired to "translate" the standard Arabic phrases and vocabulary into the local dialect. Weeks passed and when they returned, they assured the Arabist that his work was perfect and needed no modifications. Despite considerable discussion of this doubtful conclusion, the two local employees stuck to their story. The books were printed, and when they were put into use, all sorts of dialectical errors were found. When confronted with these facts later on, the two local employees admitted that they had recognized the errors but did not want to criticize their superior because it might "blacken his face." They felt that his prestige was on the line. Efficiency was recognized as an issue in the situation, but a higher value was placed on face.

Face is an issue in other contexts as well. One of these is peer pressure. Pressure from one's group to conform to societal norms is far higher in the Middle East than in most areas of the United States. Anthropologists often divide societies into shame cultures and guilt cultures. The former are those in which the group enforces norms by shaming participants into proper behavior. The latter is a society in which norms are highly internalized and where participants feel a sense of guilt if they do not conform. Presumably the West, with its tradition of the Protestant ethic, is closer to the guilt society, while the Middle East–at least the traditional Middle East–is better described as a shame society. Indeed the word "'Aib," or "shame," is frequently used in child-rearing and in other contexts where behavior is learned.

Peer pressure reinforces the concept of face. One's appearance in the eyes of one's peers is of prime importance. Conversely, it is far less important how one behaves outside of the relevant group. This factor helps explain the remarkable flexibility of Arabs who frequently behave one way in their own society and another in ours.

It has frequently been noticed that Gulf Arabs who come from conservative, religious, austere societies, adopt many of our Western habits and customs while they are here and then slip comfortably back into their own ways upon returning home. While this may look like hypocrisy to us, a more neutral explanation is that appearing respectable in the eyes of the group—face—is more highly valued than consistency.

"Face" also helps explain another cultural trait often attributed to Arabs—a tendency to exaggeration, even bragging. The Arab feels he must put his best foot forward in public. Our preference for modesty and understatement is just not understood.

An American dealing with the Arab student should always be aware that, because of this concept of face, Arabs are much more sensitive in their feelings than are most Americans. This particularly applies to criticism, and especially public criticism. In American professional life we are far more used to direct, open criticism than Arabs are. Directness, honesty and facing reality are considered positive attributes in American society, even when abrasiveness results. Such behaviors are not highly regarded in Arab society, precisely because they tend to lessen the individual's status and dignity before the group. Arabs sometimes complain about the absence of politeness in American life. However, one should not spare Arab students all criticism or foster an alienation from the realities of life. Rather, criticism should be made in a way which will minimize loss of face, and with a maximum of politeness, if it is to be effective. It would help to encourage Arab students to talk about their problems. They are frequently very shy about raising them, and, of course, problems cannot be solved if they cannot be identified.

To this litany of cultural problems facing Arab students in the United States should be added the general problem of adjusting to a modern technological society, a problem with which Americans themselves have some difficulty. This problem is greater in the case of the Gulf Arabs, who come from areas where the impact of the West has been late and where technology has not yet penetrated deeply into the society, than it is for the Arabs of the Fertile Crescent countries and the Mediterranean, where contact with the West has been continuous throughout history. Under this heading we could group a number of diverse problems. One of the most obvious is the Arab sense of time, or rather lack of it. Arabs are simply used to a more leisurely pace of life than we are. Their sense of time is more indeterminate. The classic Arabic expression, *"bukra,"* "tomorrow," reflects this. As with *"mañana," "bukra"* refers to some undefined time in the future, rather than to a specific commitment to the day following the present one. This vague sense of time is reflected in the grammatical structure of the Arabic language. Arabic has three tenses, one reflecting something done or completed in the past, another reflecting something that is in process and the third reflecting something that is incomplete or will be done in the future. Without making too much of this linguistic point, it is a fact that it is difficult for Arabs to adjust to the hectic pace of our life in the States. One obvious problem is meeting deadlines and schedules; another is planning one's time. The importance of time, planning, schedules and meeting deadlines must be impressed on Arab students early in their academic careers if future trouble is to be avoided.

Another problem in the area of adjustment to technological change lies in operating motor vehicles. While probably not widely recognized, our traffic regulations do cause Arab students difficulties. So does the kind of driving we do and our great dependence on the car. Again, this is an area where the Gulf students may have more problems. In Saudi Arabia, where the automobile is a late arrival and most students have only recently learned to drive, the accident rate is incredible. I was informed that Saudi Arabia had 17,000 automobile fatalities last year, 24 times the number in Great Britain. A group of Saudi students recently surveyed in the United States rated traffic problems second in importance among the problems they encountered in the United States. (Dealing with American women was first!) They cited traffic regulations, arrests for driving without a license, and the like.

Yet another difficulty—one I have already discussed—which might be listed under this heading is that of residential patterns. Apartment living often causes problems, especially for students from conservative, religious societies. Keeping one's wife happy, for example, when she is living in an isolated apartment without family and friends to visit, is difficult. Conservative traditions, if followed, prevent the wife from engaging in a number of activities usually offered to foreign wives and restrict her life considerably. Such difficulties in the home can cause psychological or emotional problems of adjustment for the married male student.

Still another consideration to be discussed is that of the contrast in educational systems between the Arab world and the United States. A number of points can be made in this connection.

A striking difference between the traditional philosophy of education in the Middle East and that of the United States is evident. In the Middle East, education is often not valued in and of itself, but rather is seen as the route to a career or job, especially a job in the bureaucracy. Not only is education tied to the job, but to prestigious jobs. Manual labor is still widely frowned upon and an education is seen as a means of avoiding such employment. Thus, intellectual activity, the academic curiosity upon which a liberal arts education is founded, may be in short supply among Arab students.

Even more important is the difference in pedagogical methods. Traditionally, education in the Middle East stressed memorization. Knowledge was conceived of as a solid body of facts, which a person worked to acquire. When this knowledge, or a portion of it, was learned, the person was educated. Our concept of knowledge as something to be discovered, as a constantly creative process, is new to the Arab and is not widely accepted, even among Arab educators. Our emphasis on methodology is often difficult for students to grasp. In the Middle East, even when modern, scientific subjects are taught, they are taught by traditional pedagogical methods. A university colleague of mine recounted to me that the usual way to teach a social science course at his university was to give students a list of materials they were supposed to know at the end of the class. They then went home, learned it and reproduced it on the final exam.

Middle Eastern students will frequently have difficulty studying under our system and adjusting to our classroom methods. They may not be familiar with our libraries, since library reading outside of class is not widely done in their countries. In addition, they may be unfamiliar with essay writing. They have simply not been trained to write imaginative or even logical essays and may have to be taught how to do so.

This may also be the place to say a word about cheating and plagiarism, a problem often faced by teachers and foreign student advisers. Part of the explanation for the occurrence of cheating may be the pressure to obtain good grades, or the need to achieve status and a prestigious job as a result of education. This pressure, coupled with the reliance on personal ties and the stress on contacts, may result in a higher incidence of plagiarism among Arab students. Another explanation may be more simple—not understanding what plagiarism is. If students have never had to write an essay or term paper, and if memorization and factual content have been stressed in their educational experience, they may assume that writing a paper means copying it out of a book. One way to cut down on such incidents is to be certain that our definitions of plagiarism and cheating are clearly understood.

My final generalization is that some students will encounter difficulties in adjusting to American society because of their conservative religious background. While some of the Arab students coming to the States will be Christian, the bulk will be Moslems, and a word should be said about the role of religious observance in traditional society. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss Islam. For our purposes, Islam is relevant to the process of adjustment because of its influence on Arab social structure and because of certain religious observances and practices which Moslem students may follow.

Students will vary greatly in the degree to which they observe Islamic precepts and practices. Some students will observe Islamic practice strictly, while others will neglect it entirely, with most students falling somewhere in between. The most conservative of the societies from which Arab students come is Saudi Arabia. Thus, a few words on Saudi religious views and observances are in order.

Saudi conservatism springs from the state's adoption of "Wahhabism" as its official policy. Wahhabism is a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, named after its founder, Muhammad Ibn' Abd al-Wahhab. Saudis do not use this term, but call themselves Unitarians. The aim of Wahhab, who lived in the 18th century, was to rid Islam of many of the superstitions and practices that had crept into Islam since the death of its founder Muhammad in the 7th century. Wahhabism sees the Koran and the very early traditions of the Prophet as the source of religious law and practice. Wahhabis interpret the Koran strictly and have adopted the strictest Islamic code of law. In a sense, Wahhabism can be compared to early Puritanism. It is very austere and disapproves of lapses of behavior such as drinking, failing to observe prayer, failing to adhere to the modesty code for women, and the like. These fundamentalist prescriptions, which are reflected in the Shari'ah, the comprehensive code of behavior and practice that governs the life of the believing Moslem, have a great deal to say about family structure—marriage, divorce, inheritance, the raising of children, etc. In these areas, Islamic law is clearly spelled out, and in Saudi Arabia it is more strictly interpreted than elsewhere. This is most striking in the segregation between the sexes in public. Nowhere else in the Arab world is this code so strictly observed, although aspects of the code are observed to a lesser extent elsewhere in the Arab world. The tradition of separation of men and women, the emphasis on separate sex roles, and restrictions of female behavior will certainly continue to cause difficulties of adjustment in our open society, both for men and women. Codes of conduct for women in Arab countries and those for women on most U.S. campuses probably provide the greatest contrast between the two cultures.

Many Middle Eastern governments, and the Saudi Arabian government in particular, are determined to retain their own cultural traditions in the face of technological modernization. The Saudis, for example, say that they will maintain strict conservative religious practices at home—even while building schools, hospitals and factories that tend to break them down. Because they are worried that the students they send to the United States will absorb American culture and American ways of life, they restrict Saudi men from marrying foreign women. Lest we conclude that this attitude is limited only to the conservative religious governments, it should be stated that at the other extreme, Iraq—a radical, socialist regime—has precisely the same point of view, though from a different perspective. They, too, do not want their students adopting American ways of life, but they are not worried about women's liberation. They are concerned with students picking up our capitalist ways, our consumer ethic; therefore they, too, place restrictions on students marrying American women. It seems that our number one cultural weapon is the American woman!

One last point about educational trends in the Arab world that may have bearing on the adjustment of Arab students remains. My own field study in the Arab world has been political elites. I am interested in surveying the social, educational and occupational backgrounds of the current political leaders in Iraq. My data have convinced me that we are now seeing a new generation of men and women coming to the fore in the Arab world. This generation increasingly comes from rural areas, from the lower middle class and from families with little or no education. This change is not surprising since education has grown rapidly in the last few decades and is now spreading to provincial areas. Whereas Arab students in the U.S. twenty years ago would have been from the upper classes, and possibly from families with a high degree of sophistication, the coming generation of Arab students will increasingly be drawn from groups whose family educational background may be weak, and who have had little or no foreign exposure before embarking on their U.S. educational venture. They may also come from areas with a more conservative religious outlook, and hence some of the attributes of traditional society may be more important than they formerly were in shaping the behavior and viewpoints of Arab students in the U.S.

These contemporary Arab students—especially the ones from oil-producing countries—may have more money to spend than their predecessors did. One problem on the increase is the elitist attitude of some Middle Eastern students who come to the American campus with considerable wealth. Their wealth generates antagonisms between Arab students and Americans and often among the Arab students themselves. It is my impression that this elitist attitude is more often associated with the student coming on private funds than the one with a government scholarship. The latter must perform or lose his scholarship. Nevertheless, with the oil funds generated recently in some Middle Eastern countries, even scholarship students have far more money—to buy cars and rent apartments—than most American students, and this is a problem which may grow. It is one which Middle Eastern governments are aware of, and advisers on campuses where it arises might want to take it up with the home governments of the students. In addition, admissions policy might be better monitored, with more emphasis placed on the contract student than the private one.

I have tried to indicate some of the areas where cultural conflict may emerge in the adjustment of Arab students to American society. I would like to conclude with a few suggestions on how to help Arab students over the transition period. First, since many students will be accustomed to a certain amount of paternalism, bear in mind that they will expect to be dealt with firmly, and probably should be, at least at first. They expect school administrators to be disciplinarians. Firmness in rendering advice will probably bring the best results.

A word of caution on the subject of authority. The adviser should avoid giving the impression that he or she is the student's "contact" in getting done whatever is needed, and that all the adviser need do is to say the word and a grade can be changed, a regulation waived, or the like.

Second, since students will be unfamiliar with American educational methods and techniques, these should be carefully and thoroughly described to students. Two topics needing particular attention are study skills and writing essay exams. A library tour would also be exceedingly useful.

Third, to the greatest extent possible, students should be dealt with in small groups and should be given as much personal attention as staffing permits.

Fourth, in explaining our culture to the Arab student, it might be helpful to have on hand individuals from the students' own country who have been in the States long enough to have made the adjustment to living here. They may better be able to explain our customs and practices and to act as mediators in interpreting our culture.

Lastly, thought might be given to the idea of publishing a handbook on *How to Live in America.* Any number of handbooks of this type have been produced for the use of Americans who are living in the Arab world. Why not the reverse? The book should be a practical guide on how to rent an apartment, how to get a driver's license, how to use a library and other advice deemed helpful. The presence of such a handbook might allow an adviser to concentrate on the more complex problems of psychological and emotional adjustment to our country.

DISCUSSION

There are a number of practices in the U.S. academic system which present particular problems for students from the Middle East. They include objective-type tests, ambiguously phrased test items, time limits on quizzes and examinations and the absence of opportunities to retake examinations. Middle Eastern students seem reluctant to ask for clarification and assistance when faced with these and other academic difficulties, and may continue to do poorly if their teachers are not aware of their confusion and lack of preparation for certain aspects of U.S. educational practice. Middle Eastern students can benefit from orientation or English/orientation programs that include practice in test-taking, practice in laboratory work, experience in using the library and exposure to the vocabulary and academic practices that are used in their intended fields of study.

They can also benefit if their teachers have become familiar with the kind of academic background they do have and of the new skills they have to learn to succeed academically in the U.S.

Dr. Marr suggested that Arab students might seek both an authority figure and a nurturing figure when they come to the U.S. to study and want assistance. The authority figure would be the person to whom the student would go for guidance, direction and definitive answers. According to traditional patterns, that person would probably be a male and/or older person (and therefore wiser, according to the common belief). From the nurturing figure they would expect concern, caring, psychological and moral support, and guidance in interpersonal relationships. At home the person filling this role would most often be the mother.

On the U.S. campus, given a choice of advisers or counselors, Arab students would probably adhere to these familiar patterns of behavior. In the case of foreign student advisers, for instance, students might speak with the authority figure to learn about the rules and regulations governing status as a foreign student in the U.S. and then might go to the nurturing figure to discuss the problems that are encountered in being a foreign student.

It is difficult for given individuals who work with Arab students in the U.S. to fill both the roles of authority figure and of nurturer. Should foreign student advisers, for example, be firm and formal with Arab students, insisting on the use of titles and last names and engaging only in ritually polite interactions? Or should they seek to be warm and open and try to establish a pleasant personal relationship with Arab students? It can be confusing for Arab students to deal with a person who shifts from one role to another. It would be better if the student could deal with two different people, one in the authority role and the other in the nurturing role. If an office that deals with foriegn students has only one staff member, it is possible to have that person fill the authority role and then find another person, perhaps an experienced and acculturated Arab student, to serve informally as a mediator between the office and the newer students.

Part 3:

Iranian Students

Factors Affecting Non-Sponsored Students from Iran

Frederick E. Lockyear

At any gathering of U.S. college and university personnel who work with foreign students, there is likely to be more discussion about students from Iran than about students from any other country. One reason is that Iranian students compose the largest group of foreign students in the U.S., and it is reasonable to suppose that their numbers will increase even more in the next few years. The Iranian government says it expects the flow of Iranian students to the U.S. to decline by the mid-1980's, when more post-secondary institutions are scheduled to be open in Iran, but my own experience in Iran suggests that that expectation is unrealistic because it is taking longer than expected to get the new institutions built and staffed. I think we face the prospect of having large numbers of non-sponsored Iranian students in the U.S. for many years to come.

According to 1978-79 estimates, there are between 37,000 and 75,000 Iranian students in the U.S. One-third of the estimated 37,000 are in four states: Florida, Texas, Oklahoma and California, according to a representative of the Iranian Embassy. In Tehran last year, 12,000 student visas were issued. In Shiraz, 4,000 student visas were issued.

It is not just their numbers that bring attention to Iranian students in the U.S. Large-scale political demonstrations involving Iranian students and Iranian political activity on many campuses increase the visibility of Iranian students, who also present large numbers of academic and financial problems and sometimes behave in ways which Americans have difficulty dealing with.

Some other contributors to this report offer ideas about aspects of the social and cultural background of students from Iran. In an effort to clarify the "problem" of Iranian students in the U.S., I will

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focus on the educational backgrounds of these students. I will look at the pool of applicants from which Iranian students come to the U.S., at the counseling services available to prospective students in Iran, the translation bureaus in operation there, the American colleges who are hungry for bodies and unsophisticated in their selection techniques, the pressures of military service in Iran and the lack of opportunity to enter universities there. Looking at all these factors, the only conclusion easy to draw is that the situation is extremely complicated.

In thinking about the pool of applicants from which Iranian students come to the U.S., it is useful to consider the following facts:

- In 1976, 300,000 Iranian students sat for the Konkur, the national entrance examination. Some 20,000 were successful in gaining entrance to universities. Another 20,000 to 25,000 entered non-university, post-secondary education. This left more than 250,000 who were seeking entrance to schools abroad or looking for a job.
- Consider also that the best students can receive a free education in Iranian universities, and with this education comes considerable prestige. Another 20,000 to 25,000 of the better students can receive a free education at other post-secondary institutions. Thus, much of our applicant pool for schools in the U.S. comes from the bottom 80 per cent of those seeking post-secondary education. By itself this statistic does not sound too bad, but consider the fact that these students have never been in a science laboratory and do not know how to use a library. Those who are university graduates seeking graduate training have taken many courses without textbooks and have rarely read more than 100 pages per course taken on the university level.

In other words, the students coming here from Iran are not the best qualified students coming out of the Iranian educational system. A representative of the U.S. Fulbright Commission in Iran made the following comment to me: "It is unfair and inappropriate to expect a student who is marginal by Iranian standards to successfully undertake college or university work in an entirely different culture in a second language."

- Young Iranians who do not enter a post-secondary institution face conscription into military service, a prospect that most consider unwelcome. Thus, there is a scramble for admission to foreign institutions, especially ones in the U.S.

Now let us look at the counseling services that are available in Iran for young people who want to come to the U.S. to study. Quite sophisticated counseling services are available in Tehran. AMIDEAST has provided a comprehensive counseling and placement service in Tehran for a number of years. Although they do an excellent job, the staff is small compared to the number of students coming to the U.S.

Last year AMIDEAST, in cooperation with the Iranian Ministry of Science and Higher Education (MSHE) and the United States Information Service (USIS), began a predeparture orientation program in Iran. AMIDEAST hired and trained three Iranians who were graduates of universities in the U.S. to conduct three and one-half hour sessions with students who were leaving to come to the U.S. The Iranian government and the U.S. Consul agreed to require students to participate in this program in order to get a visa. More than 2,000 students went through the program last summer, but the program was available only in Tehran.

In the fall, a pre-admission counseling program was begun again by AMIDEAST, USIS and MSHE. This program helps, but many prospective students are not being reached by it.

Even in Tehran, the pre-admission counseling available to prospective students is not always very sophisticated. To illustrate the degree of sophistication that can be found in counseling services in Tehran, let me relate what happened a year ago to a prominent U.S. director of admissions who was sent over by the State Department to review the counseling situation in Iran. While he was at the office of one Iranian agency, he noticed that all day long the only applications for admission being handed out were from a particular small, private university in the Pacific Northwest. When the director of admissions asked the counselor why only these applications were being handed out, the answer was, "It seems that this school knows a great deal about Iran. We know this because the school sent us 100 application forms." In other words, they were handing out the 100 application forms to the first 100 students who came in.

Outside of Tehran, you find very little in the way of counseling. In Shiraz, for example, one person works out of the Iran-America Society offices. She does this on her own as a private individual and collects fees from students she counsels. Even less counseling is available in other cities.

There are many operations called "translation bureaus" in Iran. These are the people whose seals can be seen on a transcript from an Iranian applicant. They say that this translator is certified or approved by the Ministry of Justice. What that approval means is that the translator is considered to be a competent translator. It does not mean that the Ministry of Justice has in any way reviewed the transcript after it has been translated, and it does not certify in any way that the translation is accurate. In fact, the translation bureaus can be particularly ingenious. They can certainly improve the quality of a student's work with some simple omissions or "errors" which come into the transcript. It is always appropriate to be extremely careful when reviewing a transcript that comes in from a translation bureau in Iran. For example, a little over a year ago, I received a call from the person who handles foreign admissions at a university in the Northwest. He had received a transcript from a translation bureau in Isfahan. The student's average at the bottom of the transcript was shown as 14. Since the university requires an average of 15 for admission, they denied the applicant admission. A couple of months later they received another transcript for the same student. None of the grades was changed, but the average computed at the bottom was changed. It was now slightly more than 15. This is the type of "error" that can creep into a transcript. These "errors" are deliberate and can be subtle, and unless the person reviewing the transcript is particularly careful, it is easy to be fooled.

Let me mention that I was speaking last year with a person who runs a translation bureau in a provincial city in Iran. He told me that he had been approached by a young person who was about to be drafted into the Iranian Army and who needed to be placed in an American university within two weeks. This person from the translation bureau told the young man that it would cost him approximately $5,000 to get placed that quickly. He flew to the United States with the records and within four days he had the student placed in a university. He then returned to Iran and charged the student a little more than $7,000 for placement.

Not all of the questionable or unethical behavior *vis-à-vis* prospective Iranian students is practiced by Iranians or Iranian organizations. U.S. organizations are also involved. To illustrate, last fall I was in Tehran as an observer at a TOEFL administration. While there I encountered a young lady who had an I-20 form from a small, private, two-year college with a total enrollment of about 200 students. The I-20 form indicated that she had established her English proficiency on the basis of "past correspondence and grades" and that she was admitted to a program in engineering. After talking with her a little, I determined that she had never written to this college and that her cousin had secured the I-20 for her. I later determined that the college did not have an engineering program; nor did it appear to have a pre-engineering program. Since this woman had completed one year of university engineering studies in Iran, for her to attend a two-year college with neither an engineering nor a pre-engineering program would have been a complete waste of her time. Unfortunately, some American colleges are so hungry for students that they do not take into consideration the hardship they cause by admitting a student for whom they can provide little or no educational opportunity.

One might suppose that U.S. consular officials would notice these virtually bogus I-20's and not issue student visas to applicants who present them. But the consular services are understaffed. Visa applicants may begin lining up at 4:00 a.m. to see a consular officer;

the officer may have two or three minutes with each applicant. Because the consular officers are overwhelmed, they cannot study I–20's carefully or verify applicants' financial documentation.

Many U.S. educational institutions, like the one that sent the I-20 to the woman described above, apparently believe that if a student is Iranian (or Arab) he/she must have money. This assumption is dangerous. While many Iranian students come from affluent families, many others do not. Most are not sponsored by their government and may not have the funds to remain in school long.

Almost every Iranian student coming here has heard stories from a relative or friend that it is possible to work or get a scholarship. Therefore, many students arrive believing they can work or get a scholarship and do not have adequate funds for their education here. Even many who do have the money will not request it from home because they do not want to be a burden on their family.

In summary, many Iranian students who come here are either weak academically or not academically inclined. They have probably not received adequate pre-admission counseling or pre-departure orientation. They may not actually have the financial support they claim. They are angry at the government of Iran, first for not letting them enter a university, and then, after keeping them out of a university, for wanting to draft them because they did not enter a university.

Because they are weak academically, they frequently have academic problems in U.S. colleges and universities.

As a result of academic problems which come from their weak preparation, Iranian students transfer some of their dissatisfaction with Iran to their educational experience here. Others have had little intention of ever going to school here, and they just vanish into the woodwork.

If we were talking about a handful of students from Iran, perhaps all these problems would not be particularly significant. When we realize that we are talking about anywhere from 37,000 to 75,000 Iranians, we realize that the scope of the problem is great. Eventually the Iranian situation may bring about a serious situation for all foreign students unless the problems discussed here are faced and solved.

To help solve the problems I would suggest two things. The first is more careful selection of students from Iran. Accept only the best students. Refuse to accept anyone who appears to be marginal. This would mean that those accepted would definitely have good academic qualifications and a better potential for academic success here. The student who is not well prepared and who would be potentially disgruntled should not be brought into higher education here.

Second, I would recommend periodic review by the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the right of educational institutions to issue I-20's. That right should be cancelled when violations of sound practice are found. If a few institutions lost their right to issue I-20's, I believe abuses would stop quickly. These abuses could easily be documented and presented to the INS. I say this in full realization that the INS has many other priorities which must be higher on their list than this one. As the number of abuses mounts and their results become more obvious and painful, perhaps the INS will give higher priority to reviewing the practices of institutions that admit students from abroad.

Social, Cultural and Religious Factors Affecting Iranian Students

Marvin Zonis

The number of Iranian students now enrolled at institutions of higher education in the United States warrants the close attention of American educators, especially since those students are subject to a multitude of pressures. Cultural, social, religious and political factors all affect the performance of Iranian students and their ability to function effectively in their university settings.

It is most important to note at the outset that those factors contribute to the successes which Iranians have experienced not only in being educated at American colleges and universities but also in beginning to meet the formidable challenge of creating credible universities in Iran. The intelligence, adaptability, openness, sensitivity and sophistication of Iranian students are among the many virtues which account for what is, in fact, an extraordinary success story.

That there are failures—more than any of us are comfortable with—should not detract from the magnitude of the Iranian achievement. That I focus here on the factors influencing Iranian students and contributing to those failures is not meant to suggest that the factors are universal, the resulting problems typical or the failures common. Rather, these remarks are directed towards those of us who would minimize the problems that do exist.

One is struck by the magnitude of the generalizations which must be made in order to delineate those social, cultural and religious factors and apply them to the very diverse community of Iranians in the United States. In a certain sense, it would be as sensible to talk about the social, cultural and religious influences affecting American students in the United States. With that reservation in mind, I will attempt to construct some "ideal type" generalizations which probably apply to no single individual student, but, we can hope, will

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have some relevance to the problems confronted in advising students from Iran.

Cultural Influences

The most important cultural influence on Iranian students in the United States is the educational system of Iran. Coming out of that educational system, Iranian students enter our institutions of higher education with a conception of the nature and functions of education which is largely different from that of our own students. For clarification of this point, I direct your attention to *An Analysis of U.S.-Iranian Cooperation in Higher Education.* *

I will restrict my remarks here to those influences on Iranian students about which less has been written. Let me concentrate first on the changing values of Iranian society. Our Iranian students are coming from a maelstrom of values, a society which is being beset by a variety of forces which call into question virtually every value which exists in Iranian society. American students were subject to this process especially during the 1960's, but the process is more wrenching in the Iranian case. Iranian society is being buffetted by the unprecedented amount of capital that is flowing into the society. Revenues from oil exports were running at the $1 billion level in 1970. In 1974, they were $25 billion per year. In addition, Iran is dominated by systems of values–religious, political and intellectual–which are unusually resistant to any coherent response to the rapid pace of social change.

One result of the flood of competing values is that many Iranian students tend to disparage all systems of value. Their basic belief seems to be that everything is in question, and since everything seems to be in flux, nothing is of worth. There is almost an agnosticism about all values.

As a result, one detects a kind of aimlessness or a shifting between value systems or even contradictory behaviors on the part of any given student as he either moves back and forth within a system of values or is influenced by different sets of values at any particular moment. It is not atypical for students to follow sets of values which are superficially contradictory.

We all hold some contradictory values, or at least values which cannot be simultaneously realized, but this phenomenon is more widespread in the Iranian case. There we see systems of seemingly contradictory values operating simultaneously. For example, one might ask an Iranian student what his goals are. Three different answers may be given at the same time. You will learn that the student wishes to return to Iran, get a job and contribute to the "White Revolution." He also wants to return to Iran and make a revolution, and he wants to stay in the United States, marry an American girl, make a lot of money and live in Los Angeles. As a matter of fact, he does genuinely want to do all those things. To suppose that the student is telling different things to different listeners is to miss the depth of the value mix.

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* By Carl K. Eicher and others. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, Overseas Liaison Committee, 1976.

A second manifestation of the cultural mix is the different values held about individual behavior. The motives of others are greatly mistrusted. Many Iranian students disparage other people's motives and believe that others' behavior is motivated overwhelmingly by self-seeking goals. It is doubtful to me that the behavior of Iranians is any more self-serving than that of Americans, but among Iranians there is a widely shared cultural value that human behavior is self-serving.

At the same time, Iranians value self-sacrifice and altruistic behavior. The standard example is the warning to be careful about making a compliment to a host in Iran because if he were really a good host he would immediately offer his guest the admired object. Now that kind of self-sacrifice is a widespread ideal and Iranians celebrate the admittedly rare individuals who meet that ideal. Iranian students seem to be searching for individuals who can be idealized as embodying this kind of altruistic behavior, which is represented for Iranians most tellingly by Ali, the son-in-law of the prophet Mohammad, the "founder" of Islam, and by Ali's sons, Hassan and Hussein. These men are venerated because they gave their lives almost 1400 years ago in defense of what they and contemporary Iranians view as the "true" succession for leadership of the Islamic community following the death of the prophet.

Foreign student advisers have been idealized in this fashion, although Iranian students may reflect ambivalence about such people. They may show an idealization of the self-sacrificing person and, frequently, a certain dependency upon that same individual. But they may also reflect a deep-seated cynicism about the motives of others. Because this dilemma has no fixed resolutions, students seem to fluctuate in their behavior from challenging others to accepting them uncritically.

Another key cultural value characteristic of many Iranian students is a very widespread mistrust of all authority or hierarchy systems. A great deal of evidence in the everyday lives of Iranians supports the wisdom of mistrusting authority. Many institutions, from the family to the government, are suspect in the way they use their authority. The assumption is not so much that these systems of authority are materially corrupt, although that is assumed to be true, but corrupt in terms of values. These authority structures, for example, are believed to have goals which are different from their manifest goals. Behind every stated goal are assumed to be a set of latent goals which are the actual goals of the structure or organization.

A second form of corruption is that the individuals who make up these authority structures are believed to pursue their own goals rather than the stated ones of the institution. The third aspect of value corruption is the belief that the people who are in positions of authority have reached them either through sycophancy or political "pull." Therefore, students tend not to respect individuals who are in positions of authority. Finally, Iranians widely believe that organizations in Iran use the very people whom they are supposed to benefit. The individual exists to serve organizations, it seems, rather than the other way around.

I suggest that these beliefs begin with the first experiences a child has with authority systems. That is to say, it begins with the child and his mother and father—with the Iranian family—and is carried on through the relationship of the subject to the monarch of Iran and affects every other institution in which Iranians function.

One result of this mistrust of hierarchy is very relevant to the task of the foreign student adviser. Virtually every Middle Eastern student I have ever talked to shares this misunderstanding. In the Middle East there is almost no university which is not of, by and for the state; almost every university is a state institution. They exist to produce graduates to serve the state—to train people with the technical skills defined as in the interests of the state. They are also by the state, i.e. staffed by people who are professional civil servants, and, of course, they are public universities. Iranian and Arab students come to this country and believe American universities are comparable. The concept of public and private universities in the U.S., or the distinction between a public university in the United States and a public university in the Middle East, is one which escapes Middle Eastern students. Those students have all heard what the University of Cairo is like or what the University of Tehran is like, even though they have never studied there. They assume that every university in the U.S. fulfills the same functions and is organized in the same way.

Thus, annual increases in tuition may be understood as a way to penalize students, since it is well known that the state will provide "their" universities with the money anyhow. There is no distinction in the Middle East between public and private institutions. Even a private business in the Middle East exists only at the day-to-day sufferance of the government. The distinction does not appear significant there and, similarly, does not appear so in this country.

There is also no understanding of the nature of power within the university system. Universities in the Middle East are important political structures. Not that we lack politics in our own universities, but in Iran or the Arab states, the central political system is directly concerned with and operates immediately inside of the environs of the university. The university is related in an intimate way to the national power structure.

At best, most students from the Middle East assume that universities are instruments of the state, are controlled by the state, cooperate with the police of this country and of their own societies and strive to produce individuals for the benefit of the state. It is obviously a self-fulfilling phenomenon, for if students believe this about universities they will act in certain ways which will encourage universities to respond in kind. We have here a phenomenon which is also not unknown among American students, but which certainly strikes at core values in the pursuit of higher education.

Another cultural value entails what can be called the active-passive dimension. A fundamental crisis in Middle Eastern values is embodied in the dilemma of activity-passivity, or independence-dependence. (If one prefers Freudian metaphors one could speak of masculinity-femininity.) The dilemma of activity-passivity represents a continuum which I think is a central issue for all young people in Iran and is different from the case in the United States. Obviously, how active or how passive one is remains an issue for each of us. We all grow up with different amounts and forms of independence or dependence; but my hypothesis is that the active-passive dimension is the central developmental issue for young people in Iran.

I believe that the institutions of Iranian society provide fundamentally ambiguous messages about this active-passive continuum. Consequently, individuals are put into an almost intolerable dilemma of being simultaneously active and passive. What results is a great deal of frustration and repressed rage which appears under seemingly innocuous circumstances and helps explain why many Iranians (and also Arabs) seem to pass with relatively minor provocation from extremes of a sort of politesse, almost obsequiousness, to what some of us might feel is brusqueness or hostility. Both sets of emotions, of course, are always present in the same individual.

The central source of this dilemma of activity-passivity is to be found in the structure of the Iranian family. The father expects, demands, and in fact receives respect as a patriarch. The child cannot become an adult until his father dies. Sons cannot receive the respect, nor are they allowed to make decisions which are befitting an adult, until the death of their own father. The person must remain a child *vis-à-vis* the father and often *vis-à-vis* society—even though he may be an older adult. He must also be independent *vis-à-vis* the other parts of his life. For example, he must be master of his own wife and master of his own children at the same time that he must be dependent on his father. The student is expected to be an independent student while remaining subservient in his family and even in the classroom. While it is not impossible to live with these contradictions–many people do so all the time–the dilemma, in combination with other factors, is particularly acute for Iranians.

One of those exacerbating factors is, of course, the entire Iranian political system. The political system is in some ways a mirror of the family system. The Shah is the chief patriarch. He is a ruler in the patrimonial sense of having, in his view, a legitimate claim on everyone and everything in Iran. He frequently refers to Iranians as "my people." The payments that come to Iran for the export of its oil are called royalties because they are, in the first instance, paid to royalty as his income. Iranians are put into a system of dependency *vis-à-vis* the political hierarchy which also makes demands for passivity, for acceptance and for obedience. As in the family, there is also a dilemma inherent in the relations of the subjects to the political system. The people are expected to be active participants in the development of Iran at the same time as they are to manifest passivity *vis-à-vis* the holders of power.

The dilemma of activity-passivity has significant results for Iranian students. One is a widespread cultural assumption that individuals are not really personally responsible for their activities. Rather, responsibilities lie in the system, for since the individual is passive or dependent on the system's structures, individuals should not be expected to accept responsibility.

A second result is rage. I suggest that there is a pervasive sense of rage among Iranians and a whole variety of cultural devices which serve to repress the rage–serve to deny, if you will, that it exists. One important instrument for repression is the system of linguistic devices which Iranians call *ta'arof*, the exaggerated form of verbal politeness. A virtually limitless number of linguistic devices exists which govern verbal interactions and insure the smooth unfolding of interpersonal relations. The *ta'arof* style of speaking becomes so conventional that even when unnecessary or inappropriate, it is used and serves to block emotions from speech.

A second mechanism for repressing rage is the immense emphasis placed on self-restraint and self-control. An individual is expected to be able to restrain himself except under the most strident provocations, at which times it is the responsibility of another person to help the person in danger of losing control. Both practices, of course, serve to limit the expression of the rage which is always present and potentially destructive. The rage is viewed unequivocably as a very grave threat to the individual's well-being and to the system as a whole.

In the U.S. the same cultural mechanisms for the control of rage do not exist. Note that I refer here not to differences in the personality of Iranians versus Americans. I am not claiming that the average Iranian student is more angry than the average American student. Rather, the claim here is that the mechanisms which are provided by American culture for the control of that anger are not familiar to or habitual for the average Iranian student.

As a result, Iranian students see themselves in a situation which offers an unparalleled opportunity for freedom of expression. But such freedom is immensely threatening because it also raises the possibility of the expression of all those internal forces which their culture has so long urged them to restrain.

One outcome is an unusually high level of acting out which occurs as the cultural mechanisms for constraint are lifted. The individual is left culturally defenseless in the face of his own rage and with a high level of personal discomfort from the possibility of expressing formerly taboo emotions. The acting out is often very frightening to the individual, as he violates cultural and personally held values. The result is personal stress and interpersonal friction.

Social Influences

Social influences refer to two notions: the social system and social behavior. The single most important pressure on Iranian students in Iran and in the United States is undoubtedly the pressure for social mobility, the pressure for career success, which will result in an elevation of social status. Social mobility in Iran is, in fact, a very widespread phenomenon, with all the greater pressure for each individual to experience it. Students are expected to develop the skills which will help them (and with them, their families) to achieve social mobility. Success in Iranian society is measured in terms of mobility and the ability to transmit the status which one achieves to others in one's family. Social mobility in Iran, as it is everywhere else, is achieved in a variety of ways. It is achieved not merely by technical skills or career competence; it is also achieved through interpersonal relations, by developing interpersonal skills, by "a gift of gab," etc. Iranian students spend a great deal of time developing those skills because, of course, they are very important in Iran. Whereas Americans at least claim to find such skills peripheral, Iranian students are quite determined and are under intense pressure to develop them.

A second social influence stems from the more widespread distribution of goods and services in Iranian society. There has been a major trickling down of material goods to formerly excluded strata of the population. For the first time in Iranian history, sons and daughters of these strata are attending not just secondary schools in

Iran, but colleges and universities in the United States. The result is a form of social conflict among Iranian students from very different social strata. Many Iranian students in America do not share the same value systems because they represent very different strata of the Iranian population. These social cleavages are a second major source of social pressure.

A third source of social influence stems from the extraordinary financial pressures under which Iranian students find themselves. Such pressures originate in the first instance from pressures for social mobility. It is so important to experience social mobility that families in Iran will go to extraordinary financial lengths to try to support the education of their children. One result is the tremendous number of students who are sent here. As you know, more students in the United States are from Iran than from any other foreign country in the world, a number certainly exceeding 50,000. Many of these sons and daughters come to the United States financially ill-equipped to cope with the economics of higher education. Even the government of Iran, except in rare cases, does not supply the level of financial assistance which would alleviate the pressures on these students. As a result, there is yet another dimension to the pressures on most students—especially students from these new strata whose parents are by no means well-to-do.

Yet another aspect of social tension is produced because Iranian students now come from regions of Iran which were formerly not represented in the Iranian student community. This phenomenon is a relatively new one. In the past students came from a few major cities—primarily Tehran. Now students appear from regions which in the past simply were not represented here. What is important about the regionalization of the student body is that the geographic regions of Iran correspond to linguistic or ethnic divisions of the population. In other words, we have students from different Iranian linguistic and ethnic groups coming to American universities. The majority of the population of Iran does not speak Persian as its native tongue. Students now come from those areas of the country whose languages are not, in the first instance, Persian. Thus, while the entire school system is conducted exclusively in the Persian language, regional and ethnic languages such as Turki, Arabic, Kurdish, Gilaki and Baluchi remain widely spoken. In short, a regional/ethnic/linguistic source of division has lately been introduced into the Iranian student community.

Let us turn from these sources of social cleavage and tension among Iranian students in America to another type of social issue—the dating-marriage-sexuality area. It is one area which is only now being understood as an important influence on Iranians in the U.S. Certainly dating, marriage and sexuality play as important a role among Iranian students as they do among American students. Equally obvious is that generalizations among Iranians are as problematic as they are among American students. But the effects are there. The incidence of dating as we understand it in the United States is virtually non-existent in Iran. (The higher the social class, the more likely one would find boy-girl dating in Iran.) In addition, no secondary school in Iran is coeducational. One cannot attend school with a member of the opposite sex in Iranian society, whether it be a private school or a public school. What heterosexual socializing does occur is, of course, very closely managed and supervised, usually by the family of the woman. Given the ingenuity of the young, however, opportunities for private meetings are undoubtedly found—at least in the larger cities.

But on balance, opportunities for boy-girl contacts are few. As a result of the unavailability of heterosexual contacts in Iran, in my view, a relatively high incidence of friendships and camaraderie among members of the same sex exists. Iran also appears to have a considerably higher incidence of homosexual relations than the U.S. It is important to mention that such sexual behavior is not to be confused with what is here considered homosexuality. For example, Iran has no "gay" culture, but rather same-sex sexual relations which exist as a substitute for heterosexual relations, which remain the desired form of sexual tie. When individual young men in Iran can afford it, they will go to prostitutes, but when they cannot afford that, they may have sexual relationships with other males. Generally these relationships disappear at the time of marriage.

All of this suggests a vast amount of confusion among young Iranian students in the United States regarding not only the nature of sexuality and how they ought to relate to the sexual possibilities which are offered by American society, but also the issues of masculinity and femininity. What is true for students of both sexes is certainly the fact that they experience a rush of excitement towards and preoccupation with heterosexual activities; whether these be sexual or not really is beside the point here. But there is a sudden involvement with the opportunities presented by American culture which are not available to the same extent in Iran. This is yet another example of the point I have made about the consequences of the lifting of the cultural restraints and the attempts by the Iranian student to cope with the new opportunities and pressures.

Religious Influences

Virtually all Iranian students in the United States, as is the case with virtually all Iranians, were born Shi'ite Moslems, in contrast to the remainder of the Moslem world, who are almost equally likely to have been born Sunni Moslems. It is not important here to elucidate the distinctions between Shi'ism and Sunnism in the Moslem world. What is very important is not the issue of doctrinal difference but the fact that Iran is the only country in the world whose official state religion is Shi'ite Islam. That the Shi'ite form of Islam is irretrievably bound up with Iranian nationalism is the most significant fact about the religion of Iranian students in the United States.

In the minds of many young Iranians, I believe, it is the religion of Iran which embodies that which is distinctively Iranian, that which in other societies would be considered nationalism. As such, Shi'ite Islam and those people who are the masters of its symbols and doctrines, which is to say the Islamic clerics, became the prime competitors of the Shah of Iran for control over the symbols of nationalism. Two competing systems of nationalism exist. One is this religious sphere and the other was the institution of the monarchy, the Shah, both competing for the claim to represent the "true" Iranian nationalism. What is also significant about the religious sphere is not merely that it was the principal competitor of the Shah for a nationalist vision, but that it is the only area of Iranian life which the monarch did not succeed in bringing under his direct control. It is only the religious sphere in which there remains a modicum—and, in fact, a considerable amount—of independence from the central political system. That independence gives great credence to the clerics' claims that they represent a system of competing nationalism. Iranian students, then, are involved in religion not only for all the reasons that our students are, but because in Iran, to be involved in religion means a form of political opposition to the existing distribution of power in Iranian society. In short, because it is dangerous to engage in open political conflict in Iranian society, people talk about religious issues and interact in religious terms in what symbolically is, in fact, major political confrontation. This same phenomenon exists among Iranian students in this country. The religious issues are of central importance to many (but not all) students, not solely because of their intellectual, philosophical, moral or eschatological aspects but because they they represent a way of dealing sensibly, in a disguised form, with the political issues of Iranian society.

These three areas—the cultural, social and religious—are significant sources of influence on the lives of Iranian students in the United States. Along with the complications which are introduced through the fragmented and frequently bitter struggles of Iranian politics, described in the following article by Professor Binder, Iranian students are subject to an inordinate amount of internally and externally generated pressures. They respond to such pressures in all the ways in which American students respond—occasionally by the more intense pursuit of their academic goals, but more frequently with apathy or withdrawal from school, substitution of political activity for intellectual, and, of course, a familiar array of acting-out behaviors.

One particular difficulty in dealing with the academic or social problems of these students is their own manner of understanding the nature of their problems. Simply put (to again make a gross generalization), Iranian society is not psychologically oriented, and, for all the richness of its poetic and mystical traditions, is not conducive to the development of introspection.

Two patterns seem to result. One is that Iranian students will usually locate the source of their problems externally. Their difficulties are to be explained by the failures of others or by flaws in institutions or systems. Other people are seen as doing Iranian students wrong by acts of omission or commission. Their own responsibility for the solution of their problems is thus limited to (a) doing something to change those external sources of difficulties; (b) striking back at the external source; or (c) bearing up, passively, under the burden of their problems.

While most Iranian students will locate their problems externally, a relatively smaller number of them will accept total responsibility for their difficulties. All too often, however, this acceptance of responsibility is done defensively, not with a view to facilitating personal changes to cope more effectively with the difficulties. Rather, one is struck by an almost defiant or sullen sense of martyrdom or self-deprecation.

However different these two modes of responding to difficulties are, they share the rather comforting avoidance of having to deal constructively with one's own self. Iranian students are thus rarely consumers of the mental health services offered by American colleges and universities.

In Iran, among the children of the upper classes of Tehran, there is an increasing awareness and use of psychotherapists. But even among this group, seeking help through psychotherapy is rare. More common throughout the society is an understanding of the problem in a totally different fashion. When the external difficulties become internal, they are understood not as emotional difficulties but as physiological ones. Iranians, then, tend to somatize their problems and to seek physical explanations and physical cures to what Americans would more often define as emotional problems. With equal opportunities and resources, Iranians will seek the ministrations of physicians more often and the services of mental health professionals far less often than would a comparable group of Americans.

But, certainly, physical illness is only one possible mode of response to one's problems. Another is to strike back. One form which this behavior may assume among Iranian students in the

United States is what American academics define as cheating. Naturally no statistics on cheating are available, but many American educators believe that Iranians disproportionately cheat. It is difficult to assess the validity of the charge, especially given what I perceive to be a rather general discomfort on the part of U.S. professors with Iranian students. However, to the extent that Iranian students do cheat, such behavior can be understood as an attack on the central values of the system which is causing them difficulties.

Put differently, Iranian students understand that cheating is an act of dishonesty. It is occasionally the case that students will justify such behaviors on grounds which appear puzzling to their American counterparts. Such justification is most likely to be used when the student believes that the professor has not performed his role appropriately. In Iran, that role is conventionally defined as helping. Teachers are to provide students with information which they need to be educated and to pass their examinations (the two being synonymous). If the teacher fails to meet his responsibilities in this sense, then the student may feel justified in cheating.

Cheating will also help Iranian students to respond to other sources of pressure by doing well at school–getting respectable grades–and thus, as they see it, increasing their chances for finding desired employment, all of which satisfy the high aspirations of their families in Iran who have, in all likelihood, made considerable sacrifices to send them to the United States.

How, then, ought American educators to deal with Iranian students, with students who bring different modes of perception and understanding to the educational system? Several courses of action seem essential:

(1) Key officials and faculty within an institution should discuss and clarify a policy for dealing with all foreign student problems which are common to the entire institution. Iranian students, like many others, are extremely astute at finding weaknesses within the college or university and playing off diverse parts of it for personal benefit.

(2) A special orientation program should be required in order to explain the nature of the institution, its modes of governance and finance and its expectations of students, both academically and otherwise. These should be presented in different ways to maximize the probability of understanding. Explicit, written statements of all such matters should be distributed.

(3) Teachers and advisers should deal with Iranian students in as explicit, public and demanding a manner as they do of all students. I think it is crucial to lay the law down very fast. "This is it! This is what the rules are." Start off by giving them the book. I mean literally giving them the book which has all the rules about when

payments are due, when classes are held, how many credits are necessary, what the disciplinary rules are, etc. Then they cannot say, "I didn't know." It will be doing them a favor to lay down the law in this manner, both because it provides information and because it gives the students a form of social or external constraint. They are not going to like it. They are going to bridle at the teachers and advisers who do this, just as they do at all authority systems. But teachers and advisers are not there to be loved; they are there to help these students get through the system.

(4) To teachers and advisers, I would say that, in a sense, the best way to deal with many Iranian students is not to know anything about Iran. The less you know about Iran, the better. It is, after all, your expectations which they have to meet. They want to be in your institution and get a degree from your institution. It is, therefore, your expectations which become dominant, a matter which must be clarified while of course demonstrating sympathy and understanding for the problems of foreign students.

(5) More rigorous application of existing admissions criteria will usually serve to restrict student status to those Iranians (and all others) who are most likely to seek education for its own sake and be able to meet the school's requirements. Certainly educational institutions should resist the temptation to admit large numbers of students to solve, directly or indirectly, their own financial problems.

(6) Many academic and social problems could be avoided by the vigorous screening of foreign students for competency in the English language.

With these and the application of other fundamental principles of higher education, American educators should be able to minimize the difficulties presented to Iranian students by their new educational, cultural and social milieus. In that fashion, Iranian students will be more successfully integrated into the American system of higher education.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: You mentioned homosexuality and close relationships among members of the same sex. Would you say that strong attachments among men, or feelings of loyalty to friends, play any role in the Iranian student movement?

A: I think the answer to that question is "yes," but only under certain conditions. Libidinized relationships between men are much more acceptable in Iran than they are in the United States. It is legitimate for men to have erotically charged relationships, irrespective of whether those relationships result in any form of sexual behavior. I am not talking about homosexuality in the conventional

American sense. I am talking about the fact that men can be very close and can have emotionally charged relationships with other men. That is a part, in my view, of the dynamics of the Iranian student movement.

Q: You said that for Iranians restraints against undesirable behavior come from outside the individual. In Iran, in my experience, it is not the family that imposes these restraints, but the teacher in school. Parents indulge their children no matter how old the children are—even after they are grown, so the children do not learn self-restraint at home. Teachers, though, are expected to restrain them, using physical punishment if necessary. Would you agree with that?
A: I think that is accurate. The problem with such a system is that when the system of externally generated social controls is not operating, one can act out. I have suggested that precisely this process occurs with many Iranian students in the U.S. It is only with the teacher imposing the discipline that there is order in the classroom. Of course, there are different authority systems to which young people are subjected. The family, as you suggest, is clearly the least rigid. The school is a second major authority system. The police and other governmental bureaucracies are very important and omnipresent in Iranian society. The point is that there are many major instruments and agencies for the exercise of social control in Iran, and they are more pervasive and efficacious than is the case in the U.S.

Q: I guess you are referring to self-control of actions and not control of emotions, because I certainly would think that in comparing and contrasting Americans and Iranians, an Iranian is very free to express his emotions. He is very open about expressing emotions as compared with a male who does not cry or does not show anything except in extreme situations.
A: Yes, that is also an important point. Iranian males and especially females are not only freer to express emotions, but are expected to be more emotionally demonstrative than Americans.

Q: The concern I have is not that we should know every nuance of a foreign student's culture, but that we should have a sense for the critical moments in people's reactions to things, and then know how we can deal with them at that point. For instance, if you lay down the law to some Iranian students, in particular, you are going to meet several responses, either the passive or the active kind. Quite often it is consistently passive, but at some points it is very active. At some levels it may be very histrionic. There may be threats. I wonder if the use of verbal threats is a tradition in Iranian culture.

How far would you let a threat proceed against a particular authority figure who says "no?"

A: By threats do you mean threats about physical damage?

Q: Bodily, physical threats.

A: This is a difficult issue. The histrionics are a very important part of Iranian culture. The display of emotion is not merely considered acceptable, but desirable, and to the extent that you can be histrionic you are considered to be a better person and a more loving and loved person.

But I believe physical threats are relatively rare. Iranians do not come from a culture in which such threats are made. But non-physical threats are made—the threat to go to higher authorities is probably the most common and most acceptable.

Q: What about threats that the student will take his life? For example, we hear Iranian students say things like, "If I don't get a passing grade in this course, I will have to take my life." And we have had suicides among the Iranian community.

A: "Educational suicides" are common in Iran. A parent might commit suicide if his children cannot get into the right schools or do poorly. Or children will spare their parents the humiliation of their own failures by leaping off a roof, jumping into a river or whatever. I think all of these things have to be taken seriously because I know that there are such suicides in Iran. The problem is that responding is most difficult because of the element of histrionics which may be present. One is never sure, because there are so many gestures or threats. My rule would be that suicide threats always be taken seriously because of the magnitude of the consequences. The threat of suicide is a cry of pain which must be heard.

Q: So if you do take it seriously, what would you suggest as the best approach within the framework of your knowledge of the Iranian culture? Would a peer be a better person to spend time with that student while he's in his depressed state?

A: Clearly an appropriate response would be to counsel the student to psychotherapy. If follow-up indicates that such advice has been ignored, then peer intervention would be a good idea. I am unsure of the extent to which you feel you are violating confidences by talking to peers, etc., but I think that would be very appropriate.

Q: One of the things that many universities are concerned about youngsters today is a clarification of values. Students are concerned with developing their own values as a part of their own development. What about the Iranian students and the value conflicts that are

emerging? I wonder whether you think some work on values clarification would be appropriate with them.
A: That's a very difficult issue of course because one doesn't even know which set of values to begin to help them develop towards. I think that it would be presumptuous of us to try to do that. They are in a milieu which has different sets of values than their own. In a certain sense, it is easier when there are large numbers of Iranians on the campus because they can work with each other over the issues which are significant to them. I have a feeling that it would be very difficult for a foreign student adviser, for example to do much in that area.

Q: My question concerns the relationship between religion and politics. We've heard from a number of speakers that in many Arab countries the ruler or the ruling people have in essence taken over the job of reinforcing religion. For example, in Saudi Arabia the rulers are not religious leaders but certainly are seen as religious enforcers. In Iran you say that that is not the case. Would you like to comment on why and how it is different in Iran?
A: It would be inaccurate to say that the monarch or the members of the royal family and the leading political figures do not support the religion. They go to great lengths to try to disseminate and support the religion. They do that for different reasons and in different ways than is the case elsewhere. The Iranian people generally understand the efforts of the regime to propagate the Shi'ite Isamic faith as attempts by the regime itself to acquire legitimacy from the religious system. That is to say, the regime is viewed as trying to use the religious system to gain legitimacy. The regime is not seen as interested in Islam or its intrinsic theological merit.

Q: Some of us have read in newspapers about religiously inspired riots in Iran. One group involved in them is called "Islamic Marxists." That's an interesting term that seems to combine incompatibles. Are they opposed to the modernization process? Are they against some of what is happening because of the oil wealth, the improved status of women and all of the other things that go along with modernization? Is this part of why they react to the Shah, or is it totally unrelated?
A: The regime always claims that the motivations of those religious elements which oppose the regime are solely their opposition to the reforms being introduced by the regime; that is, the clerics are alleged to be motivated by opposition to liberation of women, to land reform, etc. I think that is a misrepresentation of the situation. They are certainly opposed to certain kinds of reforms which we would likely support. But there is much more to it than that. The

fundamental issue is the opposition of those religious elements to the secularization, westernization and modernization of the state as defined by a regime which they view as deriving no legitimacy from the people over whom it rules. Quite to the contrary, they view the regime as deriving its legitimacy from the United States. They see the regime as a foreign agency working against the interests of the Iranian people, as defined by the clerics of the Shi'ite faith. Irrespective of the validity of that position, it would be wrong to assume that their opposition to certain modern reforms represents the essence of their oppositional stance to the regime. In fact, they represent the only sort of organized, public opposition to the regime.

Political Factors Affecting Iranian Students

Leonard Binder

Politically speaking, Iranian students are generally constrained to choose whether they will take a stand opposed to their own government, or quiescently, or not so quiescently, support it. Why and how they make this choice is often a mystery and will naturally be a function of their individual life circumstances. The most that we can do here is to discuss a number of those factors that might determine what choices they will make.

The political context within which they have to make a choice is, of course, significant. I will offer some generalizations about it, generalizations that might be useful for people who work with individual students. Even if it does not appear that individual students are making a choice between supporting and opposing their government, it would be a rash mistake to think that a large number of them are either fundamentally apolitical or so untouched by the political context that they are not aware of the fact that they have either taken a position or have consciously abstained from taking a position.

In this regard, I think that the Iranian situation is very different from the situation of other countries of the Middle East. The political characteristics that we find in Iran are not any one of them unique as far as the Middle Eastern political scene is concerned, but the combination of these factors intensifies the situation of Iran to an extent that makes it quite distinctive. The political situation facing Iranian students is not the same as the one facing students from Iraq or Algeria.

Two aspects of the politics-student situation are unique in Iran. The first is the degree to which and the manner in which political development, or political change, or political modernization, have occurred in Iran. The second is the relatively unique development of political opposition, including student organizations.

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Now let us consider some of the general characteristics of political development in Iran. These are characteristics that can be found in other countries, but are not found in this combination.

First of all, Iran has a monarchy and is presumably based upon a constitutional framework. The powers of the monarchy are nominally limited, although in practice this limitation is very small. Iran is a modern constitutional monarchy and understands itself this way. That is, it presents itself not merely as a traditional government but as a government which has made the transition from tradition to modernity. It does not present itself as resisting the revolution which transforms a government into a modern government. The old order presumably went down with the last dynasty.

Secondly, Iran has an elaborate bureaucracy. This bureaucracy may not work efficiently, may not work in a manner which pleases everyone, may waste a lot of money, and may be overstaffed, but it is more or less rationally organized according to the various tasks of government that we understand to be distinctive and separable into regular departments–industries, transportation, the post office, education, the foreign office, etc. It is a typical Weberian bureaucracy with ranked officials and job descriptions and salary increases after so many years in each position and so forth. Again, it does not await a revolutionary change. Iran has already made that transformation. Maybe it does not work as well as one would want, but in an ideal sense it has made the change.

Thirdly, Iran has, in terms of administration and policy-making and economic control, a rationalized system of government. Centralized policymakers view problems that may arise in the future and plan against possible kinds of change. Instrumentally rather than traditionally oriented, the administration has set rational goals, among them economic development.

However, Iran is not a perfectly modern state. It does not work efficiently. Economic development, one of the central goals that has been sought for decades, involves managing resources and expending them in such a manner that they may increase the welfare of the population and enhance the position of the government. It is clearly understood that resources are limited and that with rational policies it is possible to organize and manage resources to suit the purposes that the government may have in mind. It is also understood that it is possible to use these resources for political purposes, to gain loyalty by distributing them among various kinds of people.

Extensive land reform is one outcome of the rational coordination of political and economic policy. However, land reform is another modernizing policy which has weakened the economic and social base of at least the regional and local elites who had based their influence on ownership of the land and on control of the peasants who worked on that land. Land reform has directed the efforts and interests of the landowners into other pursuits—bureaucratic, entrepreneurial, and so on. Therefore, the class structure of the society is no longer the class structure of a traditional society. No longer decentralized, diffused and agriculturally based, the social structure may have elements reflecting the fact that it once was a traditional order, however, the economic base that had been the foundation of the Iranian social structure for thousands of years has been fundamentally altered. Iran's social structure is a modern one.

An entrepreneurial class has emerged as a consequence of the land reform. Iran has large factories and some centers where numerous factories have been established. A laboring class has emerged, and banking institutions have been established. Although Iranian capitalism does not work the same way American capitalism works, Iran has a capitalistic sector.

Fifth, perhaps in a contradictory fashion, given these developmental aspects of the modern state and the modern economy, a police state has developed in Iran. Public order, political order, political activity and political communication are all strictly controlled by a burgeoning security organization or set of security organizations which have, especially since the mid-1950's, become stronger and more ubiquitous, more efficient, more searching and more adventurous. They have developed newer and, from their point of view, better techniques to the extent that the reputation of the internal security apparatus has gone far beyond its actual effectiveness. It appears to outsiders and to its victims as monolithic, all-powerful, ubiquitous, enormously skilled and capable of penetrating into any sector of the society. I think it falls far short of that. It also has the reputation of being extremely brutal and unfeeling. All the evils of which human beings are capable have been said to be embodied in this organization. Whether or not this reputation is deserved is unclear. One hears dreadful reports about what goes on in the places of incarceration and interrogation, but one also hears other stories that seem to suggest that things are not always so bad.

People do indeed disappear and people are being tortured and killed. Thus, whether one takes the extreme view or a more moderate one, it is clear that a relatively effective police state apparatus has been built up over the last 20 years and with a good deal of American support, at least in the beginning. The internal security apparatus has become a central political symbol identified with the regime. Hardly any Iranian will be unaware of this or will be passive in his judgement of this organization.

Along with the development of these contrasting aspects—a bureaucratic, rationalized, modern, capitalist state and a police and security apparatus which suggests a high degree of totalitarianism, centralization and authoritarianism—a spirit of nationalism has developed since the 1930's. This is a sixth characteristic of Iranian political development.

Numerous traditional elements have been blended together to form a modern Iranian nationalism. It is remarkable that while strong nationalist feeling exists among Iranians, no great work elaborates the principles or the spirit of Iranian nationalism. What exists is a combination of a linguistic and religious uniqueness and a cultural heritage that goes back to pre-Islamic times. In addition, Iran has an artistic heritage which is unique and outstanding in decorative arts, poetry, literature and architecture. In sum, Iranians may point to their past with pride and may feel themselves to be quite distinctive from other Moslem countries. They perhaps feel no need to elaborate on their tradition in a formalized statement of the bases of their nationalism. The sense of Persian nationalism is clear to them and not a matter that has to be elaborated and worked out. Both the monarchy and the opposition use the symbols of nationalism in their appeals for public support.

A seventh characteristic of politics in contemporary Iran is the concern for its international image. The policies not only of the present Shah but also of much of the elite and even of the counter-elite are concerned with the international prestige of their country. Thus, much that goes on politically is concerned with how other people view Iranians and with what Iran does on the international stage. A matter of national pride, Iran's international image is also of significance because it may be used to strengthen the regime or to weaken it. Therefore, much of Iranian politics is played out in an international arena, an arena that sometimes includes the campuses of educational institutions in the United States.

If all of these things were not sufficient to make Iran something quite unique in the Middle East, an enormous amount of petroleum lies underneath the ground in Iran. It has given rise to a windfall affluence with enormous effects on the politics of the country. One consequence of this affluence is that a tremendous amount of wealth is being handed around. The political stakes have become very high. Wealth can be broken up into all kinds of chunks and distributed widely to large numbers of people. This situation politicizes a very large number of people in all kinds of social classes because they can now get some share of this affluence. Furthermore, the affluence brings Iranians to the center of world politics and brings attention to Iran, allowing it to work much more effectively with its neighbors and to have a more important role in the Middle East.

Above all, the affluence means that Iran has to make fewer concessions to a world standard which is set by the developed world, by Western Europe and by the United States, as to what its politics ought to be about, what its cultural goals should be and how it should adapt its internal political and social arrangements to an international standard. Their affluence allows Iranians to say, "Well, you have your definition of modernity but we have our definition of modernity, and we can afford to pay for our definition. We don't have to take your money. We also don't have to accept your standards."

Iran has used its wealth and its capacity for producing petroleum to influence the policies of other nations in ways that enhance its own position in the world. This is the so-called "politics of oil". These policies have brought even more wealth and influence to Iran.

Now, one would think that a government with such wealth and influence would have enormous popularity among its own population. It is a modernized, developed, rich country with a strong nationalism, a centralized bureaucracy and large numbers of educated people. How does it happen that in the midst of this remarkable set of circumstances such a strong and well-organized opposition movement exists?

The second unique characteristic mentioned previously is the development of strong political opposition and of the Iranian student organizations. The younger generation, particularly the students, are highly politicized and the intensity of political opposition that we find in Iran is absolutely remarkable. Whereas Middle Eastern countries have periodic manifestations of student opposition to particular governmental acts or policies, Iran has consistent counterposition of various branches of the student movement and of other political movements which are linked with the students against a government which is described in the most fantastic terms. The government is described as being fully in control, completely centralized and absolutely authoritarian, as though it had gone beyond the effectiveness of the Stalinist regime, which is the model for much of the description.

Against this purportedly brutal and totalitarian regime is a movement of students who are willing to be killed—who have in some cases been killed—who will brave what they know will be the use of main-force police lined up in tanks, armored cars and motorcycles if the government fears that something is going to take place. The student opponents of the government show a clear willingness to resort to the most extreme kind of force. While the opposition movement includes urban guerrillas (who have taken action against Americans as well as Iranians in Tehran), most of what goes on in the form of opposition to the regime is not of an extreme nature and is manifest in student demonstrations on the campus and elsewhere. Demonstrations within the confines of the religious shrines at Qum have expressed the opposition of religious students from all parts of the spectrum of religious opinion.

On a broader scale one sees in Iran a widespread disaffection and rejection of the regime. Nearly anyone one speaks to informally will be critical of the regime and will call it authoritarian. Very few people will praise the regime as a political structure or set of political institutions. Nearly every time that one hears the regime praised it is in a quasi-public way where someone else is expected to be listening and where what is said may be reported.

What I am describing is a very unusual situation which is not easily understood or explained and has no historical precedent. The Iranian regime embodies a tremendous centralization of political power and also a willingness to use ruthless force—a combination that most of our American theorists of political development did not expect would be characteristic of political development and modernization. Our theories did not include, and U.S. governmental aid policies did not anticipate, the idea that political modernization and economic development would be accompanied by the highly committed negativism that characterized Iranian politics. Iranians are brought up into a kind of cultural opposition to and criticism of the regime. They carry it from Iran when they go to school elsewhere, and they form organizations that show remarkable solidarity. Organized on campuses throughout the U.S., they may have a center or headquarters from which they operate in the larger cities. In Chicago, for example, they work out of a clearly identified neighborhood storefront. The movement is not clandestine, for the most part.

Consider the organized, large-scale demonstrations that took place during the Shah's 1977 visit to the U.S. No ordinary phenomena, these demonstrations far exceeded what was expected. Such activities pose a problem of public policy in this country and a problem for every university administrator in western society.

One group that is well known for its interest in and ability to organize political activities is, of course, the Communists. Going back into the 1940's, Communists have been involved in Iran. They have been better organized there than elsewhere in the Middle East. A large, effective Communist Party supported by the Soviet Union at one point infiltrated the army and the bureaucracy. It even had one or two religious leaders in its ranks. Communist influence no doubt persists in Iran although it is less effective than it once was.

Most likely a fair amount of Communist influence exists in the most radical elements in the student movement. I cannot prove this assertion, but I think it is true. Such slogans as "The Shah is a U.S. puppet" seem to come more from a Communist viewpoint than any other. It is difficult to see how the use of such anti-American slogans could influence most Americans in favor of the students who oppose the Shah. Those Iranians who are most vocal in their opposition to the Shah, who are most organized and quite obviously in receipt of funds and direction from outside, do not appear to be acting only on the basis of a sense of rejection of the regime. They appear to be involved in a serious political confrontation, with serious planning aimed at an overthrow of the Iranian regime.

From the Communist Party or not, external support for the Iranian student movement in the United States and elsewhere exists. Some kind of central organization and communication is evident. This organization can be seen clearly in instances where particular events—not just the Shah's visit but those of his wife and other well-known Iranians—have brought about protests that were clearly orchestrated across the U.S. Iranian students go from place to place to participate in protests and use a common rhetoric which is sometimes decidedly anti-American and anti-capitalist, leftist and radical.

This is not to say that unity exists among the Iranian students. Indeed, they are factionalized, although the factions are organized, in some cases perhaps with the aid of Communists. Demonstrating leadership and organization, the student movement is not a spontaneous welling up of opposition to an authoritarian regime. One sees a systematic orientation toward goals. What goals, though?

Two major oppositional orientations among the Iranian students are evident. One is overthrow of the regime, and frankly, we do not know very much about those who have this orientation. The organization, doctrinal bases, and goals of students who hold this orientation are all unknown. It may very well be that all the people in this faction hope for is that somebody will take a lucky pot shot at the Shah that will bring everything tumbling down.

The more interesting oppositional orientation, at least until the regime is overthrown, I have called "positive system challenging"—challenging the system, not with a view to overthrowing it (I call that orientation "negative system challenging") but challenging the system, declaring its illegitimacy, with a view to getting a share. Positive challenging of the system involves making oneself available to be asked to join the regime, to be coopted. The way one makes oneself available is first to make oneself known. The best way to make oneself known is to criticize the regime, to raise a storm of protest. One is more likely to get a decent job if one comes from an unknown family, if one is a student leader who has been making trouble, and if one indicates that one can be bought off. One can be invited to talk to a Minister and be offered a job. If one is not that important, maybe by a Deputy Minister. Maybe by the head of a department. This is the way in which the mechanism works. It is the primary basis of the recruitment of personnel into the various bureaucratic and political structures of the Iranian government.

I have been discussing general aspects of politics and student opposition. Let me close with some remarks about the implications of all this for individual Iranian students in the United States. When looking at an individual student, it is important to try to figure out "where he's at," what is on his mind and what his problems might be. Where does he come from? What does his father do? What is his social class? How does he fit into this picture? Why did he come to the States instead of going to school in Iran? Generally, one is better off going to school in Iran. It is already a strike against a young Iranian if he failed to be admitted to a university in Iran and came to the States to go to school.

Remember that the way a young person gets into the regime is by cooptation. Iranian students know that one has to be somebody that the regime already likes or somebody that they do not like. If they do not know you, they neither like nor dislike you.

Thus, we have the Iranian student far away from home, with uncertainty about the possibility of a career. The student feels considerable uncertainty about what it means to be an Iranian now, since so much change is taking place. He knows at the cultural level what it means to be an Iranian, but not what it means in terms of work. Can he make a career? If he succeeds in getting in, how does he go up? Where does he go? Is it arbitrary? He knows that the Shah could have dismissed him at any time. Does he have to perform well? Does he have to perform loyally? Tremendous uncertainty is involved in these considerations.

And what does he do politically? He will see all these other Iranian students organized and espousing various views. They will threaten him, cajole and ridicule him to get him to join them. On the other hand, he will see that not every Iranian student joins these organizations.

When they join it is not clear why they join, whether it is out of some deep political conviction, out of the belief that they must join in order to become known, or from simple peer pressure or some combination of these factors. It is clear that, whatever political choice they make, they are being watched and their choices will be made known back home. Iranian officials have publicly stated that they employ people to watch their students in the U.S.

It is not easy to be an Iranian student in the U.S. The situation back home is full of tension and uncertainty. Pressures are great on Iranian students here. A potential for violence exists in both places. In these circumstances it is difficult to make rational choices. Irrational behavior cannot be unexpected or surprising.

The Role of Women in Iranian History

Fahimeh Mortazavi

The progress of Iranian women through the centuries must be considered in the context of Iranian history itself, for women have often played major roles in Iran's more than 2,500 years of recorded history.

Iran is a country richly diverse in terrain and culture, and this diversity has left its mark on the history of the Iranian people, producing both primitive nomadic tribes and one of the world's greatest empires, the Achaemenian, which at its peak under Cyprus the Great stretched from India to Egypt, covering most of the known world. While the story of Iranian women's emancipation is primarily a modern one, much of the present success has its origin in a previous heritage. Thus, the history of Iranian women must be considered within the framework of three basic periods—the period prior to the introduction of Islam, the post-Islamic period, and, in modern times, the progress made under the Pahlavic Dynasty.

Pre-Islamic Period

The ancient lore and history of pre-Islamic Iran (the period prior to the mid-seventh century, A.D.) is filled with the deeds of famous Iranian women—wives, mothers and female rulers. Women's status in these early times reached its peak with the rise of the Achaemenian Empire (540 B.C.) when, building upon earlier practices, women were considered full partners of men. Women retained high social status during the following Parthian Dynasty (223 B.C.-223 A.D.) although they were not as active in political affairs. But a peak had been reached and, with the advent of the Sassanian Dynasty (223 A.D.-632 A.D.), women found their position radically altered. It is true that in the writings of Zoroastrianism, which became the state

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religion during this period, the education of women was encouraged. The religion also considered men and women to be equal in creation. But, at the same time, women lost much of their social equality with men, retaining only their authority over the household and the right to own property. Marriage laws were modified and polygamy became permissible if the husband could prove he had adequate support for an additional wife. As opposed to the Parthian period, when women could unconditionally divorce their husbands, divorce could now be granted only if the terms were mutually acceptable to both parties. The literature and poetry of this 800-year period reveal a generally high regard for women.

Post-Islamic Period

The most dramatic alteration in the status of Iranian women followed the Arab invasion of Iran in the mid-seventh century, A.D. The change occurred not as a result of the introduction of Islam itself, but from practices adopted under Arab influence. The teachings of Islam granted women numerous and extensive privileges, such as the right of ownership, economic independence, equality in business transactions, the right to education and the right to accept or reject marriage proposals. The Prophet Mohammed, in expressing his own high regard for women, attempted to stress this belief in his own actions and statements. Although the practice of polygamy was continued to ensure that the surplus female population would be adequately provided for, it was restricted and institutionalized by the *Koran*. A man was permitted up to four wives but was required to treat them equally.

Unfortunately, the prophet's followers did not adhere to his enlightened concept of women. Also, because the Arab-imported culture and tradition gave women little status, practical reality differed widely from the ideal. The *Koran*'s concept of modesty, which states that a woman should reveal herself only to her male relatives, was translated into female seclusion. Women were covered with veils and forbidden to participate in public affairs.

After 200 years of Arab rule, the Iranians revolted in 850 A.D. Persian women gradually regained some of their earlier rights. In the following centuries a number of women rose to outstanding roles in national affairs. As the centuries wore on, several women emerged as active contributors in astrology, music, literature and calligraphy. As Western culture developed in the 18th and 19th centuries, Western-style educational institutions were founded in Iran and Iranians began to study in Europe. Women joined in this activity, and the turn of the 20th century saw a small but growing group of women who were highly educated and interested in the betterment of the status of women.

Period of the Pahlavi Dynasty

The emancipated status of modern Iranian women closely follows the constitutional history of 20th century Iran. Women worked for and supported the adoption of the 1906 Constitution of Iran and joined in the struggle against the Quajar regime. Many moved on to lead the struggle for women's rights in the 1920's and 1930's, publishing their works, supporting democratic changes and serving as personal models through their actions. Outwardly it seemed that the veil was the main point of controversy surrounding women's status. When Reza Shah the Great assumed power in 1925, women were effectively second-class citizens suffering from a number of restrictions: they could not vote or hold public office; they could not pursue higher education because of discriminatory entrance requirements; under the Civil Codes, they had no status in the family—husbands were sole heads of families and could prevent a wife from holding employment or travelling; in marital relations, men could unconditionally divorce a spouse and had sole rights to the children.

Gradually, under Reza Shah the Great, some of these restrictions were lifted as the country itself moved forward to greater days. The first change came in 1928 when women were allowed to study abroad and receive government grants towards their education. But the most drastic and long-awaited change came when Reza Shah the Great announced the abolition of the veil in 1935. The first women to appear in public without veils were the queen and the monarch's two daughters, Princess Shams and Princess Ashrof. Their act was one of great courage in a society which had veiled women for almost 1300 years. The Civil Code was modified, allowing women to obtain divorce for specific reasons, such as nonsupport or ill-treatment, and women were admitted to the civil service and to the university.

The Revolution of Shah and People, initiated by Shah Reza Pahlavi in 1963, transformed many aspects of Iranian life, particularly women's status. Especially important was the fact that women were given the right to vote and hold public office.

Women voted for the first time in September 1963 in the national election, and six female deputies won seats in Parliament. The Shah followed by appointing female senators.

The first woman cabinet minister was appointed in 1965, as minister of education. The numerous women's organizations which had existed throughout the country were consolidated in 1966 into the Women's Organization of Iran, under the presidency of her Imperial Highness Princess Ashrof. The first assembly of this new organization brought 7,000 delegates together in October 1966 and resulted in an urgent call for reform of the Civil Codes. The government sponsored the Family Protection Act, which became law in 1967.

Under the new law women could initiate divorce by applying to the courts. They also were given the right to retain custody of their children after divorce, and the minimum marriage ages were raised to 18 for women and 20 for men. The act was further modified in 1975 to eliminate the mutual consent requirement for divorce, leaving the decision entirely to the courts. Mothers were also given custody of their children upon the death of the father, rather than having guardianship go to male family members, as had previously been done.

In 1967 women were admitted to judiciary and the police force. In 1968, the Social Service Law was passed, enabling women to participate in the Revolutionary Corps, serving for two-year periods in the areas of health, literacy and rural development. As women increased their active involvement in the social and economic development of Iran, their influence began to be felt in rural as well as urban areas. The first women were elected to town councils in 1969 and to county council in 1971.

Before the overthrow of the Shah, women representatives held 21 of the 268 seats in the Majlihs (Parliament) and two female senators are among those appointed and elected in the Senate. In the cabinet, the minister of state for women's affairs was Mrs. Mahnaz Afkami, who received the appointment in January 1976. In early 1978, the Shah appointed Dr. Mehrangiz Dolatshahi to be Iran's first woman ambassador, assuming the post of representative to Denmark. Up until the revolution, five of Iran's 105 undersecretaries were women and 18 of the 465 departmental directors in various departments were female. The ministers have appointed 500 women and 3,500 men as experts. In 1975, two of the 393 district chiefs and two of the 438 mayors were women. Women constitute 50 per cent of all primary school teachers and 33 per cent of secondary school teachers. In actual numbers there are 55,000 female teachers. In institutions of higher education there are 1,803 women professors. In the major state-supported universities women occupy 15 per cent of all full-time faculty positions; at private institutions the figure is 25 per cent.

Education is recognized as the key factor in determining the rate at which women can more fully participate in society. As early as 1944, legislation concerning compulsory education was passed, and since then many other steps have been taken to make educational opportunities more accessible to all Iranian citizens.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: Right now there are more students in the U.S. from Iran than from any other country. Even larger numbers are expected in the next few years. Why are so many of them coming here?

A: Right now in Iran, education is very, very important. For families at all economic and social levels, getting education for the children—males and females both—is first on the list of things to do. Parents encourage their children to study overseas, and these days that means in the United States. They make very big sacrifices in order to send their children here. They will sell land, carpets or whatever is necessary to raise money for their children to study in the U.S. Studying in the U.S. gives people a certain amount of status, even if they do not graduate. They have been to America—that opens doors for them.

Q: Is education really so important for getting ahead in Iran?
A: Yes. If you have a bachelor's degree, you're nothing. Nearly everyone who lives in an urban area and wants to work has a bachelor's degree. If you want to get a job in a ministry or some other good job, you need a master's degree. Titles are important, and if you have a PhD, all doors are open to you.

Q: We have a political forum that meets periodically on our campus. Often Iranian groups there debate among themselves, and they really go to it. Is that typical?
A: That's classified as an argument. When you are having an argument, you have to really have an argument. You can't just sit there peacefully and have an argument. You have to show your energy. Everything comes out.

Q: We worry a lot about the many non-sponsored students who come here with only enough money for one year. Is there anyone in Iran who is telling prospective students how expensive it is to go to school and live here?
A: That has been a problem. Many Iranians have the idea that it is possible to get a job in the U.S. once they get here. That has made studying in the U.S. more attractive than studying in Europe, where foreign students are usually not permitted to work. Of course, we know that it is usually necessary to get permission to work here, and both that permission and jobs are hard to get.

Another factor here is that many U.S. colleges and universities are recruiting in Iran, campaigning to get students here. The recruiters go to Iran and persent a rosy picture of the United States, saying, "Don't worry about it! We'll take care of it." These recruiters give an unrealistic picture. Now that the Iranian government is requiring an orientation program for people coming to the U.S. to study, we can hope that Iranian students coming here will have a more realistic idea of how much it costs and will not come here unless they can afford it.

Q: Is anyone telling them about the need for health insurance?
A: Yes, I think so. As I understand it, the government is now requiring all people who are coming to the U.S. as students to have health insurance. They can get a policy through an American company.

Q: We are sometimes faced with a young female Iranian student who is distraught because of pressure she is getting from American students in her dormitory or, from other Iranian or foreign students, to participate in dating or other social activities with Americans. These young women might be here just to study, and all these pressures bother them and sometimes interfere with their studies. They may be interested in being more active socially, but they do not know how to go about it. They seem to be afraid that dating means going to bed with someone. What can we do to help in situations like this?
A: We're talking about two different value systems, with a conflict between them. Usually when a person comes to the United States to study, her number one priority is studying. Our living standards and habits are different from Americans'. We don't have to go out every Saturday night. Our dating is not done the same way as it is done in America. So the fact that these students spend their time studying does not necessarily mean there is a problem, as a lot of people tend to assume it does.

I have personally dealt with female students who are having problems as far as dating is concerned because they want to date on a different level than is done here—they want still to be at home and date in the way it is done there. Or they feel that they want to become Americans and accept American values, but they know their families will not approve, so they feel they have to retain their old value system. Value conflicts like these affect people. Some counseling and some time can help them. You cannot change their values for them. You can assure them that they are not weird for having these feelings. You can say, "Tell me what your values are," and, "These are our values." You try to help them develop values they can accept. You give them information about the dating system here. After some time, they will work out what they want to do.

Q: How would you suggest that students keep up with the rapid changes that are taking place in Iran so that going home will not be such a shock?
A: I think the Iranian embassy should try to send students information about what is going on at home. And I think students should be encouraged to go home for a visit at least once a year, if they can afford it. It's not so expensive, with the discount Iranian students get from the national airline.

Q: How can the climate of fear among the Iranian students on a campus be dispelled?
A: Not easily or quickly. One thing that happens is that some of the political organizations capitalize on the insecurity of newly-arriving Iranian students to talk politics with them and try to induce them into taking certain political stands or joining certain organizations. I would suggest that you not use older Iranian students in orientation or helping with new ones.

Q: What nonverbal behaviors should be observed with Iranian students?
A: Use your title, rather than just your first name. Using only your first name implies that students can expect special favors from you.

Among Iranians, touching takes place only among family members or friends.

Q: In view of the fact that many Iranian students coming to the U.S. are very young and unaccustomed to the amount of freedom they find here, what approach should be taken in dealing with them?
A: I'd make several suggestions. Clarify every instruction; ask them to repeat their understanding of what has been said. Then hold them responsible for anything that has been agreed upon. Don't let them cop out by saying "I'm a foreigner," or "I don't understand," or "I didn't know."

You can help them accept reality. In Iran, all "no's" can be resolved if you know the right people and procedures. Let Iranian students know that here it is not like that. There may be no alternatives. Be frank and direct, and do not wait until a problem has developed fully before you take this approach.

You can help them find their identity. They are reluctant to accept counseling, but in conversation you can ask them about their perceptions of things and about their values and the areas where their values conflict with the ones they find in the U.S. Then you can ask how to deal with these differences.

Appendix I:

Bibliography

A very large amount of material about the Middle East has been published, and any selection from that body of material is inevitably arbitrary. An extensive listing of publications about the Middle East can be found in John Bagnole's *Cultures of the Islamic Middle East: A Guide to Introductory Readings for the Non-Specialist,* published in 1978 by the America-Mideast Educational and Training Service (AMIDEAST). Price $4. (See address under organizations.) The publications and annotations in this bibliography that are noted with asterisks are taken directly from Bagnole's Guide and are reprinted with permission of the publisher. Other annotations were provided by the NAFSA staff editor. The publication has annotated entries concerning 402 publications. It also lists bibliographies, reference books, journals that include articles about the Middle East in general, and then lists a few publications concerning specific Middle Eastern countries represented by the largest numbers of students in the United States. The bibliography concludes with information about two of the many organizations that can be asked for more information about the Middle East.

Publications

General

*Berger, Morroe, *The Arab World Today.* Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc. (Anchor Books), 1964 (originally published in 1962).
This is an excellent study by a well-known professor of sociology who deals with the personality, culture and social institutions of the Arab world. The book is thorough, e.g. the chapter on "Men, Women, and Families" includes sections on love, marriage and divorce; family roles; the rearing of children; changes in the family; and the changing status of women. Other chapters

include "Islamic Background of Arab Society," "Patterns of Living: The Desert, Village, and Urban Communities," and "Personality and Values." Outstanding, not-too-technical, and comprehensive.

*Hamady, Sania. *Temperament and Character of the Arabs.* New York: Twayne Publishers, 1960.
A popular and somewhat controversial pioneering study of a sensitive topic by an American-educated Druze social anthropologist/social psychologist. The book attempts to describe, analyze and generalize about the Arab character. Topics include "Feelings and Reactions," "Identifications and Loyalties," "The Arab's Outlook on Life" and "The Arab Mind." The study is quite comprehensive but many readers may find the descriptions more valid than the analyses. Although it is sometimes unclear where the generalities stop, the book is still valuable.

Hammond, Paul Y., and Alexander, Sidney S., *Political Dynamics in the Middle East.* New York: American Elsevier Publishing Co., Inc., 1972. Copyright by the Rand Corporation.
Studies in this volume constitute part of a larger research program on the economics and politics of the Middle East. This publication examines regional conflicts, military perspectives, the Arab-Israeli dispute, politics of the Fertile Crescent and the involvement of extra-regional powers.

Hudson, Michael. *Arab Politics: The Search For Legitimacy.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.
The first systematic comparative analysis of political behavior throughout the entire Arab World. Hudson sees the present malaise in Arab politics as the result of insufficient legitimacy accorded by the people to their ruling structures, ideologies and leaders.

International Journal of Middle East Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, quarterly journal.
Publishes scholarly work concerning the area encompassing Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Israel, Pakistan and the countries of the Arab world from the seventh century to modern times. Particular attention is paid to comparative religion, theology, philosophy, politics and economics.

*Landau, Jacob M. *Man, State, and Society in the Contemporary Middle East.* New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1972.
Part II of this book will be of interest to readers who want to know more about Middle Eastern society and culture (the Magrib is excluded). Distinguished experts discuss a multitude of topics, including "Religion and Ethnic Groups," "Arab Education," "Reading and Education in a Lebanese Village," "The Dilemma of the Arabic Language," "Youth and Women's Emancipation in Egypt," "A Day in Sana," "Homemaking" and so on. Interesting.

*Mansfield, Peter, *The Arab World: A Comprehensive History.* New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1976.

The section on "The Arab World Today" gives a good summary of contemporary trends and issues in Arab countries.

Lenczowski, George, editor, *Political Elites in the Middle East.* Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975.

Nine authors write about theories of organizations and elites in Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Israel and Lebanon.

McLaurin, R.D.; Mughisuddin, Mohammed; and Wagner, Abraham R. *Foreign Policy Making in the Middle East.* New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1977.

Analyzes the regional conflicts of the Middle East within the context of foreign policy processes of the respective states.

*Mernissi, Fatima. *Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in a Modern Moslem Society.* Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1975.

Written by a Moslem Moroccan trained in sociology in Rabat, France and in the U.S., this book attempts to analyze the sexual dynamics of the Moslem world and "to explore the male-female relationship as an entity within the Moslem system, a basic element of its structure." The book focuses on three imperatives of modern Moslem life: being an Arab in the face of Western influences, being a Moslem in the face of Christian arrogance, and the need to change the sexual division of labor in developing Moslem societies. Also of interest are the comparisons of the writings of Ghazali and Sigmund Freud and the discussion of women's liberation in the Arab world. Good bibliography.

*Patai, Raphael, *The Arab Mind.* New York: Charles Schribner's Sons, 1973.

A book of this nature is bound to be controversial. Delving into the psyche, emotions and behavior of "the Arab" is bound to lead to generalizations which can be refuted. Nevertheless, one cannot help but gain a better understanding of traditional Arab values and behavioral expectations by reading this well-written and comprehensive work on child rearing, language, Bedouin values, and modern society, "the realm of sex," the Islamic component, extremes and emotions, art, music, literature, conflict resolution, etc. The reader must be careful to balance when examining traditional and modern values, the particular and the general, and the stereotype and the real.

*Pierce, Joe E. *Understanding the Middle East.* Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle Co., Inc., 1971.

In this valuable documented account the author, an anthropologist, discusses many of the traditional values of Middle Eastern and North African cultures, such as honor, virginity, hospitality and religion. The book is well written but some topics are stressed at the expense of others. Partly due to the anthropologists' convention of writing in the present tense, the impact of modernization on traditional values is not always clear. Fine photographs, a glossary and suggested readings are appended.

Spaulding, Seth and Michael J. Flack, *The World's Students in the United States*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976.

This book contains, among many other things, an annotated bibliography of research concerning Middle Eastern students in the U.S.

State, U.S. Department of, *State Department Background Notes,* available by subscription from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

These periodic pamphlets provide a brief overview of the history, geography, economy, and political situation in each country of the world.

*Stewart, Desmond. *The Arab World.* New York: Time, Inc., 1962.

Using the pictorial essay approach, *Time-Life* has produced this well illustrated yet overly ambitious book designed to cover the entire contemporary Arab world. It is successful in showing diversity and uniformity in Arab culture. A good introduction, it should be supplemented by other works.

Symonds, *et al., Arab Culture Assimilators.* Out of print, but available in photocopy form for about $30 from the Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, Champaign, Illinois 61820.

The culture assimilators take a programmed learning approach to teaching about other cultures. The reader is presented with vignettes that can be interpreted in various ways. The reader selects the interpretation that seems most accurate, then checks against the "correct" answer. Studies have shown the culture assimilator approach to be successful in training personnel for work in various countries of the world.

The Middle East. London: International Communications Publications Ltd.

A monthly magazine distributed by IC Publications, Room 1121, 122 East 42nd St., New York, N.Y. 10017. Features news and information about the politics and economics of the Middle East.

Iran

*Arasteh, A Reza, with Arasteh, Josephine. *Man and Society in Iran.* Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1970 (reprint of 1964 edition).

The author examines both traditional and contemporary Iranian society and culture in order to draw conclusions about Iran's future cultural and social development. For those who enjoy the academic approach.

*Armajani, Yahya. *Iran.* The Modern Nations in Historical Perspective Series. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. (Spectrum Book). 1972.

A good introductory book on Iran, skillfully linking past and present with a slight imbalance in favor of the latter. In a documented yet highly readable style, the author unfolds the history and civilization of Iran from ancient times to the present. He includes discussions of the many Persian and non-Persian societies which have merged to create the modern state. Some of the author's "new interpretations" of certain historical events may be controversial but the basic presentation is sound and interesting. The chapters on **"Iran Under Islam"** and **"The Persian Renaissance"** are of particular interest. A helpful bibliographical essay is appended.

Chemers and Chemers, *Iranian Culture Assimilators.* See the entry under Symonds, above.

Kuwait

*Daniels, John. *Kuwait Journey.* Luton: White Crest Press Ltd., 1971.

A descriptive account of events, impressions and personalities of Kuwait by a British civil servant who, with his family, has spent over twenty-five years in Kuwait and other countries of the Middle East. An insider's view of traditional culture, including weddings and religious celebrations.

*Freeth, Zara. *A New Look at Kuwait.* London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1972.

One of the most readable books yet to appear on Kuwait describes and juxtaposes the old and modern sides of Kuwait in terms of life styles, material wealth and cultural traditions. The author is emotionally involved with Kuwait, where she has spent much of her life.

Libya

*Keith, Agnes Newton, *Children of Allah.* Boston: Little, Brown and Co. (An Atlantic Monthly Press Book), 1965.

A delightful and informative account of life in Libya in the 1960s by the wife of an American FAO official. Very well written, recounting many of the author's own adventures, the book also reveals a great deal about Libyan customs, ceremonies and family life. Many glimpses of the lifestyles of Libyan families, especially women, of different classes and in different regions of the country. Unusual line sketches by the author.

(See also Mize's bibliography at the close of his article in this volume).

Saudi Arabia

*Alireza, Marianne. *At the Drop of a Veil.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1971.

A personal account by a California woman who married into a prominent Saudi Arabian family and spent 13 years in intimate contact with Arabia. Mixing personal experiences with impressions of Saudi society in transition, the writer evokes emotion and empathy in this smooth-flowing narrative. A bit naive at times but a good reflection on one woman's cross-cultural experience.

*Lipsky, George A. *Saudi Arabia.* Survey of World Culture series. New Haven: HRAF Press, 1959.

A handbook on the land, people, culture and institutions of Saudi Arabia. Somewhat outdated but the first seven chapters are still relevant: culture and setting, history, geography and population, ethnic groupings and languages, religion, family, and social organization. To be supplemented.

*Shaffer, Robert. *Tents and Towers of Arabia.* New York: Dodd Mead & Co., 1952.

The personal account by an American diplomat sent to post-World War II Saudi Arabia to help administer an aid program. Filled with a myriad of anecdotes and descriptive detail of Saudi society before the petroleum revenues started flowing in. Well-written.

Organizations

AMIDEAST (America-Mideast Educational and Training Services, Inc., formerly called American Friends of the Middle East), Suite 100, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Furnishes bibliographies, film lists and publications concerning the Middle East. Much AMIDEAST material is related directly to educational exchange between the Middle East and the United States.

Middle East Institute, 1761 N St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Sponsors various educational activities concerning the Middle East, offers publications and has a film library from which films can be borrowed at low cost.

Appendix 2:

Some Concepts to Stress in Studying the Middle East

Space does not permit an elaboration of the points mentioned below but it is hoped that the brief notes which follow will prove suggestive rather than superficial.

The Middle East is a term which allows various definitions. Generally it has replaced the term "Near East" which comprised basically the territories of the former Ottoman Empire. The Middle East generally includes now, besides the aforementioned area, Iran and Afghanistan; some people include West Pakistan. Because of the similarity in geography, language and cultural aspects of its peoples, North Africa is frequently included, so that the Middle East in its widest sense reaches from Morocco to India.

Importance of the Geographic Base

A large part of the Middle East is desert land, broken by fertile valleys and jagged mountain peaks. Approximately 90-95% of the land cannot be used. The large deserts are the Sahara and the Arabian, plus the large desert areas of Iran and Baluchistan.

Seas include the Black, Caspian, Dead, and Red, the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean.

Rivers include the Tigris (1100 miles long, starting in Eastern Turkey and running through Iraq to the Gulf, with tributaries in Iran), the Euphrates (1700 miles long, also starting in Eastern Turkey and running through Syria and Iraq, combining with the Tigris before entering the Gulf), the Nile (4145 miles long, starting in East Africa, with the main stream flowing through Sudan and Egypt into the Mediterranean) and the Indus (1900 miles long, starting in the Himalayas and flowing into the Arabian Sea near Karachi).

***By permission of the publisher, this section is reprinted from Leonard S. Kenworthy, *Studying the Middle East in Elementary and Secondary Schools.* New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, copyright 1970.**

Part of the Middle East is called the Fertile Crescent, an arc or horseshoe-shaped territory extending from Iraq to Egypt. This has been a productive area in the past, but its fertility has declined in recent time.

The nomadic life is an adjustment to the lack of fertile lands.

Basic Resources of the Area

The Middle East (including North Africa) is the world's largest oil-producing area; it has over 60 percent of the world's proven resources, with vast areas still awaiting exploration. In order of oil revenue, the following were the leading countries (as of 1969): Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Iraq. Algeria, the Gulf States (including Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and Dubai).

Coal and iron limited, but one or both found in Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Algeria and Morocco.

Natural gas: contains one third of world's known reserves, with significant production begun in Algeria and Iran.

Gold deposits in Saudi Arabia and Sudan.

Chrome in Sudan and Turkey (10 percent of world's production).

Copper found in Iran, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

Manganese in Morocco, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Egypt.

Sulphur in Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Phosphates in Morocco (world's largest exporter of phosphate rock), Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria, Iraq, Israel and Egypt.

Potassium, magnesium and other minerals found in significant quantities in the Dead Sea.

Cement production important in Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Lebanon and Egypt.

Excellent cotton produced in Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Iraq and West Pakistan.

Area-wide production of fruits (¾ of world's dates from Iraq).

Wheat a major crop in West Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Algeria.

Tobacco grown in Syria, Lebanon, Turkey and Morocco.

Variety of People in the Middle East

The population of the area is approximately 250 million, of which the largest nations are West Pakistan (65 million), Turkey (35½ million), Egypt (34 million), Iran (28½ million), Afghanistan (17 million), Sudan (15½ million) and Algeria (13½ million).

These people belong to a great variety of ethnic groups. Easiest to classify by languages. The largest include:

–Arabic-speaking people
–Turkish-speaking people
–Persian-speaking people
–Urdu-speaking people (a combination of Persian and Hindi)
–Hebrew-speaking people
–Armenian-speaking people
–Berber-speaking people (North Africa)

The minority groups in the Middle East include the following:

–The Kurds: 4½ million in Turkey, 1½ million in Iraq (or ¼ of the population), and 400,000 in Syria (10 per cent of the people).
–The Armenians in various countries.
–The Azerbaijanis in part of Iran.
–The Pathans of Afghanistan in West Pakistan.
–The Arabs in Israel.

Population growth is high for the entire area–2.5 to 3 per cent. Second only to Latin America in percentage of gain.

Social groups include:

–Peasants, sharecroppers
–Bedouins
–Urban workers
–Intelligentsia
–Plutocracy, including some Bedouins, as in Jordan
–Refugees

Cities have always been important in the Middle East. The percentage of people in cities is as follows: Israel 70 per cent, Lebanon 40 per cent, Syria 33 per cent, Egypt 30 per cent, Iraq 20 per cent and Iran 15 per cent.

One writer states that the people of the Middle East live in four time segments: the nomads in the Bronze Age, the peasants in the time of Charlemagne, the small-town people in the time of Columbus, and the big-city people in modern times, and in some other time segments.

Understanding Some Characteristics of the Arabs

It is difficult to generalize about any group of people and yet there are some characteristics which seem predominant and helpful in understanding the Arabs. Among them these traits are common enough to mention.

- *Leisure, tending to resignation.* Due to many factors, including the climate, the health of many people, and their philosophy of life. Proverbs include "Hurry is of the devil" and "Patience is from God."
- *Individualism.* People usually count more than institutions. Politics in many instances develop around individuals.

- *Imagery in thought and speech.* Evident in the Bible and the Koran. Well illustrated by the poetry of Khahlil Gibran, Lebanese author known in the United States especially for his book, *The Prophet.*
- *Hospitality.* As a host, the Bedouin has no peer. For examples of this see the accounts of Justice William O. Douglas on his travels in the Middle East.
- *Love of feasts and festivals.* These events provide a break in the monotony of life. Twenty-four special feast days in the Egyptian Moslem calendar. In *What Is This Moslem World?* C.R. Watson says, "It is doubtful if any people, unless it be the Jews, have taken religious observations so seriously as have the Moslems."
- *Love of beauty.* Examples are the minarets, the lattices, the rugs and the Persian miniatures. Took such forms because of the prohibition on reproducing human figures or images.
- *Pride and sensitivity.* Once rulers of the world; loss of their exalted position and subjection to colonialism have hurt. Moslems consider Islam a superior, universal faith.

Long and Rich History

It is impossible here to do more than suggest the succession of the main empires in the Middle East. Novices may find this helpful; experts will certainly consider it reckless. A time line on the history of the Middle East is included in Ethel Ewing's *Our Widening World* (Rand McNally) textbook.

The longest span of recorded history of any region in the world. To most Middle Easterners this is a precious heritage; to some it is a mixed blessing and curse.

The succession of major empires included the following:

The Egyptian civilization of the Nile Valley.

The various civilizations of the Tigris and Euphrates valleys—first the Sumerians and the Mesopotamian civilization, then the Babylonian Empire, followed by the Assyrians.

Meanwhile the development of the Persian Empire, starting its prominence under Cyrus the Great, around 550 B.C.

Roman control came next, with the empire split in the 4th century A.D. into eastern and western parts; Constantinople became the center of the Eastern Empire, later called Byzantine Empire.

A long period of control by the Byzantine Empire 300-1453 A.D.

During part of this period the Sassanian Persian Empire was powerful in the eastern part of the Middle East (226-641).

Arab supremacy under the banner of Islam began shortly after the death of the Prophet Mohammed in 632 A.D. In 732 extended from the Pyrenees in the west to the borders of China in the east.

The Christian Crusades, 1096-1270.

The Arab-controlled Islamic Empire later broke up and large parts fell under Persian and Turkish control.

The Ottoman (Turkish) Empire lasted the longest of these (1290-1918).

Western domination, mostly British and French, over large parts of the area started in the 19th century and was strongest during the first half of the 20th century.

With the Republican regime in Turkey started a period of intense Westernization.

Contributions of This Region to World Culture

Discoveries and inventions by early man in the Middle East included the use of fire, the wheel, the domestication of animals, the making of pottery.

Later man learned to make bronze and then iron; to write in picture writing or hieroglyphics.

Fairly early, men constructed ships and began sailing into various parts of the world; Phoenicians surpassed others.

Four major religions started in the Middle East: Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Zoroastrianism.

Much of the culture of the Greeks was passed on to the Moslems, retained and often enriched by them, and then recaptured by the Europeans at a later date, via Spain.

Outstanding men in this region in mathematics and astronomy.

Much interest in medicine. Approximately 6000 medical students in Baghdad in 11th century.

Knowledge of chemistry and natural sciences advanced in Middle Ages.

Turks were long noted as organizers; great in architecture and ceramics, particularly tiles, outstanding in calligraphy and poetry.

Persians excelled in gold and silver ware, in superb rugs, in the tile work of their mosques and in their miniature painting.

Arab Shadow Plays outstanding, using leather figures against linen screens.

Many centers of learning were established; some have been in continuous existence for more than 1000 years, as Al Azhar in Cairo and the Qarawin in Fez (Morocco).

Damascus is considered to be the oldest continuously inhabited city in the world; Baghdad was the capital of the Islamic Empire for several centuries, fabulously rich.

Literature has ranged from the tales of the Arabian Nights to the work of Iqbal (the Shakespeare of the Moselm World) and Omar Khayyam.

Important Role of Middle East in World Religions

Home of various religions: Christianity; Judaism; Islam; Zoroastrianism (in Iran, with the Parsees now in Pakistan and India); Greek Orthodox Church, with claims to Istanbul as its capital; Baha'i, which started in Iran and now has a large center in Haifa in Israel.

Intense feeling about Jerusalem as center of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.

Importance of Islam in Middle East

Islam, monotheistic like Judaism and Christianity, has many features similar with both. Friday their Sabbath; they prayed in early days facing Jerusalem.

Accept Abraham, Moses and Jesus as other prophets; Mohammed as the last prophet.

Jesus and Mohammed both stressed love of God. Jesus stressed love of neighbor; Mohammed the love of family.

Some people liken Islam to colonial New England with the Koran substituted for the strict interpretation of the Bible.

Islam stresses reverence to parents, kindness, gentle care of animals.

Forbids images, gambling, drinking and eating pork. Ban on images intended to curb idolatry of Mohammed's time.

Polygamy (now banned in many Moslem countries) limited to four wives for free Moslems. Originally considered severe limitation.

Deceptively simple in its beliefs:
- One God—Allah. Monotheistic.
- Salat or prayer five times a day.
- Offerings to the poor.
- Pilgrimage to Mecca once in a lifetime, if possible.
- Fasting throughout the day during the month of Ramadan.
- Koran the last of a series of inspired books.

Accepts many prophets:
- Adam—the chosen of Allah.
- Noah—the preacher of Allah.
- Abraham—the friend of Allah.
- Moses—the speaker of Allah.

Jesus—the word of Allah.
Mohammed—the apostle of Allah.

Mohammed: Was born in Mecca in 570 A.D., at that time a center of pagan worship. His father, mother and grandfather died when he was a boy. Little is known of his life between the ages of 12 and 25. Mecca was the greatest trading center in Western Arabia and he worked in the caravan trade in one of the commercial establishments belonging to a wealthy woman. Later he married her. Frequently retired to the hills for meditation. Around 610 he felt the call of becoming God's special messenger *(rasul)*. His followers were persecuted, some fleeing to Ethiopia. In 622 Mohammed fled to Medina—the *Hejira*—Year One in the Islamic calendar. Became not only a spiritual leader, but a military leader and legislator as well. His death occurred most probably on June 8, 632 A.D. Practically all of Arabia was under his control at the time of his death. Divisions within Islam, as in other religious groups, as follows:

Sunnis. The largest group. Observe the Sacred Writ, plus the organized tradition of Orthodox Islam, plus the teachings of acknowledged successors of Mohammed.

Shi'ites. Originally split because they insisted that the succession (the Caliphate) should remain in the House of Mohammed. Developed their own set of traditions. Mostly centered in Iran. Various subgroups, one of which is the followers of Agha Khan.

Wahhabis. Puritanical, orthodox; the Koran alone is recognized. Center in Saudi Arabia. Almost the same are the *Senussis* in Libya.

Most creative period of Islam, 622-1222 A.D. Produced much in science, art and architecture, poetry and literature, mathematics and astronomy, irrigation. Developed universities.

Great appeal of Islam in Africa and the Middle East today: simplicity of the faith; idea of brotherhood and fraternity; feeling that it is adapted to the rugged life of the area—not "soft"; stressing submission to God and love of God; absence of racial intolerance.

Educational Systems

In earlier times, the Koranic school in the mosque was the chief center of education for the young, limited to boys.

Many missions and foreign schools were established in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Many still exist and are famous over the whole area, such as Robert College in Istanbul, the American University of Beirut and the American University in Cairo. Female education was introduced by the missions.

Illiteracy is still high in several countries, although strenuous efforts are being made to improve conditions.

Public education is a relatively recent innovation. Curricula are following largely European patterns; the French system in Syria, Lebanon and North Africa; the English system in Jordan, Egypt, the Sudan, Iraq, Pakistan and in Iran (partly).

The Middle East had outstanding universities in the past; government universities have begun to be established in recent years in the various countries.

The study of the Koran and the beliefs of Islam are still central. In Israel the study of the Torah is essential.

English and French are the dominant foreign languages studied.

Considerable foreign aid is being given to the Middle East by various governments and by UNESCO, including the training center in fundamental education for the Arab World at Sirs el Layyan in Egypt.

Health Conditions

Chief problems in the rural areas where a large percentage of the people are ill housed, ill fed and subject to preventable diseases, accentuated by poverty, illiteracy, unstable political conditions and lack of proper medical personnel.

Tuberculosis extending now from cities to rural areas; trachoma (a disease of the eyes) very frequent in Egypt; water-borne infections common almost everywhere.

Considerable progress in recent years through national governments, aid of other governments (including the U.S.) and help from the World Health Organization and UNICEF. Training of nurses and doctors, establishment of clinics and hospitals and public health educational campaigns in all countries.

Establishment of Israel as a Nation

Israel became a nation on May 14, 1948.

Carved out of former British Mandate of Palestine.

Bitter resentment in the Arab World caused by the creation of Israel. Open warfare broke out in 1948, 1956 and 1967. Until now merely an uneasy truce with intermittent clashes, no peace. Israel is not recognized by the Arab states.

Immigrants from 75 nations of the world; many well-educated; some illiterate.

Large amounts of foreign aid from individuals, organizations and governments have been a great boon to Israel's development, as have the skills of her citizens.

Population 70 per cent in cities; steady growth of small industries many of them specialized.

Arab opposition to Israel remains a major problem in the region.

Political Conflicts in Middle East

Pan-Arabism or Arab nationalism versus local nationalism.

Conflict between the Arabs and Israel.

Struggles within several countries between conservative and radical forces, those favoring and those opposing changes; Arab socialism.

Struggle in the Middle East between pro-Russian and pro-Western forces. Central Treaty Organization composed of Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and England, with strong U.S. support. Was the Baghdad Pact until Iraq withdrew.

The Arab League, founded in 1945, composed of all sovereign Arab countries. Supposed to be a unifying political element but, like the United Nations, finds a greater success in the fields of education, health and commerce.

Chief nations outside the area interested in the Middle East—England, France, the United States and the USSR.

Some of the Significant Changes Occurring in the Middle East

Far-reaching, accelerating changes occurring today in many aspects of life in the Middle East. Among them are the following:

Land reform. Firm grip of absentee landlords broken in many places. Land reform laws passed and some action taken to implement these laws in places like Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Pakistan and Iran.

A struggle for leadership internally in most nations. Declining power of the old ruling classes. Rising power of the military in many places. Revolutions in Libya, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria as examples. Patterns of the future not clear.

Urbanization. Rapid growth of such cities as Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Istanbul, Karachi, Tehran and Tel Aviv.

Increased economic planning. Almost every nation has a five-, seven-, or ten-year plan, often developed with outside aid. Usually includes industrialization, irrigation, improved agriculture, better transportation and communication, health and education.

Industrialization. Israel the most industrialized. Egypt, Turkey and Iran have developed considerable industry. Trend toward light rather than heavy industries.

Building of dams. For irrigation and electricity. Most significant dams—Aswan Dam in Egypt and the Wadi Tharthar in Iraq.

Lessened control by foreign oil companies. In most countries at least 50 per cent of the profits now go to the national government—much more than formerly.

Some of the Obstacles to Pan-Arabism

As noted by Mendi Makosteen in *Approaches to an Understanding of World Affairs:*

Geographical diversification.
Racial and ethnic heterogeneity.
Nationalism and regionalism.
Regional socioeconomic peculiarities.
Tribal isolationism and individualism.
Lack of well-formulated ideology acceptable to Arab leaders of various countries and regions.
Lack of organization.
Lack of leadership.
Unfavorable reaction to centralized authority.
Tendency of each Arab state to act alone to achieve self-determination.
Prevailing semi-feudal character of Arab states.
Vast economic and value difference between desert and urban Arabs.

Some of the Factors Tending to Unite Peoples of This Region

Common religion of most people—Islam.
Common language of many people—Arabic, although several dialects.
Anti-Israel feeling.
Anti-Western feeling after a long period of foreign trade.
Nationalism.
Revolution of rising expectations.
The Arab League, despite its weakness at the moment.
Role of Nasser, formerly as a leader, now as an image.

Basic Facts on the Middle East and North Africa

Country	Area in sq. mi.	Population	Capital	Per capita GNP	Chief products
Afghanistan	250,000	20,000,000	Kabul	$ 130	Cotton, wheat, livestock, rugs
Algeria	920,000	17,800,000	Algiers	780	Oil, natural gas, zinc, wheat, wine, fruit
Arab Republic of Egypt	386,662	38,900,000	Cairo	310	Cotton, oil, grain, iron/steel, cement, textiles, phosphates
Bahrain	231	300,000	Manama	2,240	Oil production/refining
Iran	636,300	34,800,000	Tehran	1,440	Oil, coal, sugarbeets, fruit, rugs, textiles, grain
Iraq	167,924	11,800,000	Baghdad	1,280	Oil, grain, dates, livestock, textiles
Israel	7,993	3,600,000	Jerusalem (Tel Aviv is diplomatic capital)	3,580	Grain, fruit, textiles, polished diamonds, chemicals/fertilizers, food processing, metals/machinery
Jordan	37,737	2,900,000	Amman	400	Grain, fruit, cement, livestock, phosphates
Kuwait	7,780	1,100,000	Kuwait	11,510	Oil, natural gas, fertilizers, fish
Lebanon	4,015	2,800,000	Beirut	1,070	Oil products, textiles, tobacco, agricultural products
Libya	679,362	2,700,000	Benghazi, Tripoli	5,080	Oil, grain, fruit, nuts
Morocco	172,834	18,300,000	Rabat	470	Grain, fruit, sugar, livestock, tobacco, food processing, phosphates
Oman	82,000	800,000	Muscat	2,070	Oil, fruit, fish

Qatar	4,000	100,000	Doha	8,320	Oil, fish
Saudi Arabia	830,000	7,600,000	Riyadh, Jedda	3,010	Oil, fertilizer, cement, iron, steel
Sudan	967,500	16,300,000	Khartoum	290	Cotton, livestock, gum arabic, peanuts, grain, sugarcane
Syria	71,498	7,800,000	Damascus	660	Grain, cotton, cement, textiles, tobacco, livestock, oil refining
Tunisia	63,378	6,000,000	Tunis	760	Phosphates, cement, crude oil, zinc, fruit, iron ore
Turkey	301,382	41,900,000	Ankara	860	Sugar beets, cotton, textiles, nuts, fruits, cereals, metals, coal, sugar refining, lignite, cement
United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman, Sharjah, Fujairah, Ras al Khaimah, Umm al Qauwain)	32,000	200,000	Capital of each has same name as state	10,480	Oil (Abu Dhabi, Dubai only), fish, dates
Yemen Arab Republic	75,290	5,600,000	Sana'a	210	Coffee, fruit, grain, textiles, food processing
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	111,074	1,800,000	Madinat ash-Shaa'h	240	Cotton, grain, fish, oil products, hides

Sources: Population and Per Capita GNP: 1977 World Population Data Sheet (Population Reference Bureau, Inc., Washington, D.C. 1977). All other data: *The Middle East and North Africa, 1976-1977* (Europa Publications Ltd., London, 1976). This chart was edited and updated by Erich W. Bethmann, March 1972, with permission of the author.

Appendix 3:

Cultural and Information Offices

Embassy of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria
(202/234-3770)
Cultural Office
2118 Kalorama Road, N.W.
Washington, DC 20008

Arab Information Center
1875 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006

Embassy of the State of Bahrain
(202/965-4930)
Cultural Office
2600 Virginia Avenue, N.W., Suite 715
Washington, DC 20037

Embassy of Iran
(202/333-8588)
Cultural Office
2135 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20007

Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt
(202/265-6400)
2200 Kalorama Rd., N.W.
Washington, DC 20008

Iraqi Interests Section
(202/483-7504)
1801 P Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Embassy of Israel
(202/483-4100)
Cultural Information Office
1621 22nd Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20008

Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan
(202/265-1606)
Cultural Office
2319 Wyoming Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20008

Jordan Information Bureau
1701 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Embassy of the State of Kuwait
(202/244-4709)
Cultural Office
4340 Connecticut Avenue
Washington, DC 20008

Embassy of Lebanon
(202/332-0300)
Cultural Division
1560 28th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20008

Embassy of the Libyan Arab Republic
(202/452-0840)
ATTN: Press Department
1118 22nd Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Embassy of Morocco
(202/462-7979)
1601 21st Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20009

Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman
(202/387-1980)
Cultural Section
2637 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20008

Embassy of the State of Qatar
(202/333-8330)
Cultural Section
600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20037

Embassy of Saudi Arabia
(713/629-5170)
Cultural Attache
2223 W. Loop South, Suite 400
Houston, TX 77027

Embassy of the Sudan
(202/387-8205)
Cultural Counselor's Office
2612 Woodley Place, N.W.
Washington, DC 20008

Embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic
(202/232-6313)
2215 Wyoming Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20008

Embassy of Tunisia
(202/234-6644)
Cultural Office
2408 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20008

Turkish Press and Information Counselor
(202/462-3134)
2523 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20008

Embassy of the United Arab Emirates
(202/338-9180)
Cultural Division, Suite 750
600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20037

Yemen Mission to the United Nations
(202/965-4760)
Suite 2402
211 E. 43rd Street
New York, NY 10017

Appendix 4:

Workshop Participants

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University of Nebraska

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Director, International Student Services
University of Houston

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Lucy Hale
International Student Adviser
University of Virginia

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University of Michigan

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University of Pittsburgh

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University of the District of Columbia

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Appendix 5:
Map of Middle East


40°
30°
20°
10°
0°
15°
30°
45°
60°
TURKEY
TUNISIA
CYPRUS
LEBANON
SYRIA
IRAQ
IRAN
ISRAEL
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
LIBYA
JORDAN
KUWAIT
EGYPT
BAHREIN IS.
QATAR
EMIRATES
SAUDI ARABIA
OMAN
SUDAN
N. YEMEN
S. YEMEN
ETHIOPIA